

HISTORY MATTERS



An Undergraduate Journal of
Historical Research

Appalachian State University
Volume 13
May 2016

For the History Matters family

The History of History Matters
Appalachian State University
Department of History

Have you ever spent so much time and effort on something that you wanted to share it with other people? Have you ever felt unfulfilled receiving only a grade and your own satisfaction as a reward for your hard work? Have you ever wanted to get your work published?

For these reasons History Matters was founded. In the spring of 2003, Eric Burnette, a freshman, was looking for an outlet—a venue for his research paper. He figured that other students probably felt the same way. Dr. Michael Moore, who had edited *Albion*, a professional journal of British history, for over 25 years, began advising Eric on how best to go about starting an academic journal for students. Another student, Matthew Manes, was asked to join the interesting experiment, and together they laid the groundwork for History Matters.

Our first deadline was in late January 2004. For the editorial staff, it was an extensive and time consuming process of reading, revising, and communicating with both the authors and the Faculty Editorial Board. In the end, the collaboration published one research paper, one research essay, and three editorial book reviews. The first issue of History Matters: An Undergraduate Journal of Historical Research was published online on April 28, 2004.

From the beginning, Eric and Matt wanted to expand the journal. The more students involved meant that more students had the opportunity to be published, and the better those papers would be. The 2004-2005 school year saw the participation of the University of North Carolina—Asheville and Western Carolina University, as well as submissions from half a dozen schools nationwide. The 2005 issue was published with two research papers, one from Appalachian State University and one from a student at Villanova University, and five editorial book reviews from all three participating departments.

Since 2004, History Matters has grown drastically. Over the years our submission base has increased from 11 papers in 2004-05 to 185 submissions in 2014-15. We now receive submissions from all over the United States from distinguished universities including Yale, Harvard, and Stanford. History Matters has also expanded internationally. We receive submissions from Canada, South America, Great Britain, and Australia while also employing international staff members as contributing editors.

History Matters continues to grow and prosper thanks to a supportive faculty, department, university, and most importantly, the students who have worked hard on their papers and work with us to get them published.

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The *History Matters* staff would like to dedicate this issue to Dr. W. Scott Jessee. We wish him the best in his retirement and thank him for his dedication as our faculty advisor.

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Volume 13

A Threat to National Security:
The Cold War on Drugs

Brionna Mendoza
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Introduction

During the Cold War era, U.S. officials perceived both an external and internal threat to their country's national security, each involving Latin America. The era of being the "good neighbor" ended as the Colossus of the North focused on strengthening its national security. In order to achieve this goal, U.S. domestic policy provided for the creation of a national security apparatus to monitor communist activity. Globally, the United States employed the policy of containment to prevent the spread of communism to third-world regions deemed vulnerable to takeover. Within the Western Hemisphere, the United States protected and pursued the rule of conservative, authoritarian regimes in Latin American nations, so long as they continued to denounce communism and put down leftist uprisings seeking revolution within the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

Domestically, American society experienced an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty amid the chaos of multiple cultural upheavals, including the Red Scare, the social equality movement, and anti-war demonstrations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Richard Nixon confirmed and comforted these fears when he won the presidency in 1968, while running on a "law and order" platform that prioritized the return of peace and discipline to the country. The Nixon administration identified the increased use of illicit narcotics by a wider spectrum of society outside of the stereotypical criminal addict as one of the threats to the American way of life. As the architect of the modern War on Drugs, Nixon addressed the issue through foreign source-control measures and domestic rehabilitation programs.

The War on Drugs was further escalated by the Reagan administration, which conflated the narcotics conflict with the anxieties surrounding the Cold War. When evidence surfaced that leftist guerrilla groups were involved with narcotics trafficking in Latin America, Reagan

declared war on drugs. He feared that the trafficking of cocaine to the United States indicated a concerted effort by leftist rebels to undermine American society and make it more susceptible to Communist infiltration. Acting on what it believed to be a direct collaboration between narcotics manufacturers and leftist guerrilla groups that threatened the security of the country, the Reagan Administration implemented a militarized strategy that aimed to eliminate the very sources of the supply of narcotics. However, because the policies largely ignored both internal American demand for drugs and the long-established cultural traditions within the Andean region of Latin America surrounding the cultivation of *coca*, the War on Drugs did not achieve any lasting victories in reducing drug trafficking.

Outset of the Cold War

With the Allied victory ending World War II, a global shift in power occurred that placed the United States and USSR at the top of the metaphorical global food chain. The two nations' competing ideologies concerning which direction postwar Europe, and the world in general, should advance created an irreconcilable tension that escalated into the Cold War. Stalin's apparent expansionist agenda unnerved America under the Truman administration, and the threat presented by the Soviet Union created an atmosphere of insecurity which would influence American foreign policy for the next 50 years.¹ The Clifford-Elsey Report, presented to the White House in September of 1946, evaluated the Soviet Union's actions in preparation of the "ultimate conflict," or nuclear showdown, between the two nations. The report concluded that the United States must continue to try to demonstrate to Stalin that coexistence was possible, but simultaneously maintain adequate military strength in case the Communists should strike.²

¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* [New York: Oxford

² Clark Clifford, "American Relations With the Soviet Union, 1946", online at the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf 3, 71.

Subsequently, the United States under Truman's leadership implemented a domestic system dedicated to national security and a foreign policy focus on inhibiting Soviet expansion.

To prepare against the communist threat, the Truman administration created an internal bureaucracy emphasizing national security to ensure readiness in case of foreign intervention. The National Security Act, implemented in July, 1947, permanently installed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created a National Security Council (NSC) within the executive branch, and provided for an independent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Essentially, this legislation "institutionalized the enhanced role assumed by the military during WWII," which demonstrated the high alertness that the country's leadership felt was necessary to maintain in face of Soviet aggression.³ In addition, Truman, in a speech given before a joint session of Congress, declared, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," and called for economic aid to be provided to countries that were at risk of succumbing to leftist rebel groups, which might then invite intervention by the Soviet Union.⁴ Truman's words provided the foundation for the Truman Doctrine, a policy of containment through which the United States justified intervening in multiple at-risk foreign nations throughout the Cold War.

As an outgrowth of the paranoia of the period, another source of communist subversion was identified by Harry J. Anslinger: drugs. Anslinger served as the commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from 1930 to 1962, and maintains a legacy as the "first drug czar" of U.S. federal narcotics policy. From his position, Anslinger launched a demonizing campaign against marijuana, which he linked to "crime, insanity, promiscuity, and general immorality." With the

³ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 614.

⁴ Harry S. Truman, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947," online by The Avalon Project from Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. This speech specifically calls for aid to be provided to Greece and Turkey, but is significant because it served as a precedent for future intervention in foreign countries in the name of containing Communism.

outset of the Cold War, he further demonized drugs by conflating them with Communism and organized crime, convincing many politicians to back legislation that severely punished all drug law violators without exception in order to maintain security of country and family. In this context, according to Daniel Weimer, “drugs were linked to the peril of internal subversion from Communists inside and outside the country, as well as to an elusive organized crime network, the Mafia, itself an organization of foreigners.” As scientific studies conducted on drug abuse shed more light on the nature of addiction, Anslinger was largely silenced by critics, especially as President Kennedy was more receptive to approaching the issue of drug addiction from a medical standpoint rather than a criminal one.⁵ However, suspicions of a connection between Communist subversion and the drug trade, reminiscent of Anslinger’s paranoia, would resurface only a few decades later.

Within its own hemisphere, the U.S. government sought regional solidarity in the face of the Cold War because policymakers identified Latin America as a key battleground region where the fight against the spread of communism would continue. Washington’s diplomatic efforts included establishing the Organization of American States at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota in 1948. The Charter of the Organization of American States adopted at the conference served to reaffirm regional solidarity and commitment to the ideals of liberty, national sovereignty, and promoted further collaboration, especially against the communist threat posed by the USSR.⁶ At the same conference, delegates approved the U.S.-drafted "Resolution 32: The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America," which

⁵ Daniel Weimer, *Seeing Drugs: Modernization, Counterinsurgency, and U.S. Narcotics Control in the Third World* [Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2011], 37-41.

⁶ Delegates to the Ninth International Conference of American States, “The Charter of the Organization of American States,” [May, 1948], in Robert Holden and Eric Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011], 181-184.

explicitly expressed regional opposition to Communism, reiterating that the ideology was “incompatible with the concept of American freedom.”⁷

The United States also sought to ensure that Latin American leaders were aligned with the U.S.’s anti-communist stance. During the Good Neighbor era, the United States actively encouraged democratic elections throughout the Latin American nations. However, some of these elections brought leftist and reformist groups to power and, in light of the Cold War, these governments seemed to be threatening, rather than promoting, the development of democracy. For example, Guatemala’s popularly-elected Jacobo Arbenz aroused Washington’s suspicions when he implemented land reforms that nationalized privately-owned property and redistributed it to peasants. Thus, the U.S. government authorized a CIA-backed operation to overthrow Arbenz and install handpicked leader Castillo Armas, who then implemented a government receptive to the United States and its foreign policy goals.⁸ U.S. intervention in Latin America in the name of containment proved that any inkling of a communist threat to its national security would be counteracted forcefully and without compromise.

However, U.S. unilateral action of this sort did not happen without fallout. Many of the conservative, dictatorial regimes supported by Washington neglected to properly provide for their citizens, which created deep unrest within Latin America. Economic downturn further exacerbated this unrest and widespread suffering manifested itself in the removal of dictators from their power and regional expression of hostile, anti-American sentiment. This hatred overflowed during Nixon’s Good Will Tour of Latin America in 1958, as protestors stoned his

⁷ Delegates to the Ninth International Conference of American States, “Resolution 32. The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America,” [May 2, 1948], in Robert Holden and Eric Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011], 185.

⁸ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 684-685.

motorcade and riots raged in all areas he visited.⁹ Instead of quelling rebellion, as its policy had intended to do, Washington realized that they had actually contributed to the creation of an environment ripe for revolution. Not long after, the U.S. government's worst fears were realized with a successful Communist revolution in its backyard.

When Fidel Castro proved victorious in his long rebellion against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, it was not immediately clear that he intended to establish a Marxist regime.¹⁰ While Washington initially remained wary of the rebel's plans, the media publically praised Castro for the fortitude he displayed in his leadership of the revolution. Castro himself declared his revolution to be a "humanistic one," which sought to improve the economic situation of his country.¹¹ Nonetheless, Cuba had a strong anti-American attitude, the result of years of festering resentment against U.S. interference in the island nation's affairs. Castro ultimately wished to free Cuba of U.S. control and saw alignment with the Soviet Union as the solution.¹² By December, 1961, Castro proclaimed his belief in Marxist-Leninist tradition and encouraged similar uprisings throughout Latin America.¹³

The Cold War had squarely positioned itself in the United States' backyard and threatened to spread Communist ideology throughout the region, posing a dire threat to its national security. President Kennedy responded by forming the Alliance for Progress, through which he pledged \$20 billion in public and private funding to assist Latin America in implementing social reforms throughout the region. Kennedy described the program as "an alliance of free governments" which "must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in

⁹ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 685-686.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 687.

¹¹ "A Cuban Dictator Falls," *New York Times*, January 2, 1959; "Castro Declares Regime is Free of Red Influence," *New York Times*, April 18, 1959.

¹² Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 688.

¹³ "Castro Proclaims Belief in Marxism", *New York Times*, December 2, 1961.; Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 688.

which it has no place.”¹⁴ Castro's success in the Cuban Revolution demonstrated to U.S. leadership that allowing conservative dictators to maintain power while neglecting the vast poverty affecting their countries encouraged insurrectionary activity rather than deterring it. The U.S. government, however, did not learn from this lesson, and instead continued to turn to military action to secure the region, which ultimately added to anti-American resentment among Latin American nations.

Nixon Responds to the Rise of Drug Culture in America

An exploration of the way Nixon laid the foundation for the modern War on Drugs and the context within which he acted is necessary to understand the militarized escalation of the conflict under Reagan. During the mid-1960s, a shift occurred in the demographics of those who engaged in drug use in the United States. Before, the typical drug user or addict was lower-class, often a foreigner in origin, and approached by the government as a criminal whose abuse could only be remedied through strict law enforcement. Through the 1960s and 1970s, drug use became popular among college students and accompanied the tide of anti-establishment sentiment among the younger sector of society.¹⁵ Some, like Kenneth Keniston, suggested that this growing trend reflected youths' perceptions of their society, stressing that their affluence, the numbing effect of the deluge of information encountered daily and their “social and political disenchantment” prompted them to pursue the bigger questions of life by turning inward.¹⁶ Drugs aided this mission by expanding the senses. In contrast, the more conservative sectors of society

¹⁴ John F. Kennedy, “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* [1962]: 170-175, in Robert Holden and Eric Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011], 221-223.

¹⁵ Daniel Weimer, *Seeing Drugs*, 42.

¹⁶ Kenneth Keniston, “Heads and Seekers: Drugs on Campus, Counter-Cultures, and American Society,” *The American Scholar* 38, No. 1 [Winter, 1968-1969], 108.

consisting of parents and politicians viewed expanding drug culture as a breakdown in traditional American values, which would in time erode the foundation of the country.

Although Americans remained committed to their anti-drug attitude, the increased use of recreational drugs by a larger sector of society affected the way that politicians approached drug policy. Because people outside of the stereotypical criminal addict began to experiment with drug use, it could not be contained solely through law enforcement methods. As clean-cut college kids, suburban mothers, and white-collar professionals engaged in drugs recreationally, law enforcement entities had trouble justifying the arrest and prosecution of these individuals because very little, if any, other criminal activity accompanied their drug use. Additionally, the medical and legal fields recommended that policymakers decriminalize drug addiction and instead treat it as a medical condition. This atmosphere of “drug toleration” encouraged action to address domestic addiction and demand alongside traditional source-control measures. These two policy approaches acted as the foundation of the drug war.¹⁷

Amidst panic over the unhinging of American society, voters found solace in the election of Richard Nixon to the White House in 1968. According to Weimer, as part of his “law and order” campaign theme, which resonated throughout his tenure of office, Nixon conflated the drug problem with overall societal instability and “defined illegal drugs as an un-American symbol whose containment would help restore the United States’ domestic and global greatness.”¹⁸ Nixon galvanized support for his program by suggesting that the elimination of drugs from society would replace the chaos caused by race riots, antiwar demonstrations, crime, and Cold War paranoia with the peace and prosperity of the postwar era. He especially emphasized the connection between crime and drugs, assuming that addicts would turn to

¹⁷ Weimer, *Seeing Drugs*, 50.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 55.

robbery and extortion in order to acquire the substances they so desperately needed. At an appearance in Anaheim, California on September 16, 1968, the then-Republican nominee explained his plan to combat drugs if he won office. The tentative plan emphasized stopping “the flow of drugs at its source,” increasing the number of customs agents to intercept illicit shipments before they entered the country, strengthening domestic antidrug laws, and providing rehabilitation for addicts, especially among youth.¹⁹ President Nixon delivered on his campaign promise on June 17, 1971, when he assured Congress that “America’s public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse.” He asked for increased funding for antidrug action and announced a new office within the executive branch which would coordinate action between various pre-existing offices. Furthermore, Nixon insisted that enforcement must be coupled with domestic rehabilitation in order to reduce overall demand, crime, and the spread of addiction to others.²⁰

At the center of Nixon’s drug control campaign was source control in foreign countries, or the elimination of the supply of narcotics before they could enter into the United States. This policy stemmed from the American attitude that drugs were largely a foreign problem imported into the country, spreading addiction among its society, much like a disease. Therefore, U.S. policymakers focused on breaking up the foreign trafficking networks, like the French Connection, the Golden Triangle, and routes from Mexico. Given its proximity, the Nixon administration first set its sights on eliminating trafficking from its southern neighbor. However, since the Mexican government did not place the same priority on drug control as the U.S.

¹⁹ “Nixon Vows a War to End Use of Drugs”, *Chicago Tribune*, September 17, 1968.

²⁰ Richard Nixon, “Remarks About An Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047>; Richard Nixon, “203-Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971, online by Gerhard Peter and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3048>.

government, White House senior advisor John Ehrlichman recommended that “the Mexican government be forced into a program of defoliation...by commencing a campaign of strict enforcement and customs inspection at the border.”²¹ Operation Intercept, commenced on September 21, 1969, was designed to interdict illicit drug shipments at the U.S.-Mexican border by stopping all traffic to search vehicles, which simultaneously placed economic pressure on the Mexican government. The underlying goal aimed to make the Mexican government more receptive to U.S. recommendations concerning drug control within their own borders, a goal that the operation ultimately achieved. Intercept was replaced by Operation Cooperation, a bi-lateral drug control arrangement between the two countries that made the Mexican government an active player in combatting the production and trafficking of narcotics.²² Through bilateral discussion, the U.S. government recommended that the Mexican government expand previous efforts to eradicate marijuana and poppy plants using herbicides, a plan to which the Mexican government acquiesced in 1975. Eradication through herbicides was successful in the short-term; between September, 1975 and August, 1976, the Mexican government reported the destruction of 21,000 plots of opium, whereas previous eradication campaigns had eradicated only 13,580 plots.²³ Operation Cooperation did not, however, produce a long-term reduction in the production of drug crops due to the lack of success in crop substitution, or convincing *campesinos* (indigenous peasant farmers) to cultivate legitimate cash crops. The inability to secure cooperation from the *campesinos* was a common theme that continued to plague U.S. drug control efforts in Latin America and will be discussed more in-depth later on.

²¹ John Ehrlichman, “White House, memorandum,” from *Task Force Report: Narcotics, Marijuana & Dangerous Drugs*, online by Kate Doyle, “Operation Intercept: The perils of unilateralism,” *The National Security Archive*, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/#usdocs>.

²² Weimer, *Seeing Drugs*, 59; United States and Mexico, “Joint Declaration of the United States and Mexican Delegations,” online by Kate Doyle, “Operation Intercept: The perils of unilateralism,” *The National Security Archive*, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/#usdocs>.

²³ Weimer, *Seeing Drugs*, 193.

In addition to foreign source control, Nixon needed to address domestic drug addiction. On May 16, 1971, a front-page New York Times article declared that, “the use of heroin by American troops in Vietnam has reached epidemic proportions.”²⁴ This revelation, though exaggerated, greatly exacerbated fear among the U.S. public and policymakers alike about what would happen when heroin-hooked Vietnam veterans returned to the country. Two Gallup polls conducted in 1972 showed that drugs were viewed as one of the most pressing problems facing the country, third only to the war in Vietnam and the high cost of living.²⁵ In June 17, 1971 address to Congress, Nixon outlined his plan to provide support for the urinalysis of returning soldiers before they left Vietnam, a federal network of methadone maintenance clinics, and a drug education program for the wider public.²⁶ Nixon’s war on drugs devoted much more attention to the rehabilitation of drug addicts than his successors in their own drug control campaigns. This could be attributed to the aforementioned “drug toleration” atmosphere which viewed drug addiction as a medical issue rather than a solely criminal bad habit. Ultimately, this attitude was temporary and was abandoned in favor of escalating an increasingly aggressive source-control campaign that Ronald Reagan pursued in the 1980s.

Reagan’s War on Drugs

Following the presidency of James Carter, who favored the decriminalization of marijuana and reduced sentences for those in possession of drugs, Ronald Reagan’s entrance into the White House brought the continuation of the drug war as initiated by Nixon, though it escalated into aggressive proportions throughout his tenure of office. Reagan’s presidency

²⁴ “G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam,” *New York Times*, May 16, 1971.

²⁵ Dr. George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977*, vol. 1, [Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1978], 48, 64.

²⁶ Nixon, “Special Message to Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control”; Weimer, *Seeing Drugs*, 57. Methadone maintenance involved the administration of methadone, a synthetic narcotic that blocked withdrawal symptoms without producing the euphoria associated with heroin, in order to help addicts reintegrate into society. The experimental program was expanded by the federal government after success in Chicago and D.C. clinics was reported.

coincided with several key developments in the illicit drug industry that prompted this escalation of the War on Drugs. First, the Colombian drug cartel Medellín, an alliance between notable traffickers including the Ochoa family, Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, and Jose Gonnzalo Rodriguez Gacha, rose to power. Their power and rival competition introduced an extreme level of violence both in their home country and in South Florida, a key entrance point for drug shipments. This escalation necessitated increased law enforcement efforts both domestically and abroad to keep it under control. Second, crack cocaine emerged in the United States in the mid-1980s, offering its users a cheap, highly-addictive trip. As emergency room admissions for cocaine overdoses soared and complications such as “crack babies” entered into the American consciousness, the U.S. public panicked over this new threat to the nation’s children and future.²⁷

Amidst mounting public concern and pressure, 1986 marked an eventful year for the Reagan administration’s action to combat the scourge of drugs. First, Reagan signed off on National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD 221), which continued the tradition of treating drugs as an issue of supply rather than demand, asserting that “the expansion of narcotics activity creates a regional, as well as a country-specific, problem.” According to NSDD 221, drug trafficking in foreign countries, especially those of Latin America, compromised U.S. national security because violence, political corruption, and rural insurgency accompanied drug operations, which undermined the stability, authority, and reliability of the source countries’ governments to maintain a democratic state and cooperate with U.S. counter-narcotics operations. The policy recommendations included expanding the role of the military in supporting counter-narcotics efforts, emphasizing the national security ramifications of drug

²⁷ “A New, Purified Form of Cocaine Causes Alarm as Abuse Increases,” *New York Times*, November 29, 1985; Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine*, 84-86.

trafficking henceforth, and considering foreign cooperation in U.S. counter-narcotics operations as a criterion for the continuation of economic aid to countries.²⁸

An important idea underlined the implementation of NSDD 221. The Reagan administration believed whole-heartedly that "a nexus existed between Cuba, Nicaragua, and the guerrillas in the northern Andes to facilitate drug traffic in order to finance Marxist revolutions throughout the hemisphere."²⁹ Supposedly, leftist rebels believed that supplying narcotics to American youth would erode their societal foundations, ultimately making them more susceptible to instigate revolution as they matured and moved into positions of power. This distrust of the Castro and Sandinista regimes further intensified as evidence surfaced throughout the 1980s indicating that certain figures in each government had actively participated in drug trafficking operations. For example, a testimony given during a Congressional committee hearing by Jose Blandon, former intelligence aide to Manuel Noriega of Panama, discussed Fidel Castro's involvement with drug and arms traffic.³⁰ Later, a CIA-undercover operation produced a photograph showing Federico Vaughan, aide to Interior Minister Tomas Borge of Nicaragua, working with the Medellín cartel to smuggle cocaine out of the country.³¹ Much of the evidence used to accuse Cuba and Nicaragua was circumstantial and based on eye-witnesses, so it could not be said whether or not key figures in each government were actively promoting drug trafficking operations. However, what is important is that the Reagan administration believed the evidence was enough to confirm their suspicions of a narco-communist nexus and based their

²⁸ The White House, "National Security Decision Directive Number 221: Narcotics and National Security," April 8, 1986, online by John Pike and Steven Aftergood, "NSDD-National Security Decision Directives Reagan Administration," *Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Resource Program*, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm>.

²⁹ Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine*, 91.

³⁰ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications, *Drugs, Laws Enforcement and Foreign Policy: The Cartel, Haiti and Central America*, Hearings, April 4-7, 1989 (S. Hrs. 100-777, Pt. 3), [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983], 31-34.

³¹ Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine*, 102-103.

counter-narcotics policies around this “fact,” motivating them to address drug trafficking as an act of terrorism and war instead of just a black-market economy threatening American health.

Second, Reagan initiated a piece of legislation that became the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which adopted a zero-tolerance policy towards drug use by those employed by the federal government and in school environments; allocated resources for those seeking to recover from drug abuse and to create drug education programs; and, mainly, strengthened laws that punished traffickers and provided financially for the expanded role that the military was to play in the war on drugs.³² The entire budget for this act neared \$1.7 billion. Yet the way it allocated the funds, argued Joel Brinkley of the *New York Times*, reflected a disconnect between Reagan’s voiced support for education as the answer to the drug problem in America and the policies his administration pursued in actuality. Brinkley’s article pointed out that only 12% of the budget was intended for establishing educational programs, in addition to another \$375 million for drug rehabilitation programs. The only sustained attention devoted to domestic drug abuse came from Nancy Reagan and her “Just Say No” Campaign, launched in 1984.³³ The remaining \$1.1 billion was intended for law enforcement measures. Considering the urgency lent to the War on Drugs by the public, the media, and especially NSDD 221, expanding interdiction and enforcement measures was the only plausible way to achieve rapid, though not necessarily lasting results, as time would soon demonstrate.³⁴

With the new definition of the issue of drugs as one of national security and with the money and approval of Congress in place, the Reagan administration could proceed with its

³² Ronald Reagan, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat Drug Abuse and Trafficking,” September 15, 1986, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36417>.

³³ “Mrs. Reagan to Parents: ‘Be Tough’ on Drugs.” *New York Times*, November 9, 1981.

³⁴ Joel Brinkley, “Anti-Drug Law: Words, Deeds, Political Expediency,” special to the *New York Times*, October 27, 1986.

“enhanced military and law enforcement activities to shut off the narcotics supply...[from] Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.”³⁵ One of the primary features of the counter-narcotics strategy in these countries was eradication of drug crops through the use of herbicides, fire, or manual uprooting. This strategy was not a new one; as discussed earlier, the Nixon administration employed the same techniques in Mexico. However, Reagan’s use of U.S. military troops to provide ground support for eradication efforts in foreign source countries distinguishes his drug war from Nixon’s. This is best demonstrated through Operation Blast Furnace, a bilateral operation executed in Bolivia in July, 1986. Blast Furnace aimed to destroy cocaine production labs in the Chapare and Beni regions of Bolivia, areas that were historic strongholds of coca cultivation and trafficker operations due to lack of development and lack of Bolivian governmental authority. If they could destroy the production labs, the idea went, then the subsequent reduction in demand would slash the price of coca and make *campesinos* more willing to abandon their crop in favor of a legitimate one. U.S. military personnel was sent in to support the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Leopards (the Bolivian drug enforcement task force) in their operation due to past violent *campesino* reaction against the agents that often succeeded in halting eradication efforts and pushing them out of the region. Bolivian public backlash against the presence of U.S. military on their country’s soil was huge; many viewed it as an invasion and as a violation of their sovereignty. Overall, the joint U.S.-Bolivian effort made temporary gains. They pushed traffickers out of the region and dropped the price of the coca leaf, but the industry quickly recovered when the U.S. forces withdrew at the end of the operation. A more lasting consequence of Blast Furnace was the strengthening of *campesino* opposition to coca control and eradication efforts.³⁶

³⁵ Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine*, 51.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 77-79.

Ultimately, Reagan's approach to the war on drugs did not produce any positive, long-term victories. His administration's attitude that drugs were an issue of supply caused them to focus too narrowly on eradicating the crops of foreign source countries, which only served to strengthen opposition to drug control operations. This failure owed much to the fact that the Reagan administration did not consider the cultural connotations surrounding *coca* cultivation in the Andean region in South America.

As mentioned earlier, convincing Latin American peasant farmers to willingly accept and participate in drug control activities presented a major roadblock to achieving long-term gains in the War on Drugs. As the use of cocaine steadily increased in American society during the mid-1980s, the United States set its sights on eradicating coca, the plant that is the foundational ingredient for the production of the drug. Coca is native to the Andean mountain region of South America, where indigenous peoples in Peru and Bolivia have cultivated it for thousands of years. In contrast to the demonized image held by the U.S. public and politicians, coca is a centerpiece of life and culture in the region. It has practical uses, such as for nutrition or combatting altitude sickness, as well as religious significance. Nancy Obregon, member of Peruvian Parliament elected on a platform defending *campesinos'* right to cultivate the crop, described partaking in coca as "a spiritual gathering...with our ancestors."³⁷ The cultivation of coca is not just an opportunistic action taken by the Andean people for economic benefit; rather, it is a cornerstone of their cultural lives.

Economically, coca is the only viable crop for the *campesinos* to grow, since only it can thrive in the soil of the region, unlike traditional cash crops like corn or coffee. Furthermore, given spike in demand for coca due to its role in producing cocaine, the farmers could earn up to

³⁷ *Coca: A New Leaf of Life*, Films on Demand, 2007, <http://digital.films.com/PortalViewVideo.aspx?xtid=39111>.

\$4,500 per hectare of land, while other crops averaged only about a \$600 return per hectare. For rural areas that have been traditionally neglected by their governments regarding development, selling coca to drug traffickers provided the only option they had to earn the money needed to keep their families alive, especially in times of economic crisis.³⁸ Given the cultural and economic context surrounding the cultivation of coca, it is obvious why U.S. eradication programs evoked widespread backlash from the *campesinos*. One cultivator of the crop, operating illegally, summed up the *campesino* opinion succinctly with this comment following the eradication of his crop: “this plant here, this was to maintain my children...the U.S. is the primary consumer of drugs. Why don’t they eliminate their consumers instead of our coca leaf?”³⁹

As a consequence of the aggressive manner in which the United States pursued eradication of coca, *campesinos* welcomed the protection of leftist insurgent groups that based their operations in the rural areas where Latin American governments had hardly any control. For example, in Peru, the rebel group Sendero Luminoso established its network of operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley, a traditional area of coca cultivation that the United States targeted with drug control efforts utilizing eradication and agricultural development in the form of crop substitution. To consolidate support for its movement, the Senderos presented themselves as “advocates for the rights of campesino coca growers,” and provided protection to growers and traffickers alike, in exchange for protection fees.⁴⁰ Similar situations arose in both Colombia and Bolivia. With a reliable base of support from campesinos and drug traffickers, guerrilla groups strengthened their hold over rural areas of the Andean nations, which prompted the United States

³⁸ William L. Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America*, [Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010], 43, 50. These numbers are specific to Peru, but similar economic situations existed in Bolivia and Colombia.

³⁹ *Coca, A New Leaf of Life*.

⁴⁰ Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine*, 66-70.

to pressure the governments to implement aggressive, militarized measures to combat the rebels and traffickers simultaneously. However, doing so fueled the vicious cycle already in motion, since escalated action further isolated campesinos from their governments.

Conclusions

To summarize, foundations for Reagan's War on Drugs were laid down during the outset of the Cold War and in Nixon's initiation of the modern struggle against the scourge of drugs in American society. If the Reagan administration had pursued and expanded the medical approach to drug addiction that Nixon initially explored, more attention would have been paid to the issue of American demand for drugs, alongside supply-side action. However, the increasing visibility of the threat of drugs, from cartel violence to frequent hospitalizations of those who had overdosed on cocaine, presented considerable pressure for the government to act. In a similar manner to Harry J. Anslinger, the Reagan administration operated on the assumption that a narco-communist nexus existed and was continuously trying to subvert American society. Thus, Reagan escalated the War on Drugs by defining it as an issue of national security through NSDD 221 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which enabled the United States to throw its full military force against the drug traffickers. Unfortunately, doing so elicited intense anger and opposition from *campesino* farmers who felt that their governments were acting as puppets of the United States, and so turned to the protection of guerrilla insurgents who would protect their interests.

It is largely agreed today that the War on Drugs was an absolute failure. Until the U.S. government realizes that military might is not the remedy to clandestine drug trafficking networks, little progress can expect to be made. Rather, U.S. policy makers should head the

angry protests of Latin Americans who have been affected by the drug war, and turn their attention to addiction within America's borders.

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Stopping The Infection:
Anarchists and Immigration Restriction in the United States

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“Our Legislature has acted promptly...for the eradication of disease, actual and incipient. A firm, strong, intelligent hand has grappled with the problems of cholera, consumption, yellow fever and smallpox. Shall the Anarchist, who menaces openly and defiantly our Nation’s peace, progress, and happiness, be dealt with less severely than a scourge that brings death?”

- “Traitors and Anarchists,” *New York Times*, September 11, 1901.

Long before Syrian refugees dominated political discourse, American politicians used the threat of foreign terror to legitimize xenophobia and further a nativist agenda. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the aftermath of the assassination of President William McKinley. In McKinley’s time, it was not Muslims but rather Catholic and Jewish immigrants that stimulated the paranoia of millions of Americans. His assassin, Leon Czolgosz, a self-proclaimed anarchist with a foreign sounding surname, brought the worst fears of nativists to life. McKinley’s murder would be used by nativist politicians to justify their policy positions, providing momentum for what evolved into a twenty-year journey towards the highly restrictive immigration policies they desired. Yet Czolgosz’s early life was hardly abnormal for his day. His parents, Polish immigrants, struggled financially. His father’s income, just over \$500 per year, had to support a wife and ten children.⁴¹ But despite the tough financial situation of the family, Leon, who was described as the best scholar in his class, stayed in school until he was 16.⁴² His family made sacrifices because they believed he had the potential to rise above these humble origins. So how did a classic case of the American Dream produce a man who assassinated a sitting President? To his contemporaries, the answer was clear. Czolgosz’s mind had been corrupted by a foreign disease called anarchism. Since Americans considered anarchism an intrinsically foreign threat, Czolgosz’ actions legitimized the fear of new immigrant groups. Anarchist terror had plagued

In an effort to give the reader a better sense of the identity of the politicians mentioned in this paper, the first mention of Congressmen and Senators will be followed by their political party and state in parentheses. For example, William Jennings Bryan (D-NE), would mean that Mr. Bryan was a Democrat from the state of Nebraska.

¹ Eric Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt’s America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 124-125.

² *Ibid.*

Europe in the 1890s, but the United States had mostly managed to avoid the turbulence. Until the McKinley assassination, Americans believed that the United States was immune to ideological violence. Czolgosz's actions ended that fantasy. With his Polish surname and perceived European ideology, politicians and the media were able to turn the American public against the foreign anarchist threat.⁴³

The vast majority of turn-of-the-century immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were not anarchists. But the actions of a minute few linked the two groups in the mind of the American public. Opportunistic politicians worked to entrench that link. American politicians found the anarchist concept of “propaganda of the deed,” the idea that acts of terror were the most powerful way of spreading anarchist beliefs, to be a particularly powerful propaganda tool of their own. For American politicians, “propaganda of the deed” provided a powerful means of not only proliferating xenophobia, but codifying it. Since the majority of notable anarchists were from Italy or the Russian Empire, anti-anarchism provided a rationale by which politicians could restrict the influx of new immigrant groups. Politicians and the media used the fear of anarchist terror to foster xenophobia and justify nativist policies that restricted the immigration of Southern and Eastern Europeans.

In order to understand the politicized motives of restrictive immigration policies, we must first look at the political landscape of the period. Both parties were divided over immigration policy. In the 1890s, Democrats were often seen as the champion of immigrants, whereas Republicans were characterized as the party of nativism. Over time, that neat partisan divide became increasingly blurred. The Democratic Party of the early twentieth century was not nearly as ideologically homogenous as it is today; it was a party composed of western populists,

⁴³ Rauchway, 114-115, 53.

Wilsonian progressives, and southern conservatives. Organized labor increasingly became part of the Democratic Party during these years. The differing agendas and ideals of these groups created internal divisions within the party that often created collective action problems for party elites.

Immigration policies increasingly divided Democrats in the early twentieth century. Immigrant voters were a vital cog of the machine politics that dominated the era. New York's Democratic machine, Tammany Hall, was heavily reliant on the votes of Irish and other European immigrants.⁴⁴ But urban political machines were not the only piece of the Democratic coalition heavily invested in the immigration debate. Union leaders, including Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor, petitioned that the influx of new immigrants would reduce the standard of living for all Americans.⁴⁵ Since immigrant laborers were rarely union members, the argument was that employers could hire them at a lower wage than natural-born Americans. In time, union workers would either lose their jobs or accept a lower wage. These conflicting interests inside the Democratic Party prevented it from taking a clear and comprehensive stance on immigration. Party leaders feared that they would create an internal rift if immigration made it into the party platform. To avoid creating that rift, the 1912 and 1916 Democratic Conventions crafted no plank on the issue.⁴⁶ Democrats could ill afford to alienate these large voting blocs, and the party did its best to maintain a middle ground that ostracized no one.

Republicans were not in agreement on the immigration issue either. While the party by and large supported a more restrictive immigration policy, it fractured over the issue of a literacy

⁴⁴ Matthew Frye Jacobsen, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign People At Home and Abroad, 1876-1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 185-187.

⁴⁵ Robert F. Zeidel, *Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission 1900-1927* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 25.

⁴⁶ Don Wolfensberger, "Wilson, Congress and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in America," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, 3. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/immigration-essay-intro.pdf>

test. The rank-and-file members of the party passed literacy tests through the Senate in both 1896 and 1898, but in both instances party leaders killed the bill.⁴⁷ President McKinley may have promised to “secure the United States from invasion by the debased and criminal classes of the Old World,” but he made a concerted effort to avoid going on record about a literacy test.⁴⁸ While the measure was popular with the voting public, it would not have been popular with the business interests that financed McKinley’s 1896 campaign.⁴⁹ McKinley could ill afford to make an enemy of the men who had helped put him in office in the first place. Unlike their Democratic counterparts, Republicans did not differ over whether to restrict immigration, but over how restrictive the measures should be.

Underneath the anti-anarchist rhetoric, demographic changes were the real driver of xenophobic sentiments in the United States. Between 1850 and 1914, thirty-three million people immigrated to the United States.⁵⁰ Considering that the population of the United States in 1910 was approximately 92 million, the influx of immigrants equaled roughly one third of the nation’s population.⁵¹ In this context, it is not surprising to find President Theodore Roosevelt speaking in 1905 about the “race suicide” of Anglo-Saxon Americans.⁵² Just as important to understanding the American psyche during this time period was the closing of the frontier. In 1890, the Census Bureau deemed that zero acres of unsettled land remained in the United States.⁵³ For decades, the frontier provided a new home for earlier immigrant groups and displaced workers, keeping the

⁴⁷ Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 32-33.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Daniels, 33.

⁵⁰ Rauchway, 90.

⁵¹ “United States Census, 1910”, United States Census Bureau.

https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1910_fast_facts.html

⁵² Theodore Roosevelt, “On American Motherhood,” March 13, 1905.

<http://www.nationalcenter.org/TRooseveltMotherhood.html>

⁵³ Rauchway, 91.

population of eastern cities in check. Since eastern cities could no longer export their labor surplus west, fear of overcrowding in these cities became a concern.

Racial and cultural differences added to societal strains. Unlike previous newcomers, the vast majority of turn-of-the-century immigrants came from Southern and Eastern European countries. More damning in the minds of the Protestant establishment, they were largely Catholics, or worse: Jewish. Race played a factor as well. White Americans, a term which at the time did not necessarily include Southern or Eastern Europeans, were paranoid about new racial and religious groups becoming more prominent voices in the United States, potentially drowning out their own. The 1890 census reported that between 70 and 80 percent of the residents of major urban centers such as New York and Chicago were either immigrants or the children of immigrants.⁵⁴ This number, large in its own right, does not include the millions of immigrants who arrived in the United States in the following 20 years. These rapid demographic changes contributed to the xenophobic sentiments and reactionary organizations of older ethnic groups in the United States. The Ku Klux Klan reemerged as a nativist organization with vehemently anti-Catholic sentiments. As historian Richard Hofstadter wrote in 1964, “anti-Catholicism has always been the pornography of the Puritan.”⁵⁵ While he was referring to the nineteenth century, his words remained true in the early twentieth century. Protestants feared a Catholic demographic takeover of the United States because it would mean that Protestants would no longer control the destiny of the nation. To prevent other religious groups from growing in number and power, the Protestant establishment desperately searched for justifications to exclude them.

⁵⁴ Jacobsen, 186.

⁵⁵ Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 21.

Education level was one of these justifications against new immigrants. Eastern and Southern Europe, by and large the homelands of new immigrants, were painted as backwards by the American public because of their underdevelopment and low education levels. As Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) wrote in 1891, the plurality of new immigrants was unskilled and illiterate.⁵⁶ But at that time, his calls for literacy tests fell on deaf ears. While large segments of the American public believed new immigrants to be unassimilable and accused them of driving down wages, political elites lacked a legitimate reason to exclude these newcomers from the United States. Americans seldom questioned whether or not to exclude the newcomers, but rather how to justify doing so.

On September 6, 1901, Leon Czolgosz gave nativists the justification they had been searching for. His bullet did far more than kill the president; it became symbolic of the “foreign” attack on the American system. Czolgosz transformed anarchists from “harmless fanatics” to “the manifestation of a disease.”⁵⁷ Anti-anarchist sentiment escalated almost immediately. Johann Most, a German immigrant and anarchist who printed a decades old article about tyrannicide in his newspaper that morning, was arrested for predicting the assassination.⁵⁸ Czolgosz’s own brother even called for the death penalty.⁵⁹ When Buffalo police issued an arrest warrant for anarchist orator and Czolgosz’s idol Emma Goldman, police around the country rounded up any anarchist they could find.⁶⁰ The general public offered even less sympathy for anarchists. Mobs went after prominent anarchists, anarchist communes, and anarchist

⁵⁶ Henry Cabot Lodge, “The Repression of Immigration,” *North American Review* 152 (Jan 1891), 27-36.

⁵⁷ J.C. Burrows, “The Need for National Legislation Against Anarchism,” *The North American Review* 173, No. 541 (Dec 1901), 728.

⁵⁸ Sidney Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” *The American Historical Review* 60, No. 4 (Jul., 1955), 782. Most was a German immigrant who is often viewed as one of the first prominent Anarchists in the United States. Most was the mentor for Emma Goldman, who was idolized by McKinley’s assassin: Leon Czolgosz.

⁵⁹ “Devilish Reds Doomed: Shots Fired At McKinley Have Sounded The Death Knell of Anarchism in America,” *Chicago Eagle*, September 14, 1901.

⁶⁰Fine, 782.

newspapers, forcing many to flee in fear for their lives.⁶¹ Anarchist newspapers across the country were shut down, including *L'Aurora*; an Illinois based paper which hailed Czolgosz as a martyr.⁶² In the case of *L'Aurora*, the federal government imposed fines on the paper for violating postal regulations, while the townspeople ran the editor out of town.⁶³ Freedom of the press did not protect the newspaper from mob tactics and clever prosecutors. The idea that Czolgosz may one day be viewed as a martyr led Auburn Prison officials to bury Czolgosz on prison grounds, burn his personal effects, and pour sulfuric acid on his remains.⁶⁴ They wished to make sure that Czolgosz could never become a martyr for the anarchist cause. No shrines or idols would be created on their watch. The anti-anarchist crusade had begun.

While Americans had never been fond of anarchists, Czolgosz's actions elevated their disdain to another level. The use of "anarchist" as an insult caused one New Yorker to get his throat slashed.⁶⁵ Leaders in the African-American and Chinese-American communities saw opportunity in anti-anarchist sentiments. Booker T. Washington and Wu-Ting Fang hoped that by stressing the American ideals of their respective communities, they could get anarchists to replace themselves as the bane of White America's existence.⁶⁶

The press played a key role in fostering anti-anarchist sentiment. The *Washington Post* published the failed "Hill Bill" of 1894 that would have allowed the federal government to

⁶¹ See: Fine, 786; "Given Tar, Feathers, and A Ride on the Rail: Man Who Said He Was Glad the President Was Shot is Specially Punished," *The San Francisco Call*, September 12, 1901; "Free Love Colony Under Surveillance: Tacoma Anarchists Declare The Shooting of The President Justifiable," *The San Francisco Call*, September 12, 1901.

⁶² Fine, 786.

⁶³ Ibid, 785-786.

⁶⁴ "Assassin Czolgosz Is Executed At Auburn. He Declared that He Felt No Regret for His Crime. Autopsy Disclosed No. Mental Abnormalities. Body Buried in Acid in the Prison Cemetery," *The New York Times*. October 30, 1901.

⁶⁵ "Called Anarchist; Used Razor," *New York Times*, September 12, 1901.

⁶⁶ "Wu-Ting Fang on Anarchists: Says That They, Rather Than the Chinese, Ought To Be Excluded," *New York Times*, September 21, 1901; and Rauchway, 77-78. Washington would strike a deal with Roosevelt to create an agenda to do exactly that. Fang's hopes for improved social standing of Chinese immigrants and Americans of Chinese descent would not amass similar levels of support from the President.

exclude anarchists from immigrating.⁶⁷ Printed while McKinley was fighting for his life, the article aimed to incite uproar about a measure that could have prevented the shooting. Senator J.C. Burrows (R-MI) published an article blaming the House of Representatives for failing to pass the “Hill Bill,” which he claimed could have prevented McKinley’s death by removing foreign anarchist preachers from American shores. To Burrows, Americans with Czolgosz-like ideologies would never have existed if foreigners like Emma Goldman and Johann Most could have been prevented from poisoning their minds.⁶⁸ A letter to the editor published in the *New York Times* compared anarchists to smallpox and cholera, and called for the eradication of the anarchist disease from the United States.⁶⁹ An article in the *Washington Post* called for a penal colony in the South Pacific where “the sexes would be separated in different island groups” so that “the anarchist species could not be propagated and ... become extinct.”⁷⁰ The stories were neither fair nor balanced, especially obituaries of anarchists, which often featured titles like “Another Anarchist Less.”⁷¹ Their deaths were celebrated as if they symbolized the triumph of the American state over the evil anarchist. The public and the media had become staunchly opposed to anything resembling anarchism. Politicians were quick to capitalize.

Theodore Roosevelt echoed Senator Burrows’ call for new immigration laws in his address to Congress that December. Roosevelt, like Burrows, sought to prevent the working classes from becoming anarchist sympathizers. With this in mind, Roosevelt characterized

⁶⁷ “Almost Became A Law: The Senate Passed a Bill to Deport Anarchists.”

The Washington Post, Sep 12, 1901. The “Hill Bill” had been proposed after the assassination of the President of France in 1894 and after it was reported that the 500 anarchists France had expelled from the country were coming to the United States. Despite passing unanimously in the Senate, the bill was never brought to a vote in the House of Representatives.

⁶⁸ Burrows, 733, 731.

⁶⁹ “Traitors and Anarchists,” *New York Times*, September 11, 1901.

⁷⁰ “A Penal Colony To Be Composed of the Anarchists of All the Nations,” *Washington Post*, September 20, 1901.

⁷¹ “Another Anarchist Less,” *The Anaconda Standard*, November 2, 1901; and “Jumped Into The Sea: Anarchist Decided He Could Not Kill A Monarch,” *Montgomery Advertiser*, August 13, 1902; and “Called Man to See Him Die: Then a Young Anarchist Out of Work Drank a Poisonous Acid,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1901, and “A Dead Anarchist,” *The Anaconda Standard*, March 18, 1906.

McKinley as a friend to labor and his murder as an attack on the American state. Roosevelt asked Congress to pass legislation that banned foreign anarchists from entering the United States and deport those already here. To Roosevelt and others, removing these anarchists from the United States could stop the spread of the infectious ideology in America. McKinley's death left many politicians demanding changes to the immigration system. In their minds, immigration reform was the only way to prevent anarchist terror from spreading.⁷²

Roosevelt's and Burrows' calls to arms were answered in the form of the Immigration Act of 1903, often referred to as the "Anarchist Exclusion Act." The act was the first federal law in American history to exclude immigrants on the basis of their ideological beliefs. It also granted the federal government the right to bar entry to "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States." Additionally, the bill gave the federal government a three-year window after a person's arrival to deport them for anarchist beliefs. For the first time in its history, the United States had deemed an ideology un-American, and enacted legislation to prevent the growth of its infection.⁷³

The new law faced its first significant test in October 1903, when anarchist lecturer John Turner was arrested and ordered to be deported to Great Britain. Emma Goldman saw an opportunity to fight the law. She asked Turner to stay in the United States and fight his deportation.⁷⁴ A circuit court upheld Turner's deportation, ruling that excluding anarchists did not violate freedom of religion or speech.⁷⁵ Anarchist leaders had hoped Turner's case would strike down the 1903 law as unconstitutional, but even the Supreme Court sacrificed free speech

⁷² Theodore Roosevelt, "First Annual Address to Congress", December 3, 1901.

<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3773>

⁷³ "Immigration Act of 1903", 57th US Congress. <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brianl/docs/1903ImmigrationAct.pdf>

⁷⁴ Julia Rose Kraut, "Global Anti-Anarchism: The Origins of Ideological Deportation and the Suppression Of Expression," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 19, No. 1 (Winter 2012), 184.

⁷⁵ "United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams (1903)," United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York. http://darrow.law.umn.edu/documents/ex_rel_Turner_Cir_Ct_1903.pdf

to combat what Americans perceived as an anarchist infection of their country. While the act was seldom used for anything more than rhetoric during the Roosevelt presidency, it is significant for establishing ideological exclusion as constitutional. This act may not have resulted in the largescale deportation of radicals nor did it put in place the sort of preventive measures that Lodge and other restrictionists advocated, but it did create the framework for future legislation which would do exactly that.

Two events in early 1908 shocked Americans and reignited their fears of the anarchist infection. On February 24th, an Italian anarchist shot a Catholic priest at a Denver church, inciting fears of an anti-clerical conspiracy amongst the clergy.⁷⁶ Anarchists were often atheists, leading many members of the clergy to fear that the events in Denver that morning were part of a wider plot. The murderer told reporters that the church bells provided the motive for his actions, reminding him of how his excommunication in Sicily caused his wife to leave him.⁷⁷ The murder of Father Leo Heinrichs reawakened fears of the godless anarchist and reignited nativist sentiment. While the headline read anti-anarchism, the body of the article blamed Italians for bringing church feuds to the United States.⁷⁸ Beneath the fear of anarchists was unadulterated xenophobia. To calm fears amongst Chicago priests, Police Chief George M. Shippy cracked down on anti-clerical anarchist groups, an effort which inspired an anarchist to make an unsuccessful attempt on Shippy's life.⁷⁹ Shippy killed his attacker, but the attempt left many Americans feeling as if the core institutions of American society were under attack. In the span of a few weeks, anarchists had gone after religion and the police, two of the most fundamental

⁷⁶ "Church Bells Annoyed Him He Slew the Priest," *Albuquerque Journal*, February 25, 1908.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "The Anarchist Outbreak," *Springfield Republican*, March 3, 1908.

⁷⁹ "Anarchist Attacks Chief of Police," *Pawtucket Times*, March 2, 1908.

institutions of American society. For restrictionists, these events provided an opportunity to remind the American public that the 1903 law did not go far enough.

Almost as if on cue, the hunt for anarchists resumed. The day after the attempt on Shippy's life, the Secretary of Labor and Commerce called upon immigration officials to rid the country of alien anarchists and criminals.⁸⁰ The anarchist witch hunt had isolated cases of success, but the handful deported were viewed as only a small percentage of the anarchist population. Many Americans felt this was not enough. As one anonymous member of Congress told the *Savannah Tribune*, "What we ought to do is draw a line down the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and another one down the middle of the Pacific Ocean and to say no one shall cross."⁸¹ His call fell on deaf ears in Washington. Political support for more restrictive immigration laws did not exist in 1908, but the same could not be said a decade later.

In 1907, Congress passed a new immigration law that renewed the 1903 law and established a committee to review immigration trends.⁸² Without the "anarchist outbreak," this commission may never have existed. The Dillingham Commission, named after its chair Senator William Dillingham (R-VT), issued a report and recommendations in December 1910. The report concluded that Southern and Eastern Europeans posed a threat to American society and recommended the enactment of a literacy test for new immigrants. The literacy test would substantially reduce the amount of Southern and Eastern Europeans entering the nation. The majority of Italian and Ruthenian (Eastern Slavs) immigrants and more than forty percent of Lithuanian and Balkan immigrants were illiterate.⁸³ In contrast, Northern Europeans coming to

⁸⁰ "Places Ban on Anarchist Aliens: Federal Authorities Take Drastic Action," *Albuquerque Journal*, March 4, 1908.

⁸¹ "Dealing With Anarchy Begun: Washington Officials Admit Difficulty," *Savannah Tribune*, March 28, 1908.

⁸² Daniels, 45.

⁸³ William P. Dillingham, "Statistical Review of Immigration 1820-1910, Distribution of Immigrants 1850-1900," 61st Congress, as presented on December 10, 1910, 85.

the country had an illiteracy rate below one percent.⁸⁴ While the Dillingham Commission clearly wanted a literacy test passed, President Taft was unmoved. Taft understood that such a test did nothing to keep out the usually educated anarchists, who could easily pass a literacy test. Dillingham, like Lodge, wanted to restrict immigration not for the purposes of keeping out anarchists but for limiting the number of Southern and Eastern Europeans in general. His literacy test would have drastically reduced the number of immigrants coming to the United States in the early twentieth century. According to his report, over seventy percent of the people who immigrated to the United States between 1901 and 1910 were from Southern or Eastern Europe.⁸⁵ Had the United States instituted Dillingham's literacy test in 1900, one fourth of all immigrants to the United States between 1900 and 1910 would have been turned away.⁸⁶ Despite support from Capitol Hill, Dillingham could not convince a President from his own party to sign off on a literacy test. Anarchism may have allowed Dillingham to form his commission and give his report advocating restriction, but anarchism alone could not justify across-the-board restriction of Southern and Eastern Europeans.

While Dillingham failed to move the needle on immigration, the issues hardly disappeared from American political discourse. Political posturing over immigration reached new heights during the Wilson years. Wilson made a powerful enemy out of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, who had hoped to make Wilson his pawn in the White House. After Wilson rejected Hearst's influence, Hearst published quotes from Wilson's *A History of the American People* that not only referred to these newer immigrant groups as "having neither skill or energy or any initiative of quick intelligence" but as less desirable immigrants than the Chinese. These words were a powerful insult in Wilson's day, as racist attitudes towards Chinese

⁸⁴ Dillingham, 85.

⁸⁵ Dillingham, 12.

⁸⁶ Dillingham, 12, 85.

immigrants ruled the day. Chinese immigration was also banned by the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), so one could interpret Wilson's words as saying that new immigrants should not be allowed to settle in America either. Wilson's words forced him to the defensive with the issue of immigration, a position he maintained for the remainder of his political career. Despite the flowery rhetoric he used for the remainder of the campaign, Wilson had a hard time winning back the trust of immigrant voters. In order to not completely alienate the new immigrant voters, Wilson had to be exceedingly cautious in crafting immigration policy for his political career to prosper.⁸⁷ Wilson learned to navigate this web of conflicting interests quickly, as war in Europe would make immigration a hotly debated subject in Washington yet again.

The outbreak of World War I provided a catalyst for the efforts of ideological suppression and immigration restriction. Even before the United States entered the conflict, the question of where the loyalty of "hyphenated-Americans" lay was omnipresent on the American political consciousness. Would these immigrants remain loyal to American neutrality, or would affinity for their home countries pit varying immigrant groups against one another? President Wilson addressed these concerns in a 1915 speech in which he referred to citizens "born under other flags" as having "poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life."⁸⁸ Wilson capitalized on the opportunity to appeal to the anti-immigrant wing of the party, calling for stricter immigration laws to crush out creatures of anarchy. For restrictionists, the war proved an effective tool for furthering their agenda. They painted a picture of a post-war America which aimed to scare American voters in to line. Restrictionists created a narrative of a new wave of European immigrants who would flee the ashes of post-war Europe and come to the United States to take jobs from returning servicemen. Restrictionists depicted this coming horde

⁸⁷ Wolfensberger, 3, 6.

⁸⁸ Woodrow Wilson, "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1901.
<http://millercenter.org/president/wilson/speeches/speech-3794>

as poor and ignorant, a characterization they believed would escalate xenophobia enough to overrule Wilson and get their agenda passed in Washington.⁸⁹

In early 1917, Congress passed a new immigration act to reinforce and expand upon the 1903 law. The act is usually remembered for the Asiatic Barred Zone, but there were other important elements to the law. The act expanded the time frame for deporting a suspected anarchist to five years and established a literacy test.⁹⁰ Wilson, who had followed the precedent set by Presidents from both parties by vetoing a literacy requirement in 1915, lost the fight in 1917. Wilson's 1915 veto was politically motivated. Up for reelection the following year, Wilson decided he was better off irritating party stalwarts who were likely to vote for him regardless than anger immigrant voters who already distrusted him.⁹¹ However when Wilson followed this bipartisan tradition again in 1917, he found himself overruled by his own party. Wilson once again raised the literacy test as his justification for vetoing the bill, but this time a bipartisan group on Capitol Hill overwhelmingly voted to override Wilson.⁹² The American public and its Congress had become hyper-nationalistic by 1917. The country also was increasingly influenced by the eugenics movement, the racial prejudices of which claimed new immigrant groups were somehow inferior to Americans of Anglo-Saxon or Nordic heritage. With the war and eugenics in mind, restrictionists built momentum towards keeping the groups they deemed undesirable from American shores. After years of pushing, Dillingham and Lodge finally got their literacy test.

Under the provisions of the 1917 act, anarchists were rounded up over the course of the year. With the longer time frame the act provided, law enforcement could now arrest and deport

⁸⁹ Ibid, 46-47.

⁹⁰ "Immigration Act of 1917," United States Congress.

<http://library.uwb.edu/guides/usimmigration/39%20stat%20874.pdf>

⁹¹ Woodrow Wilson, "Letter to John Sharpe Williams," as quoted in Wolfensberger, 11.

⁹² Wolfensberger, 11-12.

known anarchists who had previously been immune to the three-year statute of limitations. The authorities quickly rounded up a group of Italian anarchists known as Galleanists, but found that the law was still not strong enough for them to deport the leaders of the sect.⁹³ The leaders had been here longer than five years, so the only way to deport them under the act was to prove that these individuals were attempting to overthrow the government or planning to kill elected officials. The language was still too vague, as proving that Galleani and his followers were advocating for the assassination of public officials often proved difficult. To restrictionists, this failure signaled that even tougher laws were necessary. Fortunately for them, America's views of radicals were about to reach mass hysteria.

The Red Scare trumped all previously mentioned incidents as the biggest instrument of change in American attitudes towards radicals and subsequent changes to immigration policy. Whereas McKinley's death lit the fire, the Red Scare poured gasoline on it. At the time the "Bolsheviki" were viewed as a wing of anarchism, not a separate political ideology. Newspaper articles often referred to Lenin and his regime as anarchists. When the Bolsheviks took power in late 1917, fear spread around the globe that like-minded revolutions would occur elsewhere. Henry Cabot Lodge used the October Revolution against Wilson in his fight against the Versailles treaty. Lodge likened Wilson's concepts of international law and a League of Nations as moving away from Washington and towards Trotsky.⁹⁴ Any policy that even slightly resembled left-wing ideology became toxic overnight. The Red Scare changed America's perception of radicals. New legislation to reflect these changing views would soon be passed.

⁹³ Paul Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 130-131.

⁹⁴ Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 241.

In this environment, even Wilson could not oppose a bill to restrict radicals during the Red Scare. The Immigration Act of 1918, or the “Dillingham-Hardwick Act,” gave the federal government the ability to bar entry to or deport any individual they could define as an anarchist or a political radical. The law also allowed the government to imprison and deport any anarchist that tried to return to the United States following their deportation. The murder of President McKinley began the push for anti-anarchist legislation, but it took a revolution on the other side of the Atlantic to strike enough fear into the American public for the nation to support broad measures to deport radicals.⁹⁵

The United States could now legally deport any anarchist they pleased, but for many restrictionists the law was not being used enough. Restrictionists could not let the American public realize that the anarchists and other radicals they had been taught to fear were actually few in number and little more than a scapegoat to further the restrictionist agenda. With the restrictionist agenda still unfulfilled, nativists and other likeminded individuals ridiculed the Bureau of Immigration for not doing its job. A *New York Times* article portrayed the Bureau of Immigration as being far too forgiving to anarchists, wondering why it gave the benefit of the doubt to any alien arriving in the United States.⁹⁶ Two higher ups in the Department of Justice, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and the Bureau of Investigation’s J. Edgar Hoover escalated the search to a level more pleasing to the Immigration Bureau’s detractors. Palmer and Hoover would both go on to leave a lasting legacy for their suppression of radical ideas.

⁹⁵ “Immigration Act of 1918,” <http://legisworks.org/sal/40/stats/STATUTE-40-Pg1012.pdf>

⁹⁶ “Alien Anarchists,” *New York Times*, December 15, 1919. The article claims that only two anarchists were barred entry, 37 deported, and 55 scheduled for deportation. The author, who is not named, felt that the authorities were too lenient in allowing suspected anarchists to remain in the United States.

In June 1919, nine bombs detonated in seven American cities within an hour and a half of one another, all of which were attributed to an anarchist plot.⁹⁷ These bombs targeted notable members of the United States government, including A. Mitchell Palmer. In response, Palmer declared a new campaign to rid the nation of anarchism. Yet despite his public call for an assault on radicalism, little was done to rid the United States of the anarchists who were seen as having infected American life. To add teeth to his campaign, Palmer turned to Hoover and what was becoming the FBI to round up radicals. Palmer wished to go after anarchists, Wobblies, Bolsheviks, communists, and other radicals, compiling a list of 60,000 individuals that he sought to deport.⁹⁸ Palmer's raids have become some of the iconic events of the First Red Scare, leading to the deportation of at least several hundred suspected radicals.

Emma Goldman topped Palmer's list. Goldman was released from prison after serving a two year sentence for obstructing the draft, only to be arrested under the 1918 immigration law, which scheduled her for deportation to Russia.⁹⁹ Luigi Galleani, a leading figure of Italian anarchists, was deported to Italy in June 1919.¹⁰⁰ On the second anniversary of the October Revolution, Palmer launched a massive raid on Russian immigrants, arresting well over 200 supposed anarchists and slating them for deportation.¹⁰¹ With these "menaces" in custody, a new problem arose regarding how to get them out of the country. Hoover orchestrated the solution to this as well. Hoover received permission from the Departments of War and State to use a recently decommissioned warship, *Buford*, which would be given the nickname of the "Red Ark." While Hoover enjoyed his success, efforts of the arrested individuals to avoid deportation

⁹⁷ "Reds Explode Bombs in Many Cities; Judge Nott's Home Blown Up; Two Killed; A. Mitchell Palmer's Home is Wrecked," *New York Tribune*, June 3, 1919.

⁹⁸ "Palmer For Stringent Law: Attorney General Asks for Sedition Act to Fit Reds." *New York Times*, November 16, 1919.

⁹⁹ "Deportation Warrant Served on Goldman in Missouri Penitentiary," *Miami District Daily News*, September 18, 1919.

¹⁰⁰ Avrich, 168.

¹⁰¹ "Will Deport Reds As Alien Plotters: Palmer's Blow Friday Hit Leaders," *New York Times*, November 8, 1919.

failed. Despite appealing the ruling, Goldman was shipped off on the Red Ark to the Soviet Union. She was joined by approximately 300 other supposed anarchists and other radicals on that voyage. Jewish immigrants, who House Immigration Committee Chairman Albert Johnson (R-WA) deemed to be “filthy, abnormally twisted, and dangerous,” made up a disproportionate number of those deported as radicals.¹⁰² While it should be noted that Russian immigrants were often Jewish, and that the ship was carrying mostly Russian passengers, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Jewish immigrants were the primary targets, given Johnson’s anti-Semitism. By January 1920, President Wilson claimed that over 4,000 anarchists had been deported since the end of the First World War.¹⁰³ For nativists and other Americans who supported immigration restriction, Hoover and Palmer were finally giving them results.

Speaking out against Palmer’s raids was career suicide. When Frederic C. Howe, Immigration Chief in New York, defended the habeas corpus rights of anarchists, typically pro-immigrant papers like *The New York World* condemned his actions. A traditionally Republican paper, *Cleveland News*, went further, accusing Howe of not only creating a “Monte Carlo” for foreign socialists and radicals but also of being a communist himself. Congressman Fiorello la Guardia (R-NY) accused Howe of only showing up to work when it was time to prevent an anarchist from being deported, and several of la Guardia’s colleagues advocated for Howe’s removal. In their eyes, the deportation of only 60 out of 600 arrested radicals proved that Howe was either incompetent at his job or intentionally furthering the anarchist cause.¹⁰⁴

The anarchist threat did not sail away with the *Buford*. A 1920 murder in Massachusetts kept the fear of anarchism alive. Anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti attempted to

¹⁰² Daniels, 47-48.

¹⁰³ “Deportation for Every Anarchist Wilson Declares,” *Anaconda Standard*, January 15, 1920.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas M. Pitkin, *Keepers of the Gate: A History of Ellis Island* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 123-125.

flee the country in great haste, fearing they would be implicated in the June 1919 bombing conspiracy.¹⁰⁵ But when they were arrested on May 5, 1920, it was not by Palmer's men looking to deport them. Rather, they were being charged with murder in connection to an April robbery of a Massachusetts shoe factory.¹⁰⁶ Unwilling to tell the authorities the real reason they were suspiciously fleeing the area in the middle of the night, the two Galleanists found themselves at the center of one of the United States' most infamous murder trials. The trial lasted years before Sacco and Vanzetti were executed in 1927. Circumspect police work caused two men to be convicted of a crime they likely did not commit. The political ramifications of the Sacco and Vanzetti case were more important than giving the men a fair trial. The narrative of two foreign anarchists murdering a shoemaker in cold blood reinforced the stance of restrictionists. They were able to point to the murder as evidence of why there needed to be more restrictive immigration laws.

The fallout from the Sacco and Vanzetti arrests caused more deaths. On September 16, 1920, five days after the indictment of Sacco and Vanzetti, an explosion killed thirty-eight and wounded hundreds on Wall Street.¹⁰⁷ The blast was a painful reminder that the anarchist plague had still not been contained. The bomber, an Italian anarchist who knew Sacco and Vanzetti, sought revenge for their arrests and the deportation of fellow anarchists.¹⁰⁸ The bombing added further fuel to the restrictionist cause, exemplifying the chaos that had consumed the United States. By the time the next session of Congress began in 1921, legislation that would forever alter American immigration history would be introduced on Capitol Hill.

¹⁰⁵ Avrigh, 196-199.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 199-200.

¹⁰⁷ Beverly Gage, *The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.

¹⁰⁸ Avrigh, 205-207.

The executions of Sacco and Vanzetti marked the end of the anti-anarchist wave that had begun with the arrival of Eastern Europeans in the late nineteenth century, escalated after the death of President McKinley, and went out of control during the Red Scare. The whole affair provided further evidence to many that the new immigrants were unassimilable and needed to be kept out of the United States. As one member of Congress described it, “We have admitted the dregs of Europe until America has been Orientalized, Europeanized, Africanized and mongrelized, and mongrelized to that insidious degree that our genius, stability, greatness, and promise of advancement and achievement are actually menaced... I should like to exclude all foreigners for years to come.”¹⁰⁹ This time, Republicans did not hide their true intentions behind a veil of literacy concerns nor incite fear of radicals. By the early 1920s, the political climate allowed them to justify a restrictionist agenda solely on the basis of race. Xenophobic legislation enacted established quota restrictions of immigration, allowing sentiments against the new immigrants to be codified into law.

When Republican Warren Harding was elected President in 1920, Albert Johnson proposed a two-year ban on all immigration. The House passed a fourteen-month ban before the Senate abandoned that plan in favor of Senator Dillingham’s quota proposal. Rather than banning all immigration, Dillingham has proposed that quotas should be set for immigration from each country, using the population level of each country of origin in the United States as a guide. Immigration from each country was to be capped at a number determined by Congress. Congress passed a more restrictive version of Dillingham’s proposal that year. Whereas Dillingham suggested using a recent census as the guide, more restrictionist minded officials decided on the 1890 census. Wilson attempted to pocket veto the measure during his final days

¹⁰⁹ Jacobsen, 201.

in office, but a slightly modified version passed the Senate 78-1 before receiving Harding's approval. Whether or not the law should be made permanent became a hot political issue in the 1924 election. The Republican platform endorsed such a measure, while the still divided Democrats could only agree on restricting the immigration of Asians.¹¹⁰ Republicans won the day. The law that passed in 1924 turned back the clock all the way to 1890, the last census before a massive increase in Eastern and Southern European immigrants, and placed the quota at two percent.¹¹¹ Had the 1920 census been used as some moderate restrictionists advocated, the quota for Italians would have been more than ten times larger and six times larger for Poles. Africa and Asia did not even get their two percent, and instead were cut off completely. Restrictionists attempted to turn back time, hoping to restore the Protestant, Anglo-Saxon America they saw quickly slipping away. Restrictionists no longer had to hide their true agenda behind a veil of keeping out radicals and criminals. By 1924, the voting public was willing to exclude newcomers on the basis of race itself.¹¹²

Anti-immigrant sentiment was present in the United States long before Czolgosz assassinated William McKinley. However, Czolgosz transformed the words of "harmless fanatics" from abstract ideas to a tangible threat. Like-minded attacks occurred in the following twenty years, targeted Wall Street, churches, and the police. It took five presidencies, but the restrictive immigration policies that nativists had desired for decades were finally put in place. In their eyes, the radicals that threatened to destroy their white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant utopia could no longer pose a danger to the United States.

¹¹⁰ Avrigh, 285-287.

¹¹¹ "Immigration Act of 1924", US Congress. <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/68/publaw-139.pdf>

¹¹² Daniels, 48- 49, 52. Dillingham's original proposal was only a temporary measure, with the quotas set at five percent and based off 1910 levels. It also gave the Secretary of Labor the ability to go above the quotas for humanitarian purposes. The lone change to Dillingham's plan before it was passed through Congress was a loophole for those fleeing religious persecution, which required they met all other stipulations.

Parallels can be drawn between immigration during this period with the controversy over the issue today. Almost one hundred years to the day of the McKinley assassination, Islamic extremists attacked the very core of American society on September 11, 2001. Their attacks hit at American financial and military centers, while a third plane is believed to have had its sight set on Washington. Islamic terrorists targeted the same types of core institutions that anarchists had attacked a century prior. Fear of Islamic terrorism gripped the Western world in the aftermath of 9-11; fear that can easily be seen today. Like the immigrants of one hundred years ago, innocent Muslims have felt the repercussions for the actions of a visible minority. Islamophobia appears to have again resurfaced in the American political consciousness, as there is a fear that terrorists could sneak into the United States disguised as refugees. Several 2016 presidential candidates, most notably Donald Trump, have made comments that both capitalize upon and fuel this islamophobia. The ramifications of such rhetoric will only become known as time goes on.

While parallels exist between the concerns regarding the two terror movements, the better comparison to the fear of anarchists in the United States a century ago would be the wave of immigrants currently pouring into Western Europe. Amidst declining birth rates in many Western European states, some Europeans fear that their states will be overrun by Muslim immigrants in the future. This fear of immigrants, especially Muslim ones, has led to the formation of nativist movements like the English Defense League (EDL) and Germany's Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Pegida). These groups echo the anti-immigrant paranoia that American politicians demonstrated a century ago. A December 2014 survey found that nearly one third of Germans polled support Pegida.¹¹³ Nativism and

¹¹³ "Survey finds one in three Germans supports PEGIDA 'anti-Islamization' marches," *Deutsche Welle*, January 1, 2015. <http://www.dw.de/survey-finds-one-in-three-germans-supports-pegida-anti-islamization-marches/a-18166667>

xenophobia appear to be on the rise in Europe-the consequences of which will only be known by historians of the future.

After 1924, the United States government had far greater control over the demographic changes in the United States. With the anarchist threat gone, communism and fascism became the feared ideologies of most Americans. For nativists, the threat of being overrun by new immigrants at last receded to the back of their minds. For labor unions, the workforce that undermined their ability to push for higher wages had been contained. For the Republicans, the growth of a significant Democratic voting bloc was now under control. Many groups benefitted from the 1924 Immigration Act. Those seeking safety in the United States were not amongst them. As Europe devolved into chaos over the next fifteen years, those seeking refuge in the land of opportunity suddenly found the golden door shut.

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The Red West: Canada's Siberian Expedition, the Western Labour Conference,
and the Birth of the First Red Scare, 1917-1919

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On November 11, 1918, as people in Toronto paraded along Yonge Street with proclamations of peace, armistice, and victory, more than four thousand Canadian soldiers were making their way to Victoria for deployment to Vladivostok, Russia (see Figure 1). It was the end of the First World War and yet, unbeknownst to celebrators across the country, the Allies' postwar vision was under quick contention. The Bolsheviks were gaining strength in Russia, proposing an alternative postwar vision that was fiercely anti-imperial, anti-bourgeoisie, and anti-Western. In a reactionary defense, the Allies formed a secret military campaign to alter the October Revolution, overthrow the Bolsheviks, and secure their imperial hegemony. Little did they know that such a campaign would not only fail militarily, it would also galvanize radicals and labour activists throughout the West. With the Western Labour Conference of March 1919 being at the epicentre, Prime Minister Robert Borden's revitalization of the Royal North-West Mounted Police (RNWMP) and staunch censorship of labour newspapers gave way to a domestic spy-war known today as the First Red Scare.

With the October Revolution in November of 1917 and the Bolsheviks' ceasefire a month later in December 1917, the European Eastern Front of World War One effectively ended and the Western Front came under threat. In a speech to the Canadian Club in Victoria's Empress Hotel, President of the Privy Council Newton Rowell saw the rise of the Bolsheviks as the most "tragic surprise" of the war.¹¹⁴ With many Allied officials believing that the Bolsheviks were actually German spies overtaking Russia, Rowell maintained, "to reestablish the Eastern Front" was to support "the Russian people, which are battling against German armed force and intrigue."¹¹⁵

Such sentiments are not surprising given that early Allied-Bolshevik relations were nothing short of disastrous. Upon his return to Russia from exile, Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky

¹¹⁴ Quoted in Benjamin Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok: Canada's Siberian Expedition, 1917-19*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

published a series of secret Triple Entente treaties in December 1917.¹¹⁶ With its imperialist contents, namely the territorial offers of parts of Austria and Albania to Italy, the partition of Turkey, and the Franco-Russian agreements on Alsace-Lorraine, it was an immense diplomatic embarrassment for the Allies.¹¹⁷ As Trotsky wrote in *Izvestia* newspaper:

Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation, its rapacious alliances and machinations, has developed the system of secret diplomacy to the highest degree...Abolition of secret diplomacy is first essential of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy...We desire a speedy abolition of the supremacy of capital...we offer to the workers the slogan which will always form the basis of our foreign policy: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"¹¹⁸

In response to Trotsky, the Allies immediately protested that the Bolsheviks violated their Allied alliance. Trotsky responded even more fiercely, telling the Russian peasantry, workers, and soldiers to not be afraid of the Allies, as "Your Soviet Government will not allow the foreign bourgeoisie to wield a club over your head and drive you into slaughter again."¹¹⁹

As tensions between the Bolsheviks and Allies escalated, a rather unexpected factor entered the Supreme War Council's military calculus. The Czech-Slovak Legion, which joined the Provisional Government's Russian Army in the hopes of achieving an independent Czechoslovakia, sought Allied assistance to return home.¹²⁰ Initially, the Allied forces saw this legion of 70 000 men more as a burden than an opportunity to overthrow the Bolsheviks.¹²¹ In April 1918, following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which officially ended Russia's involvement

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 48-9.

¹¹⁷ James Bunyan, ed., *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918; Documents and Materials*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 241.

¹¹⁸ Quoted from *ibid*, 244.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 246.

¹²⁰ Carl Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson's Siberian Disaster*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 39.

¹²¹ Ibid, 43-44.

in World War One, Soviet Commissar of Nationalities Josef Stalin ordered the Czech Corps stationed in Vladivostok, which was roughly half of the total Czech-Slovak Legion, to move to the Western Front by sea. In early May, the Supreme War Council and the Bolsheviks agreed to move the remaining forces to Archangel in North-West Siberia.¹²²

It was the Czech's actions that turned the Allies' "burden" into an opportunity. With this division of their corps, the Czechs were worried about the reunification of the Austrian-Hungarian forces. On May 20, 1918, following the brief Czech occupation of Chelyabinsk in response to Bolsheviks arresting and disarming some of their legionaries for the death of a Russian soldier, the Bolsheviks arrested leaders from the Russian branch of the Czech National Council in Moscow and demanded the immediate disarmament of the corps. Five days later, Trotsky ordered the Red Army to shoot any armed Czechs on the spot or face charges of treason.¹²³ Violent rebellions ensued across the western portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and by early June, the Czechs occupied Western Siberia, harbouring anti-Bolshevik forces along the way.¹²⁴

With the surprising Czech victory in Siberia at a time of increasing momentum amongst the Central Powers, the Allied forces recognized the removal of the Czech corps from Siberia would be a mistake. As stressed by the Supreme War Council on July 2:

The recent action of the Czech-Slovak troops has transformed the Siberian situation...Provided intervention takes place in time, there will be a Slav army in western Siberia on which Russian patriots could rally, which eliminates the risk of the Russian

¹²² Ibid, 46.

¹²³ Clifford Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920*, (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 11-12.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 148.

public opinion being thrown into the arms of Germany, as might have been the case if intervention were effected by forces almost entirely Japanese.¹²⁵

Given Russia's humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, such a perspective was certainly not without its merit. By July 5, 1918, the French command, which had official responsibility for the Czechs, cancelled all efforts to transport them and the Allies' mission became realized: to bolster the Czechs and all other anti-Bolsheviks forces in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet government.¹²⁶

For imperial and nationalist reasons, the increasing hostility between British officials and Bolsheviks enticed the Canadian elite to send a Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force (CSEF) brigade in August 1918 with the mission to bolster the Allied presence in the hopes of overthrowing the Bolsheviks. As Borden underscored, "It will be of some distinction to have all the British Forces in Siberia under the command of a Canadian officer."¹²⁷ Similarly, Rowell told the Canadian Club the war won Canada, "a new place among nations."¹²⁸ Although still under the banner of the Union Jack, the emergence of Canadian nationalism with victories in the Battle of the Somme and the Battle of Vimy Ridge convinced many Canadian leaders to seek another victory for "King and Country" in Siberia. As a colony of the British Empire, albeit a largely white settler colony, this initiate reverence to Crown was connected to Canada's long struggle to gain control of their foreign policy. As historian M.I. Svetachev writes: "The Canadian bourgeoisie, which became rich during the world war, tried to gain independence, especially in

¹²⁵ Norman Saul, *War and Revolution*, 313.

¹²⁶ Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade*, 11-12.

¹²⁷ Henry Laird Borden and Heath MacQuarie, eds., *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs*, (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1969), 2:146.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok*, 6.

foreign policy. It believed that Canadian participation in the intervention would help to reach this goal.”¹²⁹

Canada’s and the Allies’ economic motivations behind the intervention were also substantial given the resource wealth of Russia’s Far East. In Vladivostok alone there were 600 000 tons of stores and ammunition, as well as a series of warehouses near a seaport.¹³⁰ The Bolsheviks also repudiated an estimated 13 billion rubles in war loans from the Allies on January 1918, instigating a sense of urgency amongst the Allies to intervene.¹³¹ Prior to the Revolution, exports from Canada to Russia reached \$16 million, making Russia the seventh largest market for Canadian goods.¹³² Of course, after the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks interrupted trade and nationalized Russian assets. In September 1918, Rowell articulated this loss of trade to the Canadian Club. He stated that Russia “is in a very precarious position from the standpoint of trade and commerce. She needs capital and expert guidance in the work of reconstruction.”¹³³ Rowell concluded that with a greater trade network and a more intimate relationship “the greatest benefit may result both to Canada and Russia.”¹³⁴

The foundation to these imperial-nationalist and economic motives for the intervention was the Canadian elite’s aversion to the Bolshevik ideology. As one of the CSEF newspaper, *The Siberian Sapper*, warned, “Bolshevik missionaries are spreading their doctrines in every country of the world...There is a mad dog running loose amongst nations, and it would seem to be the duty of nations to handle it as mad dogs are usually handled.”¹³⁵ Yet this mentality was not shared by the working-class in the West. Suffering from high inflation, conscription, food

¹²⁹ M.I. Svetachev, *The Imperialist Intervention in Siberia and the Far East*, (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Siberian Division, 1983), 75.

¹³⁰ Kinvig, *Churchill’s Crusade*, 53.

¹³¹ Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok*, 8.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Quoted in Francis, *Seeing Reds*, 43.

shortages, and then the worldwide flu epidemic, many saw the Russian Revolution as an international symbol of resistance to bourgeois capitalism. The delayed deployment of CSEF soldiers and then their minimal engagement in direct fighting while in Siberia lessened war morale. Moreover, the dual role of the Canadian soldiers as workers created a source of contradiction in the fight against Bolsheviks and their ‘worker’s revolution.’¹³⁶ A poem by one of the CSEF volunteers, Dawn Fraser, exemplified this sense of discontentment:

And we often dream and wondering

Will the quarantine always last?

As we work like slaves at present

Thinking sadly of the past

They are taking us to Russia

As soldiers of the King

And if we see a Bolshevik

We will shout, “you horrid thing!”¹³⁷

Fraser was not alone. His comparison of military labour to slavery was not uncommon, and his hypocritical demeaning the “Bolshevist[s]” under such “quarantine” conditions captured the working-class attitudes towards the CSEF. Moreover, many CSEF soldiers were conscripts: of the total 4 210 soldiers that would be deployed from Victoria, 1 653 were drafted under the Military Service Act.¹³⁸ One of the two battalions, the 259th Battalion, consisting largely of French-Canadians but also Anglo-Ontarians and was a hotbed of dissent with 705 of 1 083

¹³⁶ Palmer, *Working-Class Experience*, 180. See also Benjamin Isitt, "Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918," *Canadian Historical Review* 87, no. 2 (2006): 225. DOI: 10.3138/chr/87.2.223.

¹³⁷ Dawn Fraser, “Red-Mud Volunteers,” in *Dawn Fraser’s Narrative Verse and Comments*, Third Edition, (Grace Bay: Eastern Pub, 1920), 119-120.

¹³⁸ Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok*, 73-74.

troops being conscripts.¹³⁹ The duplicity of fighting against the Bolsheviks as working-class conscripted soldiers could also be seen in Fraser's poem, "The Parasite":

*The world is nicely arranged for them,
Who live by the efforts of other men;
Live by the sweat of the poor and the weak,
Then marvel that men turn Bolshevik.*¹⁴⁰

Fraser demonstrated working-class sympathies to Bolshevism and subsequently their resistance to the Allied effort to overthrow the Bolsheviks.

Many new soldiers were able to correspond and expressed their pro-Bolshevik and anti-war sentiments with Victoria's labour movement. Such fierce discontentment on matters of class and conscription allowed for the unity between Western labour and the Bolsheviks to extend to the CSEF soldiers. Although not direct members, many CSEF soldiers before being sent to Vladivostok attended meetings of The Victoria & District Trades and Labor Council. On December 6, The Victoria & District Trades and Labor Council wrote a protest letter to the Minister of Militia and National Defence:

By directions of the Victoria and District Trades and Labor Council, to express the emphatic disapproval of that Body of the Governments [sic] apparent purpose in sending an expeditionary force to Siberia. Now that the war is won and ended, the members of the various workmens organizations and the common people in general, fail to see any justification for a military enterprise being pursued in that direction. More particularly as

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Dawn Fraser, "The Parasite," in *ibid*, 310.

we as a country and a nation are not at war, nor have been at war, with the Russian people.¹⁴¹

This letter was not the beginning of animosity between the Canadian government and the labour unions. Since the summer of 1918, the Borden government had been censoring the labour newspapers that republished the Triple Entente secret treaties, such as the Victoria & District Trades and Labor Council's subsidiary, *The Week*.¹⁴² On December 19, Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Sydney Mewburn's response to the Council, which consisted of Canada's war objectives to free Russia from "German domination," was met with staunch criticism by labour union activists across the country.¹⁴³

By the end of December, labour unions across Western Canada sent protest letters to the Borden administration with a mutiny erupting amongst the Willows Camp of the 259th Battalion on the streets of Victoria on the December 21, 1918. Overwhelmingly French-Canadian, these young CSEF soldiers broke ranks away from the troopship set to sail to Vladivostok. Away shots were fired in the air and eventually these men were ordered onto the ship by the point of bayonets.¹⁴⁴ It would take a total of twenty hours to move all these men on the ship *Teesta*, with twelve later detained in cells and two in handcuffs. On January 24, 1919, the deputy judge advocate general in Vladivostok found nine of these men guilty of mutiny and willful disobedience, with sentencing ranging from three years of penal servitude to twenty-eight days forfeiture of pay.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ "Protest Letter from Victoria & District Trades Labor Council to Gen. Sydney C. Mewburn, Minister of Militia and Defence." Christian C. Sivertz to Sydney C. Mewburn. December 6, 1918. Ottawa, Ontario. <http://www.siberianexpedition.ca/sources/vtlc-letter.php>.

¹⁴² Gregory S. Kealey, "State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914–20: The Impact of the First World War," *Canadian Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (1992): 288.

¹⁴³ In the letter, Mewburn also noted the intervention would raise Canada "in the esteem of the Russians, and the affect of this will be felt when commerce is extended in Siberia." See also Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok*, 67.

¹⁴⁴ Isitt, "Mutiny from Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918," 223.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 252.

This mutiny was one of many series of anti-war and labour protests, whose movement shifted to Alberta with the Western Labour Conference.¹⁴⁶ Prior to the event, the Alberta Federation of Labour adopted a resolution to be in full accordance “with the aims and purposes of the Russian and German socialist revolutions,” and to give their body “full power to call a general strike should the Allied powers persist in their attempt to overthrow the Soviet administration in Russia.”¹⁴⁷ Feelings of Western alienation convinced many Western union leaders to establish the Western Labor Conference in Calgary in March 1919, with the intent continuing to push against the CSEF in Siberia, which would end a month later in April 1919, and drawing on the larger visions of the Bolshevik Revolution. Frustrated by the Trades and Labour Congress’ ignorant if not prejudicial decision to hold their conferences only in the East, the initial socialist celebration of the Russian Revolution quickly became a conference on succession from the traditional labour movement.¹⁴⁸ Prior to the beginning of the Conference, the *Western Labor News* proclaimed, “The more effete East is burdensome to the West and slavish subservience of parliament to the interests of vested wealth has filled the cup of the West to overflowing.”¹⁴⁹

The Western Labor Conference continued to denounce censorship, advocate for general strikes, and establish a labour movement outside of the exclusive American Federation of Labor. In their “Aims of Strike Leaders,” a twelve-page document outlining the logistics of a new labour union and their radical objectives, the Report of the Policy Committee sought to create the One Big Union, a syndicalist labour group that would later be falsely accused by the government

¹⁴⁶ Kealey, “State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada,” 288.

¹⁴⁷ “Resolution Adopted by the Alberta Federation of Labor, January 1919,” cited in Tim Buck, *Canada and the Russian Revolution: The Impact of the World’s First Socialist Revolution on Labour and Politics in Canada*, (Toronto: Progress Books, 1967), 45-46.

¹⁴⁸ Francis, *Seeing Red*, 72.

¹⁴⁹ Quoted in Francis, *Seeing Red*, 189.

of instigating the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike.¹⁵⁰ The Western Labour Conference was a forum unencumbered by the AFL, so resolutions passed quickly that sought to end profiteering, eschew parliamentary lobbying, promote collective ownership, abolish the wage system, and ultimately act in common cause with the Bolsheviks.¹⁵¹

The Western Labor Conference declared its full acceptance of the “principle of proletarian dictatorship as being absolute and efficient for the transformation of capitalistic private property to communal wealth,” later proclaiming the Russian Soviet government had “won first place in the history of the class struggle.”¹⁵² As labour historian Peter Campbell aptly noted, “Canadian Marxists had no fears of ‘dictatorship’ in a workers' republic because they believed that they were living in a class society governed by a ‘bourgeois dictatorship.’ In a capitalist society ‘democracy’ was a sham concealing the wage slavery of the working class.”¹⁵³ Such a proclamation confirmed Prime Minister Robert Borden’s fear of Western labour’s “absurd conceptions of what had been accomplished in Russia” in reference to the Bolshevik Revolution.¹⁵⁴

It remains noteworthy that within the same year of the Western Labor Conference, the Royal North-West Mounted Police established a corps of secret agents to spy on labour unions. Secured by the War Measures Act of 1914, the RNWMP since the beginning of the war infiltrated many of the revolutionary organizations in the West and gathered the intelligence for the Federal Government.¹⁵⁵ Alongside the objectives of registering “enemy aliens” and imposing censorship, which by this time in the war included all “foreign-language” publications, the

¹⁵⁰ T.E. Julian, ed., “Aims of the strike leaders as set forth in the report of proceedings of the Western Canada Labor Conference held at Calgary, Alberta, March 13, 14, 15, 1919,” (Vancouver: 1919), Microform, 3.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 3-9.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, 5.

¹⁵³ Peter Campbell, "Understanding the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: The Canadian Left and the Moment of Socialist Possibility in 1919," *Labour*, no. 64 (2009): 63.

¹⁵⁴ Quote in Francis, *Seeing Red*, 192.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 302-304.

proactive tactic of this “watch and wait” policy meant the RNWMP actively fought against the imagery of socialist martyrdom.¹⁵⁶ Unlike Eastern Canada’s Dominion Police, which took an aggressive approach that consisted of several arrests and prosecutions, RNWMP commissioner A. Bowen Perry saw information gathering as the force’s primary objective.¹⁵⁷

That did not mean the RNWMP was passive; the force had one of their agents Frank Zaneth attend the Western Labour Conference. Known well in labour circles as “Henry Blask,” Zaneth went undercover as a Industrial Workers of the World or a Wobbly organizer and acted as secretary to one of the Conference’s leaders.¹⁵⁸ He attended various secret meetings of the Socialist Party, which he reported to all his superiors. Such sophisticated infiltration meant labour leaders largely left unquestioned Zaneth’s identity until December 1919 when he appeared at a Winnipeg courtroom in a RNWMP uniform to testify against them.¹⁵⁹

Without the domestic spy wars of the RNWMP, the government could have been less inclined to bolster its enforcement and manpower. In particular, following a secret meeting with three Canadian “Revolutionary Socialists,” the RNWMP’s commissioner A. Bowen Perry gave the government enough information to convince them to centralize and modernize their national police force. In his report, Perry remarked that although these “intelligent, well-read men” did not seek a violent overthrow of the Canadian government, “they are influencing a section of labour in the West and unchaining forces which, even if they so desire, some day they will be unable to control. Here is the grave danger to the peace and security of the country.”¹⁶⁰ C.F.

¹⁵⁶ Francis, *Seeing Red*, 103. Since late 1917, Canadian censorship included written hostility to conscription and extended to Canada’s conduct of the war and any other materials that would harm the public unanimity in May 1918. After extensive pressure from deputy chief censor C.F. Hamilton, the government banned all publications in “enemy language” and many in direct association with the Western Labour Conference. See also Kealey, “State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada,” 288-9.

¹⁵⁷ Francis, *Seeing Red*, 103-104.

¹⁵⁸ Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok*, 93.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 95.

¹⁶⁰ Francis, *Seeing Red*, 112.

Hamilton in his “Memo on Revolutionary Tendencies in Western Canada” was more direct: “What they aim at is an intense conflict between labour and capital, embittered by riots and bloodshed...the whole project turns upon the propagation of bad temper and mutual hate between classes.”¹⁶¹ In the end, the RNWMP’s war through words and the Dominion Police’s war through litigation prompted the federal government to revolutionize its national police force. In 1920, the RNWMP merged with the Dominion Police, marking the birth of the modern Canadian security apparatus: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.¹⁶²

By drawing together military history with the labour history of Western Canada, this essay concludes the militarization of the Canadian state was not only within its political structures, but also within its ideology. With the alliance between Western labour and the CSEF made in solidarity with the Bolshevik’s internationalist Marxist ideals, the First Red Scare intersected Canadian tensions of ethnicity, class, colonial status, and regionalism. While Canada’s military adventure to Siberia may be in the margins of Canadian history, its relationship to the Red Scare and the creation of the RCMP requires further scholarship. The development of the field would ensure a more nuanced understanding of Canada’s military-state apparatus and its criminalization of labour unions in the recent past.

¹⁶¹ Quoted in *Ibid*, 113.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 141.

Appendix



Figure 1

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Volume 13

Public Opinion and the
Trent Affair

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The American Civil War presented a complicated dilemma regarding the treatment of captured rebels, as President Abraham Lincoln did not recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation.¹⁶³ If the Confederacy were not a sovereign nation, then the act of taking up arms against the country in violent rebellion would be deemed a treasonous act. Treason is one of the highest crimes in society, for it is betraying one's own country through acts of rebellion and may be punishable by imprisonment and, in select cases, by death. Lincoln did not want to give legitimacy to the Southern cause, for to do so would imply recognition of the Confederacy and its right to exist.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, Lincoln and the Northern military establishment had to respond to the rebellion efficiently and effectively, but without angering the citizens located in the border area. These citizens were only nominally loyal to the Union but ensured the balance of power in favor of the Union.¹⁶⁵ Though Lincoln and his generals had the final say regarding the treatment of captured Confederates, the public formed its own opinion based solely on the information to which it was privy and the climate in which this information developed. The *Trent* Affair demonstrated how the initial publications of newspapers and the thoughts of influential people therein could create an impassioned fervor amongst the general public. By the end of the crisis, however, the public had become more conciliatory and appreciative of the greater circumstances surrounding the incident.

The *Trent* Affair occurred in November 1861. Captain Charles Wilkes, who commanded the Union ship *San Jacinto*, learned as he was returning from West Africa to the United States that Confederate envoys would be departing from a Confederate port to the United Kingdom.¹⁶⁶ The *San Jacinto* overtook and boarded the Confederate envoys' ship, the British *Trent*. Captain

¹⁶³ "American President," Miller Center, University of Virginia, last modified 2014, accessed December 8, 2014, <http://millercenter.org/president/lincoln/essays/biography/4>.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Charles Francis Adams, "The *Trent* Affair," *The American Historical Review* 17, no. 3 (April 1912): 542-543.

Wilkes removed the Confederate envoys James Mason and John Slidell from the *Trent* and brought them aboard the *San Jacinto*.¹⁶⁷ The two captured envoys were brought back to the United States and imprisoned at Fortress Warren in Boston.¹⁶⁸ The *Trent*, however, was allowed to continue on its way to the United Kingdom without the Confederates.

In order to understand the public reaction to this incident, it is necessary to understand popular mood early in the period of civil war. When the news reached the United States about the capture of two Confederates bound for London, the war was only four months old. In July of 1861, the Union had been under the impression that the war would be over quickly, and consequently many of the soldiers only enlisted for 90 days following the attack on Fort Sumter.¹⁶⁹ In Lincoln's initial request for war funds, he specifically mentioned that they were for "making this contest a short, and decisive one."¹⁷⁰ But in the months following July, everything changed – the First Battle of Bull Run saw a Confederate victory and Union troops retreating haphazardly back towards Washington.¹⁷¹ The Union was disappointed and shocked, as the prospects for a quick and easy victory had greatly diminished. The loss also served as an awakening to the reality of the situation and the difficulty, and obligation, of complete victory.¹⁷² By November, Northern spirits remained low and no word of Union victory had come. The war had already stretched on long past when it had been promised to end by northern politicians, and the Union was desperately awaiting a victory on the battlefield.¹⁷³

News of the capture of Mason and Slidell was greeted with jubilation throughout the North; people were relieved to finally have something to celebrate after a year of military defeats

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Norman B. Ferris, *The Trent Affair* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977), 29.

¹⁶⁹ Ernest B. Furgurson, "The Battle of Bull Run: The End of Illusions," *Smithsonian.com*, August 2001.

¹⁷⁰ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 29.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Howard Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2010), 93.

at the hands of the Confederacy.¹⁷⁴ Newspapers announced the story on the front pages, claiming a Union victory, with one *Boston Transcript* editor noting that this “was one of those bold strokes by which the destinies of nations are determined.”¹⁷⁵ Mason and Slidell were denounced, insulted, and painted as traitors to the United States and therefore described as rightly in confinement under the government’s orders.

The celebratory mood of the nation was demonstrated by the commendations heaped upon Captain Wilkes. As soon as he returned to Boston with the prisoners, the City Council voted to give him an official welcome and to host a public reception, which was widely attended.¹⁷⁶ The governor of Massachusetts, John A. Andrew, appeared there and gave praise to Wilkes, commending him for his heroic acts.¹⁷⁷ He thanked Wilkes for his “manly and heroic success” and began talking of Mason and Slidell’s capture as “one of the most illustrious services that had made the war memorable.”¹⁷⁸ On December 2, Congress passed an official resolution thanking Wilkes “for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of the traitors.”¹⁷⁹ The Secretary of the Navy even joined in the praise, thanking Wilkes and congratulating him on his “great public service.”¹⁸⁰

The public reaction, though, was initially blind to the diplomatic implications of what had happened. Wilkes had inadvertently initiated an international crisis; he had boarded a British ship after firing shots against her. Such a move might rightly be considered an act of war against the British. Although Wilkes removed the Confederates thinking that they were prisoners of war, he

¹⁷⁴ Donald Rakestraw, “The *Trent* Affair,” Virginia Center for Civil War Studies at Virginia Tech, August 2013, accessed December 8, 2014,

<http://www.essential.civilwar.vt.edu/assets/files/ECWC%20TOPIC%20Trent%20Affair%20Essay1.pdf>, p. 3.

¹⁷⁵ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 32.

¹⁷⁶ “Arrival of the U.S. Frigate San Jacinto,” *Boston Journal*, November 25, 1861, accessed September 23, 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 93.

¹⁷⁸ Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 547.

¹⁷⁹ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 93.

¹⁸⁰ Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 547.

mistakenly left the required forms for prosecution on board the *Trent*, which sobered the initial jubilation amongst Northern politicians accompanying the capture.¹⁸¹ The potentially volatile reality of the situation set in, causing many different reactions from people in influential positions and eventually the public.

There were two ways that members of the press, government, and public tried to justify the legality of the capture. The first such justification revolved around the Confederacy actively working with the United Kingdom against the United States. It was clear that the Confederacy was going to negotiate, or at least discuss, support for their cause with the British. Precedent, many believed, dictated that the United States had the right to remove the prisoners from the ship, relying on an 1813 incident during James Madison's presidency.¹⁸² The admiralty court, at that earlier date during the War of 1812, had asserted policies that "defend[ed] a belligerent's right to 'stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage.'"¹⁸³ Therefore, the captured prisoners must be held accountable for their actions and their crimes.

The second justification for the action was the nearly unanimous support from leading U.S. legal authorities for everything that Captain Wilkes had done in stopping the *Trent*. Even the Supreme Court gave commendation to Captain Wilkes for his act, indirectly endorsing the capture's legality.¹⁸⁴ Other experts, such as law professor Theophilus Parsons of Harvard, rushed to offer opinions that were submitted to the public through newspapers. He stated "I am just as certain that Wilkes had a legal right to take Mason and Slidell from the *Trent*, as I am that our

¹⁸¹ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 30.

¹⁸² "THE TRENT AFFAIR.; Public Feeling in Boston Relative to the Surrender of Mason and Slidell--The Point to be Gained by the United States," *The New York Times*, January 1, 1862, accessed December 8, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/1862/01/01/news/trent-affair-public-feeling-boston-relative-surrender-mason-slidell-point-be.html>.

¹⁸³ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 92.

¹⁸⁴ Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 547.

Government has a legal right to blockade the port of Charleston.”¹⁸⁵ Richard H. Dana Jr., a prominent maritime lawyer, happily explained that this act was justified, and swore to stand by his assertion.¹⁸⁶ The central question of international law, i.e. whether or not the *San Jacinto* had the right to stop the *Trent* and take the prisoners aboard, was subsumed by the public support for the heroic capture.

As lawyers began to justify the act publicly, the populace began to study and arm itself with legal precedents in the same manner.¹⁸⁷ Ordinary Americans followed the lead of American officials, and Republican politicians promoted the idea that the capture of the prisoners was within the bounds of international law.¹⁸⁸ This view spread through the population and permeated all facets of society. The reception of the crowds proved how willing the population was to accept that the Confederate prisoners were indeed traitors who, aboard a British ship, had violated neutrality agreements and thus deserved to be punished.¹⁸⁹ The Union crowds and the Lincoln supporters were all too eager to assign the illegality to the Confederates, whereas a significant number of Lincoln’s opponents believed the US had violated the neutrality agreements. Benjamin Butler, a prominent Union general, gave a rousing speech in New York City regarding the future end of the war that focused on the role of foreign nations in the conflict. He asserted that the United Kingdom, in particular, was claiming to be neutral by conducting trades with both the Union and the Confederacy. However, he explained, for the United Kingdom to conduct trade with the Confederacy was to acknowledge its right to exist, and also

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 548.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 546.

¹⁸⁷ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 33.

¹⁸⁸ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 91.

¹⁸⁹ “Sermon by Rev. Dr. Cheever on the Masen and Sildell Affair,” *The Daily Dispatch*, January 9, 1862, accessed December 8, 2014, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2006.05.0369%3Aarticle%3D11>.

to contradict its trade agreement with the United States.¹⁹⁰ The United Kingdom chose to benefit from the fragmented United States, and in its “neutrality” had, from the United States’ perspective, illegally recognized the Confederacy as legitimate.¹⁹¹ Therefore, the United States, as Butler alluded to, had the right to stop this trade as it violated the country’s own preexisting treaties. In a letter to the *Boston Advertiser*, Richard H. Dana Jr. claimed that “in the present case, the mission [of the two envoys] is in its very nature necessarily and solely a mission hostile to the United States. It is treason within our municipal law, and an act in the highest degree hostile within the law of nations. If a neutral vessel intervenes to carry such persons on such a mission she commits an act hostile in the same degree.”¹⁹² By this logic, the United Kingdom was fighting against the United States as well as being an ally to the Confederates, implying that the U.S. faced war with not only domestic adversaries, but also international ones. Any action at all in this scenario between the Confederates and the British posed a threat to the United States, which had the right to defend itself from foreign interference.

A similar principle of neutrality had been voiced in William Oke Manning’s *Commentaries on the Laws of Nations* long before this situation evolved. He stated, “the essence of neutrality is the abstaining from all interference whatever.”¹⁹³ By this definition, the United Kingdom was violating its self-declared neutrality by engaging in some portion of the conflict. Editors of the *Boston Post*, when writing about the affair, suggested that the British were violating neutrality laws and was thus eligible to be searched, since suspected enemy ships may be searched for contraband by the United States.¹⁹⁴ If the enemy was treated as contraband, then

¹⁹⁰ *Character and results of the war. How to prosecute and how to end it. A thrilling and eloquent speech by Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler*, (New York: Library of Congress 1863), p. 17.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 20.

¹⁹² Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 549.

¹⁹³ William Oke Manning, *Commentaries on the Law of Nations* (London: S. Sweet 1839), p. 207.

¹⁹⁴ “The International Law Question,” *The Boston Post*, November 25, 1861, accessed September 23, 2014.

the Union had every right to go aboard and search the ship. The strongest argument may have come from Adam Gurowski, an international law expert at Harvard University and a State Department adviser, who articulated that Mason and Slidell were technically contrabands going on a mission against their rightful government, and could thus not hide on a neutral ship and expect to have immunity.¹⁹⁵

Newspapers throughout the Union began to publish thoughts regarding the treatment of the prisoners and how their crimes should be handled. The *Boston Journal* reported that the prisoners Mason and Slidell “shall be treated in all respects, as to close confinement and fare, like criminals guilty of the highest crimes against the law.”¹⁹⁶ The article went on to claim that they were equivalent to prisoners of war taken in the field of battle and could be treated as such.¹⁹⁷ The Reverend Doctor Cheever went before crowds denouncing the actions of Mason and Slidell. The leaders of the rebellion, he claimed, were inflicting treasonous acts against the United States.¹⁹⁸ By law, these two rebellious conspirators, regardless of the method of capture, were eligible for confinement and even hanging. Support for hanging the traitors was widespread – even soldiers from the front lines of the war, such as Alfred Lewis Castleton, thought that they should be hanged for what they had done.¹⁹⁹

It was not only soldiers who were passionate about punishing, and potentially hanging, the two Confederate prisoners. One man interrupted a public speech on the situation’s legality to propose trying, convicting, and hanging Mason and Slidell. At the very least, people did not want to see Mason and Slidell released; war correspondent William Howard Russell reported in his

¹⁹⁵ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 92.

¹⁹⁶ “Treatment of Mason and Slidell,” *Boston Journal*, November 23, 1861, accessed September 23, 2014.

¹⁹⁷ Manning, *Commentaries on the Law of Nations*, 207.

¹⁹⁸ “Sermon by Rev. Dr. Cheever.” *The Daily Dispatch*, January 9, 1862.

¹⁹⁹ Alfred Lewis Castleman, *Diary of Alfred Lewis Castleman* (Milwaukee: Strickland & Co. 1863), accessed from <http://solomon.cwld.alexanderstreet.com.revproxy.brown.edu/cgi-bin/asp/philo/cwld/getdoc.pl?S1401-D010>, p. 55.

diary that Congress wanted to confine the prisoners at length in jail.²⁰⁰ General Benjamin Butler offered the most in-depth explanation as to why the Confederate prisoners could be dealt with slightly differently from the average prisoner of war, who would have been granted immediate parole or temporarily imprisoned before being traded in a prisoner exchange.²⁰¹ Butler first argued that this conflict quickly became a rebellion as opposed to a riot, implying that the action against the Union was much more organized.²⁰² Throughout this time of initial dissent between the competing North and South factions, the Union tried to maintain the constitutional rights of all individuals, regardless of secession status, but according to Butler this was a meaningless endeavor. When the Southern states voted to leave the Union and join the Confederacy, Butler argued, they took up arms violently and therefore forfeited all sense of belonging to and all sense of protection within the United States.²⁰³ Now the Southerners were alien enemies, and subject to international law when on the open seas. Since the people in active rebellion were not only in violent rebellion against the Union but also purposely trying to engage in acts against it, these Southern envoys could be held responsible for both murder and treason.²⁰⁴ Butler went on to claim that the Civil War itself could not be called a war, since to call it a war was to recognize the Confederacy's legitimacy and thus commit treason against the United States.²⁰⁵ However, when the United Kingdom got involved, it could suddenly be termed a war, for the actual acts were between two recognized sovereign nations. Therefore, the United Kingdom could be considered as acting in a hostile manner towards the United States by assisting its enemy in treasonous actions.³⁷

²⁰⁰ William Russell Howard, *Diary of William Howard Russell* (T.O.H.P Burnham 1863), accessed from <http://solomon.cwld.alexanderstreet.com.revproxy.brown.edu/cgi-bin/asp/philo/cwld/getdoc.pl?S1401-D010>, p. 580.

²⁰¹ Mark Weber, "The Civil War Concentration Camps," *The Journal of Historical Review* 2 (1981): 137.

²⁰² *Character and results of the war*, 9.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Character and results of the war*, 11.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

All of this commentary was either published in newspapers or written in personal recollections and records of people reading reports in the newspapers. Many legal experts had published their views in prominent and well-read newspapers, which were disseminated to the public. At this point, the public was overwhelmed with the legal justification for the actions that had been taken, and began to view the conflict's resolution as a matter of personal and national pride. William Howard Russell, in his diary, described his encounter with an unnamed United States naval officer following the incident. This naval officer said that while the legality may be in question, Mason and Slidell should never be given up to the British, for "not a man dare propose such a humiliation to our flag."²⁰⁶ After the fact, when Mason and Slidell had already been released, many, like one member of the general public who considered himself to be on friendly terms with the British, felt as though they had been insulted after the incident, believing it was disservice to the country.²⁰⁷ Ultimately, people who supported the capture were able to find legal justification for the action, yet all had different ideas of how to deal with the prisoners in terms of punishment. Many different sources conveyed or depicted people's thoughts on the issue, representing a wide array of modes of communication. The public was clearly influenced by the wave of press in favor of the capture, detention, and possible further punishment of Mason and Slidell.

While much of the public immediately accepted that the capture was a legal endeavor executed by the United States and more believed that there should be some sort of punishment, other voices examined the issue from both a political and an alternative legal perspective that condemned the United States' actions and recognized the need to release Mason and Slidell. Interestingly, these opinions also had an influence on public thought. This legal argument,

²⁰⁶ William Howard Russell, *Diary of William Howard Russell*, 574.

²⁰⁷ "THE TRENT AFFAIR," *The New York Times*.

contrary to the public's overarching reaction, maintained the invalidity of the capture because of the belief that the Confederate envoys had been taken illegally off of a technically "neutral" British ship.

This line of argument held that any justification for taking the prisoners had been abandoned because the papers which would have warranted their capture had been left on the *Trent*, meaning that all evidence for the crime was gone and that there were no legal grounds to take the prisoners aboard.²⁰⁸ According to international law, the papers naming the passengers and the nature of their business were the ultimate reward of any capture, as they were necessary for prosecution in a court of law. While the British crew made claims pertaining to the neutrality of the ship, one may argue that the neutrality component of the argument was nullified as soon as the captain of the *Trent* refused to allow a search of his ship, which should have initiated a series of events to bring the *Trent* back to an American port for examination and adjudication at a prize-court.²⁰⁹ However, Wilkes took Confederate prisoners off the ship with no papers proving the southerners' intent and therefore, by this reasoning, violated international law.

Many members of the public finally began to acknowledge that the prisoners would have to be released. Former President James Buchanan claimed that since they were sailing under the British flag, the Confederates should be afforded all the rights and protections of British citizens and not the rights of rebellious Southerners, meaning that they should be released.²¹⁰ Prominent Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, usually on the opposite side of the political spectrum from the Democrat Buchanan, acknowledged privately that the United States had been wrong in its initial jubilation, and would likely release the prisoners.²¹¹ George T. Curtis, a notable

²⁰⁸ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 34.

²⁰⁹ Rakestraw, "The *Trent* Affair," 4.

²¹⁰ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 36.

²¹¹ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 93.

historian and writer, wrote to the editor of the *Boston Journal* declaring that under international law, the British were able to demand the return of the captured Confederates to their custody.²¹² Part of this argument related back to the claim that the British were technically a neutral power, a claim that was clearly opposing the thoughts of those who believed the British were acting favorably toward the Confederacy. Many would cite Manning's *Commentaries* again, demonstrating that neutrals "have a right to carry on their commerce as in a time of piece [sic]."²¹³ Had the *Trent* been a merchant ship sailing between two neutral ports, international commerce rules would have applied. The Union, many claimed, had not respected another principle in *Commentaries*, which stated, "in cases of enemies' goods being taken from neutral ships, freight is paid by the captor."²¹⁴ Wilkes had not done that, as he had taken the two prisoners from the ship without just payment. Based on the idea that the Union had violated neutrality and international commerce rules, the Union needed to rectify the situation.

One complicating factor to the question of the applicability of international law was that the American government had not been consulted in the decision to apprehend Mason and Slidell; it had all been the work of Wilkes.²¹⁵ Wilkes had not been in contact with his Union commanders for many months before the incident, as his ship had been off the coast of Africa, and his only method of judging the current relations between the United States and the Confederacy was through gossip and newspapers.²¹⁶ He justified the capture of Mason and Slidell by examining some American treatises he had in his cabin, coming to the conclusion that the Confederates were contraband taken during a time of war.²¹⁷ However, as Butler explained

²¹² Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 36.

²¹³ Manning, *Commentaries*, 207.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 208.

²¹⁵ Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 544.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 544-545.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 545.

two years later, the Union was doing everything it could to avoid calling it a conflict and making the conflict a war.²¹⁸ Wilkes acted as though he was engaged in a war between the North and the South, while according to the Union there was no such conflict, meaning taking contraband from the enemy was illegitimate.²¹⁹

Other than the legal question of what happened, there was a question about how to move forward from a political standpoint. The United Kingdom now played a significant role in the conflict, one that had been originally between the North and the South but was now expanded to the global theater. Since the *Trent* was flying under a British flag, the United Kingdom's response to the incident would help determine the United States' actions, and the situation was one that could infuriate the United Kingdom.²²⁰ This was a correct assumption, for as soon as news reached London about the capture of the *Trent*, outrage spread swiftly, so much so that an American in London wrote to Secretary of State William Seward that "the people are frantic with rage... I fear 999 men out of a thousand would declare for immediate war."²²¹ George Cornewall Lewis, the British Secretary for War confirmed this statement, saying that unless the Union released Mason and Slidell, there would be "inevitable war."²²² The American public was still clueless as to how the United Kingdom would react. As those in the United States with power and authority, mainly politicians and lawyers, began to reflect on the situation, they gradually came to the realization that a war with the United Kingdom would be cataclysmic to the attempt to keep the Union together. The London *Morning Post* made claims that the war would

²¹⁸ *Character and results of the war*, 13.

²¹⁹ Adams, *The Trent Affair*, 546.

²²⁰ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 35.

²²¹ Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 94.

²²² Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy*, 95.

effectively be over within a month, with assured British victory abroad and thus a Confederate victory against the Union.²²³

War with the United Kingdom thus became a real possibility. On January 2, 1862, the *Boston Journal* published an article from the *London Examiner*, stating that the American predicament made the United Kingdom more inclined to support the Confederacy unless the situation was rectified, which worked against the initial ignorance the American public had of the English political position.²²⁴ Prince Albert of England drafted a letter to the Lincoln administration regarding the situation, demanding an apology and the release of the prisoners.²²⁵ War with the United Kingdom was the last thing that many Northerners wanted, and many had to begin to consider favoring the release of the prisoners. While the legality of the act was important from the American perspective, the British perspective was beginning to supersede legality. Increasingly, it didn't matter how the Union viewed the actions, for if the United Kingdom treated the acts as hostile acts and declared war, the United States' justification was irrelevant. Many began to believe that the appropriate course of action was conciliation, not defiance.²²⁶ While this would necessitate releasing the prisoners, it was a much better option than embarking on a two-fronted war.

More and more people, and not only those who believed from the beginning that the act was illegal but also those who initially supported punishment for the traitors, began calling for the release of the prisoners. This popular shift was attributed to many different factors, one of which was the work of the press to placate the American public. The press had all along been communicating the thoughts of influential people to the public, effectively controlling the

²²³ Ibid, 94.

²²⁴ "New Hostile Pretext," *Boston Journal*, January 2, 1862, accessed September 23, 2014.

²²⁵ Rakestraw, "The Trent Affair," 5.

²²⁶ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 35.

population's outlook on the situation. As the international and legal pressures began to build, the press began to prepare the inflamed American population for the release of the prisoners.²²⁷

Many of the Boston-area newspapers that had initially expressed jubilation at the capture of the Confederate envoys, thinking it provided an advantage, began to soften their tone and advocate for lesser punishment or release.

As the situation with the United Kingdom became more and more inflamed, the newspapers published fewer articles. In fact, the only major stories that appeared were about the possible release of the prisoners. Cognizant of their ability to sway the popular mood, and instead of publishing an overwhelming number of editorials contrary to the initial celebratory spirit, the press went quiet in the hope that the problem would dissipate on its own. In fact, the celebratory mood was short-lived; the initial fervor that accompanied the announcement of the capture receded into the background as more and more public figures began to realize the incendiary implications of the actions. One editorial in the *New York Herald* stated that it was "better gracefully to yield to the exigencies of the crisis, and promptly relieve England of her convenient pretext for a quarrel, without the intervention of any third party."²²⁸ Editorials such as these helped to sway the public, to convince them that a war with the United Kingdom would bring potentially grave results. Northerners began to understand the situation, noting both the danger of another war with the United Kingdom and the decreasing relevance of their legal position.²²⁹ The tide began to turn, allowing for a population that had initially been up in arms to back down and to reconsider the fate of the Union rather than their own impassioned ideals. By the time that Mason and Slidell were actually released on December 26, 1861, the public

²²⁷ "New Hostile Pretext," *Boston Journal*, 1862.

²²⁸ Ferris, *The Trent Affair*, 177.

²²⁹ *Ibid*, 36.

majority reluctantly agreed with the decision, but was nevertheless mindful of the initial pride that came with the capture.

The young United States had rarely seen such a complete shift in public opinion as that which occurred in reaction to the *Trent* Affair. Many, including legal experts, were ecstatic at the news of the capture of Mason and Slidell. The populace was split, however, on the legality of the action, with some arguing that the United States was justified in removing two hostile diplomats from a questionably neutral ship, and some arguing that Captain Wilkes had acted outside of his range of authority and that the United States had illegally taken prisoners. While international politics was not the sole focus of this event's escalation, the United States general population came to realize relatively quickly that the prisoners had to be released in order to maintain peace with the United Kingdom, and not because of the sort of compassion felt in 1865. The *rage militaire* and pride that swept the Union had to be contained in favor of reasonable politics, and it was for the most part, despite lingering feelings of joy at having captured two Confederate prisoners of war. At the end of the war, public opinion, even including radical Republicans such as Horace Greeley, was fairly united in the belief that the release of the Confederate prisoners was one specific way to help the country move on from its years of detriment in the Civil War. This shift in attitude helped to demonstrate that the Union was more aware of the danger of retaliatory action. This war, while initially invigorating and inspiring of passions, still had elements that appealed to people's rationality, which in the end helped to preserve the Union both internationally and domestically.

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Loyalty and the Formation of the Mamluk Sultanate

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Beginning in roughly the ninth century, Muslim rulers regularly employed slaves as soldiers in their armies or as personal guards.²³⁰ The slaves they collected were referred to as *mamluks*. David Ayalon, a leading historian on the Mamluks, formally defines this word as meaning: “owned, acquired; the meaning in practice: a) slave; b) gradually confined to a fair-skinned slave horseman.”²³¹ The Mamluks, who were primarily Turkish nomads from the Eurasian steppes and the Caucasus, were one of many groups of people engaged in this employment.²³² The Mamluks were purchased as young boys and had no social ties or political affinities, which made them easy to mold and trust. Additionally, after years of Arab advances throughout the Near East and continued Turkish tribal movements, the Turks entered the Near East “seeking pasturage or as individual mercenaries or mamluks employed in the armies of the Arab rulers.”²³³ For years, the Mamluks served as a “military backbone” and “bolstered the armies of several Islamic rulers” throughout Syria and Egypt.²³⁴ Egypt, in particular, experienced an influx in Mamluk service in the thirteenth century. Muslim scholars and leaders from this region provide a wide variety of evidence regarding Mamluk military slavery and training as well as significant events leading to the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt from 1250-1517. The primary aspect resulting in the replacement of the Ayyubid dynasty and the subsequent formation of the Sultanate was loyalty. Loyalty was cultivated through Mamluk education and training, personal relationships, and positions of power. This vital component

²³⁰ Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 45.

²³¹ David Ayalon, “The Mamluks: The Mainstay of Islam’s Military Might,” in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Shaun E. Marmon (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), 90.

²³² Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1382* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 1.

²³³ Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 3.

²³⁴ Martin Meredith, *The Fortunes of Africa: A 5000-Year History of Wealth, Greed, and Endeavor* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), 145.

served as the foundation of the Mamluk Sultanate and allows scholars to understand the significance of loyalty in relation to the acquisition of power.

After the formation of the Sultanate, the period of Mamluk rule can be divided into two parts: “that of the so-called *dawlat al-turk*, the Turkish State, and that of the *dawlat al-jarkas*, the Circassian State,” but there was little difference between them.²³⁵ The two periods of the Sultanate also are referred to as the ‘Bahri Mamluk Sultanate’ from 1250 to 1382 and the ‘Burji Mamluk Sultanate’ from 1382 to 1517. The Bahri Mamluks, who ruled in Egypt from 1250 to 1382, as part of the Turkish State, were the first Mamluks to rule in Egypt, and were responsible for the ejection of the Franks from the Levantine coast.²³⁶ Their name is derived from the location of their barracks on the island of Rawda on the Nile. The river is referred to as *bahr*, or ‘sea’, in Egyptian Arabic, which is where the name Bahri comes from.²³⁷ These Mamluks originally made up the elite corps of the Ayyubid army, which was the ruling in dynasty in Egypt in the twelfth and mid-thirteenth centuries. The Bahri Mamluks will serve as the focus of this analysis, although the processes of obtaining Mamluks and educating and training them were similar in both Egypt and Syria.

The Bahri Mamluks specifically played a vital role in the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate in the thirteenth century, becoming the ruling body in Egypt in 1250. The formation of the Mamluk State has been a topic of debate among several historians. Internal political conflict within the Ayyubid dynasty leading up to the establishment of the Mamluk Sultanate is evident. Scholars can agree that conflict and chaos within the dynasty made it easy for the Bahri

²³⁵ David James, *Qurans of the Mamluks* (London: Alexandria Press, 1988), 27.

²³⁶ Niall Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity’s Wars in the Middle East, 1095-1382, From the Islamic Sources* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 100.

²³⁷ Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Cairo of the Mamluks: A History of the Architecture and It’s Culture* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2007), 1.

Mamluks to claim power for themselves in Egypt and later Syria. However, other factors aided the Mamluks' transition from slaves to elite before political chaos ensued.

Loyalty, an element that is frequently overlooked because of its psychological foundation, was the primary factor resulting in the formation of the Sultanate. Loyalty is a psychological phenomenon that is intangible and not concrete; simply, there is no existing physical evidence of loyalty throughout history, only evidence that may be interpreted as being a result of or having a connection to loyalty. However, loyalty can be tied to all components of Mamluk life, specifically their education and training, personal relationships, and acquired positions of power. Examining the development of loyalty in this setting can provide a better understanding of the connection between loyalty and power in this time as well as today's society; yet, many scholars have disregarded the importance of loyalty and have argued that the Mamluk Sultanate formed because of various other reasons. Daniel Pipes, Amalia Levanoni, and Winslow Williams Clifford are just a few historians who examine this topic in order to explain the shift in power and the subsequent formation of the Mamluk Sultanate.

Scholars have continuously disagreed on when the military slave institution truly began. In his book, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (1981), Daniel Pipes examines the beginning of the military slave system and discusses the functions of an Islamic military slave. Pipes states that the military slave institution in the ninth century only developed when various practices, including “systematic acquisition, organized training, and professional employment,”²³⁸ were combined. Shortly after, the Mamluks began accumulating power granted to them by their masters, marking the beginning of their gradual change from slaves to elites. Pipes argues that their increase in authority was due to their masters relying too heavily upon

²³⁸ Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981): 140.

them, specifically al-Mutasim, eighth caliph of the Abbasid Caliphate, in the ninth century.

According to Pipes, “[Al-Mutasim] favored [his Mamluks] over others and was especially eager to replace the unreliable Arabian soldiers with them.”²³⁹ Pipes concludes that the Mamluks made up the majority of al-Mutasim’s army and were given significant responsibilities. Thus, the Mamluks were able to claim power for themselves over time.

Amalia Levanoni highlights similar ideas in her article, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt” (1990), but concentrates on turning points in the thirteenth century rather than the Mamluk slave institution in the earlier period. Levanoni argues that the Mamluks’ rise to power in Egypt was due to a change in the governing patterns of the Ayyubids; specifically, a new military system established by the last dominant Ayyubid ruler in Egypt, al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub, and his slave wife, Shajar al-Durr.²⁴⁰

Before the Mamluks came to power, the Ayyubid political system was weakened. In the midst of political chaos, Shajar al-Durr ruled after the death of her husband, which resulted in tension and unrest. Female rulers were not accepted at this time, but Shajar assumed power since her son was still too young to rule in his father’s place. Coupled with a weakened government, other members of the Ayyubid dynasty in addition to the Mamluks were vying to overthrow Shajar al-Durr, which did not make matters any better. The political upheaval in the Ayyubid dynasty made it easier for the Mamluks to seize control. Levanoni brings this notion to light once again but delves deeper into specific events that served as major turning points for the Mamluks. She explains that al-Salih Ayyub created an ethnically homogenous army of Mamluks in order to maintain loyalty and power over his army and territory. He also established a system by which the Mamluks could be nominated to various positions of power in the state, court, and

²³⁹ Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam*, 152.

²⁴⁰ Amalia Levanoni, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt,” *Studia Islamica* 72, (1990): 121.

military.²⁴¹ Eventually, the consolidation of the army and the number of Mamluks holding military power undermined the positions of the emirs and other Muslim military leaders, allowing the Mamluks to increase their power. The Battle of al-Mansurah is one significant example where victory over the Franks gave Mamluks a “claim to the traditional title of ‘defenders of Islam’ and a moral basis for their demand to continue Ayyub’s ruling patterns in Egypt.”²⁴² Winning that battle was a turning point for Mamluk prestige, as Louis IX was forced to surrender and pledge not to return to Egypt.²⁴³

The position of Shajar al-Durr became another major turning point for the Mamluks. Due to the weak position associated with her gender, Shajar had no choice but to make an alliance with her husband’s Mamluks. Originally being a Mamluk slave herself, Shajar agreed to this alliance, not realizing that this would give the Mamluks the chance to claim rule for themselves.²⁴⁴ Levanoni makes it clear that significant political unrest within the Ayyubid Dynasty, coupled with changes in military organization, offered an increasing opportunity for Mamluks to seize power.

In his book, *State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648-741 A.H./1250-1340 C.E.*, Winslow Williams Clifford studies the unity maintained within the Mamluk state after its formation. His overall argument indicates that mere violence did not hold the state together and that the “late medieval Syro-Egyptian state was in fact a rational sociopolitical structure, not an amorphous polity driven blindly by jungle law.”²⁴⁵ Clifford states that “Mamluks were harmonized as youths into collective, habitual, altruistic patterns of

²⁴¹ Ibid, 125.

²⁴² Ibid, 136.

²⁴³ Ibid, 141.

²⁴⁴ Ibid, 137.

²⁴⁵ Winslow Williams Clifford, *State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648-741 A.H./1250-1340 C.E.* (Goettingen: Bonn University Press, 2013): 14.

behavior.”²⁴⁶ Because of their upbringing, they formed bonds based on association with a common master and ethnicity shared between their comrades in bondage. According to Clifford, such ties of unity formed among the Mamluks while the Ayyubid dynasty was in power became a core factor as to why the Mamluks were able to transform from military slaves to military elites. The Mamluks’ relationship with one another was known as *khushdashiyah*, which is the process of blending or merging in the attempt to “resocialize and harmonize [the Mamluks] on the basis of peer equality, corporateness, and moral imperative.”²⁴⁷ Instituting *khushdashiyah* thus made the Mamluks significantly more formidable and established a foundation for claiming power as a unit.

Clifford also points out that Mamluk kinship was not the method of determining elite organization; therefore, the Mamluks needed to compensate after they formed the Sultanate. In other words, the Mamluks did not recognize lineage as a basis of ruling, which in turn generated the opportunity for any Mamluk to claim power and for chaos to ensue. The Mamluks addressed this issue by applying a form of “elite, artificial procreation through the generational induction of slave recruits.”²⁴⁸ This means that they continued to revitalize the Mamluk slave institution by maintaining the traditions of enslavement, even after they formed the Sultanate. Determining leadership based on lineage like the Ayyubids was practically impossible for the Mamluks because there were so many unrelated individuals holding power. There was never a clear basis for assigning political roles in the developing Mamluk Sultanate, which is why internal Mamluk unity was so important in forming and solidifying the Mamluks’ power base, allowing them to accumulate and retain power.

²⁴⁶ Clifford, *State Formation and the Structure of Politics*, 47.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 48.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 48.

Regardless of the differences between these author's approaches, loyalty seems to be the one underlying factor that connects their arguments. Loyalty was the core of the Mamluks' ability to heighten their prestige and claim full authority in Egypt. Both Pipes and Levanoni highlight key events, but fail to fully explain why they happened. The Mamluks were given various positions of responsibility and power because of their devout loyalty to their masters. They were able to rise as a unit, as Clifford describes, due to internal unity or loyalty to one another. Loyalty cultivated in Mamluk society was the core element that enabled the Mamluks to supplant the Ayyubid ruling dynasty.

In order to understand how loyalty was the primary factor in the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate, the different types of loyalty and their origins must be recognized. Mamluk loyalty can be separated into two categories: loyalty exchanged between Mamluks and their masters (later patrons), and loyalty shared between Mamluks and their comrades. Both forms began to develop early on in the lives of the slave soldiers and permeated every facet of their lives, including their education and training, personal relationships, and the positions of authority granted to them. Loyalty, developed through each of these components of Mamluk daily life, was the driving force behind the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate in the thirteenth century.

The Mamluks' rearing and organization of the military forces sheds light on how loyalty developed within the Mamluk military slave institution. The term *Mamluk* was not a name given to any ordinary, household slave. Unlike other slaves, contained in the 'slavery' of a Mamluk was the framework for specific training and forced acceptance of strict discipline. According to Martin Meredith, "military schools instilled into the youths a strict code of obedience and discipline and a clear sense of hierarchy."²⁴⁹ In a sense, the schooling given to the Mamluks

²⁴⁹ Meredith, *The Fortunes of Africa*, 146.

warped and manipulated their frame of mind and instilled in them a new and unquestionable truth; as a result, they were conditioned to follow orders instinctively. The education process resulted in the Mamluks becoming the only group of individuals in Egypt and surrounding regions that displayed such an intense degree of loyalty to their masters. The strict discipline and training given to the Mamluks therefore resulted in their masters showing them increased favoritism.

Brought in as young children, male and female Mamluks were sold to the sultan and emirs or military commanders. The more fortunate Mamluks were assigned to the sultan's household and were expected to rise to high positions in the Mamluk hierarchy.²⁵⁰ While females were incorporated into domestic services or sent to harems, most males were sent to barracks or other quarters in preparation for extensive religious and military schooling. The Arab historian Ibn Khaldun states after the arrival of Turkish slaves:

By means of slavery, [the Turks] learn glory and blessing and religion with the firm resolve of true believers and yet with nomadic virtues unsullied by debased nature...and with their ardor unbroken by the profusion of luxury... and Islam rejoices in the benefit which it gains through them, and the branches of the kingdom flourish with the freshness of youth.²⁵¹

It is clear that Ibn Khaldun thinks highly of the Mamluks and gives much credit to their simple living environment and religious instruction. Fittingly, scholars began by teaching the Mamluks Arabic and the Islamic religious laws of the Qur'an and Shari'a. In the biography of Amir al-Jabarti is included an account of the Mamluk 'Ali ibn 'Abdallah; according to al-Jabarti,

²⁵⁰ Meredith, *The Fortunes of Africa*, 146.

²⁵¹ Ibn Khaldun, *Kitab al-Ibar wa-diwan al-mubtada wa'l-khabar*, vol. 5, p. 371; English translation in *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry*, by Bernard Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 65.

“[‘Abdallah] was brought up in the Harem, studied the Koran and some elements of theology and was trained in military games and exercises and in the shooting of arrows.”²⁵² This is one of the few accounts al-Jabarti offers about the upbringing of a Mamluk slave.

Additionally, Niall Christie includes “horsemanship and fighting with a lance, sword and composite bow, as well as a shield and other weapons” in Mamluk training.²⁵³ In battle, the Mamluks were known for the effectiveness of their “shock charges,” and became skilled at “standing, rapid-fire arrow volleys that enabled them to decimate more mobile foes like the Mongols.”²⁵⁴ Horse archery was also a specialty skill taught to the Mamluks that encompassed the use of a short, recurved bow. Due to the size of the bow and the addition of a horse, this fighting style and weaponry were considered superior by the Arabs in comparison to the use of the medieval English longbow or any such weapons.²⁵⁵

Usama Ibn Munquidh, a native Syrian who took up service with many of the most prominent courts of the region in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, includes multiple examples of prestigious Mamluks in his work written in the mid twelfth century, *The Book of Contemplation*. He tells the story of a Mamluk named Yaqut the Tall, who accompanied Usama’s father and two uncles on a campaign to defeat a group of Franks. In the battle, Usama’s father and uncles would have been killed if it was not for Yaqut; the Mamluk thrust a spear at an oncoming Frank horseman and killed him, a second horseman, and both of their horses in one blow.²⁵⁶ Usama also writes about a Mamluk named Lu’lu, who was known for his hunting and archery skills: Lu’lu

²⁵² Al-Jabarti in “Studies in al-Jabarti I. Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans” by David Ayalon, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 3, no. 2 (August 1960): 159.

²⁵³ Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, 103.

²⁵⁴ Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, 63.

²⁵⁵ Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 4.

²⁵⁶ Usama Ibn Munquidh, *The Book of Contemplation*, trans. Paul Cobb (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 61.

was out hunting and rustled up ten hares killing nine of them with his pike.²⁵⁷ These anecdotes are exaggerated, but it is clear that the Mamluks were trained extensively. The Mamluks had such a high skill level that it was said they could even “make sword cuts to precise depths and bodily locations, depending on their leaders’ instructions.”²⁵⁸

The rest of the Mamluks’ education encompassed specialized military training drawn on the Muslim tradition of *furusiyya*, a set of military standards dating back to the eighth century. *Furusiyya* included not only horseback riding and weapons training, but also hunting, veterinary skills, athletics, and strict standards of behavior roughly corresponding to the European concept of chivalry.²⁵⁹ There were also various military manuals that the Ayyubids and other Arabs abided by, which fostered loyalty between them and their Mamluks and their dependence upon them: *The Memoir of al-Harawi on Stratagems of War* written by Abu’l-Hassan ‘Ali al-Harawi between 1192 and 1215, serves as such a guide. Al-Harawi states, “Let [the emir] allocate each unit himself, not depending on anyone else...Let him build up the centre [of the army], placing many men there and picking elite troops, for it is possible that it will be targeted [by the enemy].”²⁶⁰ This simple instruction sets the stage for how Arab masters began to develop loyalty between their Mamluks since the audience of this instruction book is being commanded to organize the army himself rather than establishing an elaborate chain of command and creating a disconnect between the military commander and his troops. There is no direct evidence that al-Harawi’s memoir was widely received, but similar guidebooks were known to have been followed meticulously by Arab commanders. The result would consist of Arab armies being solely made up of elite forces, which would most likely refer to Mamluks during the twelfth and

²⁵⁷ Munquidh, *The Book of Contemplation*, 225.

²⁵⁸ Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, 104.

²⁵⁹ Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, 103.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 147.

thirteenth centuries since they were so highly utilized. Also, if the emir himself was among the troops, there would be a higher potential for loyalty to be cultivated between him and his troops. Without a “middleman” giving orders and conducting the business of the emir, the Mamluks would only be building loyalty with a single leader rather than a lengthy, complex chain of command.

It should also be acknowledged that these Mamluks began as slaves from foreign regions. The children of Mamluks who were born into the slave institution rather than brought in from outlying regions were prohibited from following in their fathers' occupations in order to maintain strict discipline. They were still allowed to serve in the army, but were not granted their fathers' titles.²⁶¹ The fourteenth century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, who spent much time in Egypt and wrote about the advantages of the slave employment system, stated, “The rulers choose from among these Mamluks, who are imported to them, horsemen and soldiers. These Mamluks are more courageous in war and endure privation better than the sons of Mamluks who had preceded them and who were reared in easy circumstances and in the shadow of rulership.”²⁶² Loyalty can also be tied to the reasoning behind the decision to disregard the children of Mamluks. The children of Mamluks already integrated into the system primarily would be tied to their Mamluk parents rather than any master or patron. The loyalty between Mamluk children and other individuals or leaders would result in a higher risk of rebellion or disloyalty in the armies if the sons of Mamluks were allowed to hold the same position or occupation as their fathers.

²⁶¹ Meredith, *The Fortunes of Africa*, 146.

²⁶² *Ibid*, 146.

At the culmination of their training, the Mamluks graduated in a group ceremony, were freed, and routinely joined the “retinue of their former owners” who became their patrons.²⁶³ Even with their obtained freedom, they remained employees of the Muslim armies; this is what separated the Mamluks from other domestic slaves owned by the sultan or his emirs. Although with freedom one might think the Mamluks would have left their masters (now patrons), the Mamluks continued to be loyal and remained a revered military force. Genuine and long-lasting loyalty between a patron and slave began after the Mamluk obtained freedom; Opportunities for Mamluks to excel within the Ayyubid army increased and bonds with their masters intensified compared to their isolation during training.²⁶⁴ The loyalty developed would later aid them in attaining power and forming the Mamluk Sultanate.

Throughout the Mamluks’ education and training, social bonds formed between Mamluks and their masters. Each type of bond affected the outcome of events and the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate differently. The master-slave relationship in particular later enabled the Mamluks to receive positions of power within the military and state. One clear example of a master-slave bond appears in Usama Ibn Munquidh’s *The Book of Contemplation*. Usama was reflecting on an event involving his uncle, ‘Izz al-Dawla Nasr, who was captured by a foreign king while traveling and held captive. ‘Izz al-Dawla Nasr was entrusted to an elite guard, who kept watch over him, and the only person allowed to see ‘Izz al-Dawla Nasr was his Mamluk, Sham’un. Together, they planned ‘Izz al-Dawla’s escape by switching clothes to disguise ‘Izz al-Dawla Nasr as Sham’un. The king was astonished by Sham’un’s daring actions and asked him if he was afraid of having his head cut off.²⁶⁵ His response was, “If you would have cut off my head and my lord escaped to return to his home, then I would have been happy. For he only bought me

²⁶³ Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, 104.

²⁶⁴ Ayalon, *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, 90

²⁶⁵ Munquidh, *The Book of Contemplation*, 66.

and raised me so that I might redeem him with my own life.”²⁶⁶ Another account retells the story of Sham’un jumping in front of a spear to save his master, which resulted in him getting two of his ribs cut out of his body. He then carried his ribs around in a box as a reminder of what happened that day.²⁶⁷ The actions of Sham’un are examples of a Mamluk’s true loyalty to his master. Although Usama, who was well traveled, resided in Syria, the same values and upbringing were instilled in all Mamluks regardless of what region they lived in. If loyalty such as this existed between most Mamluks and their masters, it is no surprise their masters granted them authority and power.

Language also reveals the loyalty and personal bonds created between Mamluks and their masters. For example, the term *mamluk* used in the phrase “*ana mamluk al-sultan wa-tahta ta atihi*” that is found in various works, including al-Safadi’s *A ‘yan al- ‘Asr*, emphasizes the connection toward the Sultan. The phrase itself is translated as, “I am a Mamluk of the sultan and I obey him.”²⁶⁸ The term *mamluk* originates and is attributed with its definition, “owned,” in this context. However, having a name that is connected directly to subordination to the Sultan lends to the idea that a more direct relationship and strong bond of loyalty were developed between the Sultan and his subordinate Mamluks.

Additionally, language reveals familial bonds between Mamluks and their masters. The term used most commonly to represent a Mamluk’s master or owner was *ustadh*, meaning teacher or master. The bonds formed between the Mamluk and his *ustadh* varied, but some had very close relationships where the Mamluk referred to his *ustadh* as his father. In response to this, the *ustadh* reciprocated at times by making the slave his heir.²⁶⁹ Robert Irwin observed from

²⁶⁶ Ibid, 66.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, 66.

²⁶⁸ Koby Yosef, “The Term Mamluk and Slave Status during the Mamluk Sultanate,” *Al-Qantara* (2013): 9-10.

²⁶⁹ Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 4.

Islamic juridical texts that when a man liberated a slave, he gave the slave life and therefore became his father in a sense, resulting in the Mamluk becoming a member of their master's family.²⁷⁰ The artificial familial bonds created thus connected the Mamluk to his master's position and wealth if named as an heir. Hasan ibn 'Ali of Tus, an eleventh century scholar and vizier, includes lines of a poem in his work *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings* that read – One obedient slave is better than three hundred sons; for the latter desire their father's death, the former his master's glory.²⁷¹ The poetic lines further illustrate the favor shown to Mamluks by their masters, even over their own kin, and exemplify how bonds of loyalty could have easily been nurtured between slave and master.

The master-slave relationship developed even further once the Mamluk was freed. After they were granted freedom, the slave status was transformed into a client status, thus transitioning the master-slave relationship into a patron-client relationship. When their patrons or masters presented them with freedom, the Mamluks were indebted to them and consequently remained loyal. Al-Jabarti asserts, "The strong and intimate links binding the mamluk to his patron are also revealed by the fact that he is called quite often his son (*walad*) and the patron, in his turn, is called his mamluk's father (*walid*);"²⁷² furthermore, "after [the patron's] death, they are called his orphans (*aytam*)."²⁷³ The language used in describing these relationships is extremely family oriented. Al-Jabarti provides an example of this familial relationship and

²⁷⁰ Ibid, 4.

²⁷¹ Nizam al-Mulk (Hasan ibn 'Ali of Tus), *The Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasat-nama* translated by Hubert Darke in *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), 117.

²⁷² Al-Jabarti, in "Studies in al-Jabarti I. Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans" by David Ayalon, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 3 (continued), no. 3 (October, 1960): 285.

²⁷³ Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti I," 285.

discusses the Mamluk belonging to Amir Murad Bak, known as Muhammad Bak al-Alfi, who refers to the emir as “my father (*walidi*) Ibrahim Bak.”²⁷⁴

Adding to the “familial” bond, the Mamluks developed bonds within their own ranks and were tied by strong feelings of pride and fellowship to their comrades living in the same household.²⁷⁵ This relationship between “comrades in bondage” is what Clifford describes as *khushdashiyah*.²⁷⁶ *Khushdashiyah* encompassed every possible internal relationship of the Mamluks between each other as their training, education, and military experiences bonded them. Clifford argues that these bonds were essentially meaningless or held little stature in the grand scheme of the Mamluk military institution and the rise of the Mamluk Sultanate; however, these bonds provide the only explanation for how the Mamluks, specifically the Bahri Mamluks, were able to eventually come to power as a unit rather than individuals fighting amongst each other. There are little to no accounts provided by contemporary Arab historians of internal fighting or conflict between the Bahri Mamluks until after the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate; even then, few references exist that would indicate a lack of loyalty or ethnic solidarity within the entire group of Bahri Mamluks. Therefore, despite what some scholars such as Clifford have said, it is important not to disregard these bonds because they reveal the Mamluks’ source of power and esteem that was essential within their own ranks and in Egypt.

Sexuality also played a role in the cultivation of personal relationships between Mamluks and their masters. According to Steven Oberhelman, sex in the medieval Islamic world was

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 285-286.

²⁷⁵ Behrens-Abouseif, *Cairo of the Mamluks*, 1.

²⁷⁶ Clifford, *State formation and the structure of politics*, 47.

primarily for male pleasure and domination.²⁷⁷ This construct is not uncommon and existed in Greek and Roman societies as well. Specifically in the medieval Islamic world, male and female slaves serviced their master's sexual pleasure and desires rather than their wives, who were "jealously guarded as bearers of legitimate children."²⁷⁸ Mamluks in particular were considered to be very attractive due to their fair skin and beautiful faces. According to Everett Rowson, by the time the Mamluks took power in Egypt and Syria in the mid-thirteenth century, Arabic male poets commonly wrote about their love of boys and their beauty.²⁷⁹ An example may be found in the *Dreambook of Artemidorus*, which includes several imaginings of sexual intercourse with a slave by a male of superior status. In regards to a man's slaves, the *Dreambook* states, "To have sex with one's own female or male slave is good, for slaves are the dreamer's possessions; thus, to take pleasure in them signifies the dreamer's being pleased with his own possessions."²⁸⁰ Since the Mamluks were clearly favored over other slaves and even some of the children of their masters, it would make sense that they would be favored sexually as well, especially due to their attractive features.

There are specific examples of love affair narratives from the Mamluk period that suggest romantic feelings between a Mamluk and his Arab or Mamluk master, such as a romantic encounter between a Mamluk and Arab found in Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi's work, *The Plaint of the Lovelorn*, written in the late thirteenth century. Al-Safadi was the son of a Mamluk and wrote several homoerotic narratives throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries;²⁸¹ in *The*

²⁷⁷ Steven M. Oberhelman, "Hierarchies of Gender, Ideology, and Power in Ancient and Medieval Greek and Arabic Dream Literature," in *Homoeroticism in Classical Arabic Literature*, ed. J.W. Wright Jr. and Everett K. Rowson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 66.

²⁷⁸ Oberhelman, "Hierarchies of Gender, Ideology, and Power," 66.

²⁷⁹ Everett K. Rowson, "Two Homoerotic Narratives from Mamluk Literature: al-Safadi's Law 'at al-shaki and Ibn Daniyal's al-Mutayyam," in *Homoeroticism in Classical Arabic Literature*, ed. J.W. Wright Jr. and Everett K. Rowson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 159.

²⁸⁰ Oberhelman, "Hierarchies of Gender, Ideology, and Power," 72.

²⁸¹ Rowson, "Two Homoerotic Narratives from Mamluk Literature," 161.

Plaint of the Lovelorn, the narrator (an Arab) comes across a group of Turks on horseback carrying bows and is immediately enthralled by their beauty. After gazing upon them in awe, his eyes fall upon one Turk in particular, and he falls in love. The Arab declares to the Turkish youth that this love is God's decree and swears his devotion. In response, the Turk gives in and promises his service and obedience to the Arab, which leads to uninterrupted intimacy concluding the interaction.²⁸² In this example, homosexual love is directly connected to obedience and the declaration of service between the Turk and the Arab. Additionally, the Arab did not force himself on the Turk, but rather convinced him of his romantic feelings, leading to an informal oath of loyalty and servitude. Further examples of homosexual romantic relations between Mamluks and Arabs found in literature could suggest yet another source of developing loyalty.

In addition to familial and romantic relationships fostering loyalty, Mamluks had the opportunity to obtain titles or positions of power from their masters. According to Robert Irwin, the slavery of a mamluk, as opposed to other slaves, was the first stage in a Mamluk's livelihood that could eventually lead to occupying the highest offices in the state.²⁸³ There is evidence of Mamluks holding positions of power as early as the twelfth century. Ibn al-Athir discusses the account of the death of al-'Aziz, caliph and second Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, and his brother al-Afdal's accession to power in Egypt. They were both sons of the great Sultan Saladin. When al-'Aziz died in 1198, "the man who dominated affairs was his father's mamluke, Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas, who held authority in the country."²⁸⁴ Fakhr al-Din was an emir and military commander who needed to decide who would take power, since the son of al-'Aziz was too

²⁸² Ibid, 162.

²⁸³ Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 4.

²⁸⁴ Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh*, in *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh: The Years 589-629/1193-1231: The Ayyubids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace* translated by D.S. Richards (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005) 39.

young. Envoys sent by outside emirs made up of additional Mamluks aided in the selection of a new ruler as well.²⁸⁵ If Mamluk slaves were included or even put in charge of making decisions as significant as this, there had to be some factor present, such as loyalty, which enabled them to receive stations or titles such as emir or diplomatic consul.

Furthermore, the types of positions or responsibilities given to Mamluks were determined by whom they directly reported or answered to within the army. The Mamluk army had three principal units: the sultan's Mamluks, the emirs' Mamluks, and the halqa troops, a force of freeborn Mamluk cavalry with lesser status compared to enslaved Mamluks.²⁸⁶ The station of the Mamluks' patrons had an impact on what types of positions, if any, the Mamluks ultimately received. According to Ali Ibrahim Hasan, an Arab historian, the "People of Turkistan [the vast region in West and central Asia between Iran and Siberia, East of the Caspian Sea] heard stories about the Mamluks of Egypt and the riches of Cairo, which prompted many of the people in that land to sell their sons and daughters to have them be in the retinue of the Sultan."²⁸⁷ Being owned directly by the sultan would result in a higher probability of receiving the most prestigious titles. Additionally, the masters or patrons would bestow titles or power onto their Mamluks in response to the death of an emir under the Sultan's control. The sultan could also strip the title from an emir if he displeased him and give it to a Mamluk of his choosing. Levanoni includes an example of such a relationship in her discussion of the Mamluk ascent to power and al-Salih Ayyub, who was the last Ayyubid ruler of Egypt from 1240-1249 CE. Al-Salih Ayyub consolidated his Mamluks as a military elite by "passing down their Iqta," or form of

²⁸⁵ Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, 39.

²⁸⁶ Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2000,) 446.

²⁸⁷ Ali Ibrahim Hasan, *Tarikh al-Mamaleek al-Bahriyya*, translated by Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim in *Slavery in the Sudan: History, Documents, and Commentary* by Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013,) 24.

administrative grant, “to their children or *Khushdashes*,”²⁸⁸ meaning brother or comrade.

Levanoni continues by revealing al-Salih Ayyub’s care to reserve most Iqta’at solely for his Mamluks. Al-Maqrizi, a fourteenth century Egyptian historian, writes, “Whenever [al-Salih] imprisoned an Emir, he gave his land to one of his Mamluks; he also bestowed the title of Emir upon him, so that most Emirs of the state were his Mamluks.”²⁸⁹ Furthermore, after the death of his master, a Mamluk could also acquire a portion of his master’s title or property. The act of al-Salih bestowing titles upon his Mamluks represents a clear example of how loyalty was encouraged by granting privileges and titles to Mamluks based on their connection to their masters and their masters’ titles. When considering the large number of Mamluks that received positions, such as the Mamluks of al-Salih Ayyub, an increase in Mamluk power would be an unsurprising occurrence. Al-Salih Ayyub had such a high degree of loyalty among his Mamluks that he gave them more authority in order to strengthen his own, granting the most prominent positions in the state to his faithful and loyal Mamluks rather than to other administrators or leaders associated with the Ayyubid dynasty. Because of his Mamluks’ dependence, al-Salih would still be able to exert his authority over each region: no matter what power the Mamluks held, Ayyub would still have ultimate control. For example, after conquering Damascus, al-Salih Ayyub selected Mu’in al-Din ibn Shaykh (a Mamluk) to be his deputy there rather than another Arab or member of the dynasty, since his son was too young to hold positions of power. Husam al-Din ibn abi’ Ali, another Mamluk selected after Mu’in al-Din, was given command of the army situated in Syria by al-Salih Ayyub, in addition to “extensive executive power.”²⁹⁰ Again, these Mamluk promotions exemplify the increase in authority gained from the strong devotion between the Mamluks and their patrons.

²⁸⁸ Amalia Levanoni, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt,” *Studia Islamica*, no. 72 (1990): 125.

²⁸⁹ Levanoni, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt,” 125.

²⁹⁰ Levanoni, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt,” 128.

Another example of a Mamluk holding a prominent position is the Mamluk emir Husam ad-Din ibn Abi ‘Ali. According to Ibn Wasil, a Syrian historian who witnessed the fall of the Ayyubids and establishment of the Mamluk dynasty, Husam conducted negotiations for the surrender of Damietta, a crucial port city along the Nile River. Everyone agreed to rely on Husam ad-Din ibn Abi ‘Ali’s assistance because of his “reputation for wisdom and experience, and because of the trust that al-Malik as-Salih in him.”²⁹¹ The trust that al-Salih had in Husam can exemplify the bonds of loyalty between them. Additionally, several documents indicate the prestige tied to Mamluks: one involves the dispatching of secret messages to Ay Aba and Urus, Mamluks of Atabeg Pahlawan of the Seljuq State, who were “the most prominent of his [Mamluks], at that time the two commanders of the late Atabeg Pahlawans’s army”²⁹²; Ibn Wasil also mentions Husam, who was one of al-Malik as-Salih’s most trusted statesman and was worthy of becoming next sultan of Egypt.²⁹³ Both of these examples illustrate the frequency with which Mamluks had positions of power and responsibility given to them; an abundance of these promotions ultimately resulted in the eventual opportunity for them to claim complete power in Egypt.

With the Mamluks acquiring the majority of state and military positions, the time had come to seize power. According to Levanoni, al-Salih Ayyub’s position remained unaffected by the increase in Mamluk authority due to his own strong authority coupled with the loyalty of his Mamluk units.²⁹⁴ After his death amidst a Frankish invasion in 1249, a vacuum was created, and the Mamluk officials al-Salih strategically placed in power enabled the Mamluk army to take

²⁹¹ Ibn Wasil, “Ibn Wasil on Louis’s defeat and captivity,” in *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291*, ed. Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 362.

²⁹² *Akhbar al-dawla al-saljuqiyya* in *The History of the Seljuq State: A translation with commentary of the Akhbar al-dawla al-saljuqiyya* by Clifford Edmund Bosworth, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) 115.

²⁹³ Ibn Wasil, *St. Louis’ Crusade in Arab Historians of the Crusades* by Francesco Gabrieli (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969,) 297.

²⁹⁴ Levanoni, “The Mamluks’ Ascent to Power in Egypt,” 129.

over al-Salih Ayyub's kingdom, leaving al-Salih Ayyub's son as a figurehead ruler.²⁹⁵ As previously mentioned, actual power fell upon Al-Salih Ayyub's slave wife, Shajar al-Durr, because her son was too young to rule; although she had the means to rule with the support of her husband's Mamluks, she would never be able to maintain enough loyalty among the populace to sustain a functioning and successful Sultanate because she was a woman. This resulted in Shajar al-Durr marrying the Bahri Mamluk Aybeg al-Turkumani in 1250, establishing the co-ruling oath of *Atabak al-'Asakir*. The oath of allegiance to Shajar al-Durr included in the co-ruling agreement made the "formal status of the *Atabakiyya* (commander of the army) equal to that of the Sultanate"²⁹⁶; this meant that her new Mamluk husband would have control equal to that of a lone Ayyubid Sultan. This agreement worked for a short time until Aybeg began promoting his own Mamluks and took a second wife in an attempt to consolidate his position.²⁹⁷ In response to this, Shajar murdered him and ended up murdered herself shortly after by a faction formed around Aybeg's young son.²⁹⁸ With the last of the Ayyubids finally out of the picture, the Mamluks were growing closer to claiming full authority.

By 1259, political unrest still persisted in Egypt with various Mamluk factions vying for power. The Mamluk Baybars and his army took advantage of the situation to seize power and rebelled in order to end the unrest. Despite Baybars' efforts to claim the Sultanate, a final threat remained; the Mongols began moving closer to Egypt and threatening the Mamluks' fragile hold on their newfound power. Sultan Qutuz, the current Mamluk Sultan in Egypt, charged Baybars with warding off the Mongol invasion. In 1260, the Mamluk and Mongol armies confronted each other at Ain Jalut near the Jezreel Valley, which resulted in Mamluk victory. Within the year,

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 129.

²⁹⁶ Levanoni, "The Mamluks' Ascent to Power in Egypt," 137.

²⁹⁷ Jason Thompson, *A History of Egypt: From Earliest Times to the Present* (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 190.

²⁹⁸ Thompson, *A History of Egypt*, 190.

Baybars killed Sultan Qutuz, enabling Baybars to assume rule. With Baybars now in power, the rebellions concluded, allowing the Mamluks to rule over both Egypt and Syria and officially form the Mamluk Sultanate.²⁹⁹

After the formation of the Mamluk Sultanate, the qualities that had aided the Mamluks in their rise to power remained present in the organization of the Sultanate. The lives of the early Mamluk sultans such as al-Zahir Baybars (1260-77) and al-Mansur Qalawun (1279-90) show the continuation of a slave system containing the same core aspects as the institution formed centuries before; both sultans maintained strict control over their Mamluks through rigorous training and advancement systems intended to affirm the Mamluks' *khushdashiyya* bonds.³⁰⁰

Mamluks employed under the Mamluk Sultanate maintained a modest lifestyle and rigorous discipline within their military training program to promote a sense of respect and authority.³⁰¹ Similar to the Mamluk slaves under the control of Ayyubid Sultans, strict discipline and training remained vital in order to keep control over the state. Internal loyalty and *khushdashiyya* bonds were an extension of this training and continued to support the overall political organization of the early Mamluk Sultanate.

There is specific evidence of continued patronage in the time of Mamluk Sultan Baybars when he named his own favorite Mamluk, Bilik al-Khazindar al-Zahiri, vice-regent of Egypt.³⁰² The favoritism and consequent elevation given to Bilik al-Khazindar is comparable to how al-Salih Ayyub viewed and treated his own Mamluks. However, Baybars's actions had a different result: originally a Mamluk military slave before becoming Sultan, Baybars shared a common

²⁹⁹ Erik Hildinger, *Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001,) 161-167.

³⁰⁰ Thomas Philip and Ulrich Haarmann, ed. *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 18.

³⁰¹ Philip and Haarmann, *The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society*, 18.

³⁰² Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages*, 39.

ethnicity with his Mamluks. This ethnic homogeneity did not exist between al-Salih Ayyub and his Mamluks; instead, there was a large distribution of power among differing ethnicities, resulting in a power-struggle between the ruling Ayyubid dynasty and the Mamluks. Therefore, when Baybars acted similarly to al-Salih Ayyub in regards to the positioning of his clients and slaves, the new Sultanate functioned successfully.

Loyalties developed by the Mamluks were crucial to their rise to power. Education, personal relationships, and the acquisition of positions of power were the three primary components of Mamluk life that fostered intense bonds of loyalty and enabled the Mamluks to establish the Mamluk Sultanate. Although it may appear as if the development of the Sultanate primarily occurred from a Mamluk abundance of power, loyalty between Mamluks and their masters was the driving force behind their acquisition of power; Mamluks' titles were a result of their loyalty and connection to their masters or patrons. Combined with loyalty to their masters, loyalty shared between the Mamluk ranks played a role in solidifying unity and leading the Mamluks to finally rule as a cohesive unit. There were additional outside factors that facilitated the crumbling of the Ayyubid dynasty and other Muslim dynasties, such as the Mongol invasion and Frankish conflicts, but loyalty remains the core foundation of Mamluk power.

The formation of the Mamluk Sultanate is a clear example of the direct relationship between loyalty and power. Strong bonds of loyalty between individuals with a common origin or common goal can determine the outcome for said individuals. Although forming the Sultanate was most likely not premeditated until the possibility became clearer in the thirteenth century, maintaining intense degrees of loyalty between their masters and comrades almost solely determined the result of the Mamluks obtaining full power. Understanding the influences of

loyalty and the effect it can have on the accumulation of power ultimately allows scholars to consider how united groups of individuals can increase their power and dominance in society.

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“To weep over his faults and his fate”: America's Political Factions on the Trial
and Execution of Louis XVI

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In the early spring of 1793, the return of life to the American landscape was interrupted by a grave announcement of death. As bells droned in the steeples, their melancholy resonance spread the news faster than word of mouth or print. Louis XVI, king of France and champion of the American Revolution, was dead, the victim of the executioner's blade.*

As a fledgling nation, the United States of America was generally not concerned with foreign affairs that did not have a direct impact on the Republic. The exception was the French Revolution. King Louis XVI had assisted the Americans during their fight for independence from Great Britain, and now French revolutionaries were eager to gain a similar freedom from their king.³⁰³ The royal family had ruled France as absolutists without parliament, the Estates-General, from 1614 until the French Revolution began in 1789.³⁰⁴ France under Louis had been America's first ally during the American Revolution. The two countries signed a Treaty of Alliance and a Treaty of Amity and Commerce during the war, and they remained in effect throughout Louis's life.³⁰⁵ While many Americans sympathized with the cause of the French revolutionaries, they believed that without the king's substantial assistance, Britain would still rule the thirteen colonies. Between 1792 and 1793, the final years of Louis's reign – and years in which he was shorn of his power – Americans' response to the French Revolution ranged from royalist ambivalence to radical revolutionary support, but even some of the Revolution's most

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³⁰³ Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788 – 1800*, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993), 309.

³⁰⁴ Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution: A History*, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1902), 106.

³⁰⁵ "The Franco-American Treaty of Alliance, 6 February 1778," *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 25, 583–595; "The Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 6 February 1778," *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 25, 595–626.

rabid American supporters did not publicly wish for any harm to come to the persons of the royal family.³⁰⁶

This essay analyzes how the fate of Louis XVI influenced U.S. political culture and civil society in the early 1790s. The ways in which Americans viewed the king influenced their opinions about foreign policy in regard to the French Revolution. Americans weighed their ethical judgments surrounding the monarch's execution against their political ideals to define what they believed to be the best course of action for the United States in response to the French crises.

Americans viewed the French king positively during the 1780s, for he assisted them in their fight for independence against Britain in the American Revolution. For the most part, they did not debate why the monarch supported their cause, be it for a genuine love of liberty or as revenge against the British for humiliating France during the French and Indian War; they were simply grateful for his aid. Many Independence Day celebrations and other festivals in the United States included toasts to Louis XVI, and Americans continued to drink to his health until his death.³⁰⁷ At the end of the 1780s, Americans celebrated the political changes in France as Louis moved from absolutism and recalled the Estates-General, marking the beginning of what most believed would be a gradual progression toward democracy. It was only with the storming of the Bastille as the French Revolution began in July 1789 that Americans became aware of Louis XVI's precarious position. Those in the know did not view him as a tyrant; they saw a kind-hearted man who wanted the best for his people but lacked the stamina to enforce his

³⁰⁶ Heather Sommer, "'Great and beloved friend and ally': Louis XVI and the Americans," work in progress.

³⁰⁷ "Massachusetts. Boston, June 4," *Thomas's Massachusetts Spy*, vol. 17, iss. 793, June 12, 1788, 3; "Providence (Rhode-Island) July 5," *Newport Herald*, vol. 2, iss. 72, July 10, 1788, 2; "Annapolis, April 30," *The New-Jersey Journal, and Political Intelligencer*, iss. 240, May 21, 1788, 3; "Celebration of the Festival of St. John," *The Massachusetts Centinel*, vol. 9, iss. 30, June 28, 1788, 121; "Philadelphia, July 5," *The Virginia Gazette, and Agricultural Repository*, vol. 2, iss. 42, July 12, 1792, 3.

will.³⁰⁸ In various publications, Americans called on the king to accept democratic principles, and were pleased when it appeared that he did so. This common approval was short lived, and Americans soon developed varying opinions about their ally. Within months, as the Revolution turned violent again, the French crisis had escalated far beyond the king’s control. The Federalists remained supportive of Louis, but the Republicans began to doubt the king’s policies and his ability to govern an egalitarian state.³⁰⁹

The general American cordiality toward Louis XVI continued into the early 1790s, but growing political divisions began to shake it as Federalists and Republicans became distinct political factions that held starkly different visions for the U.S. government. The Federalists, supporting a strong national government in America, initially supported a democratic government in France, but eventually saw the French Revolution as a breeding ground for untamed chaos. The Republicans favored a limited federal power in the United States and were sympathetic to the French Revolution because of its ideological ties to the American Revolution and the liberal politics of French reformers. These emerging coalitions established rival newspapers to advocate policies and to mobilize public opinion.³¹⁰

The Federalist and Republican split over Louis XVI can be seen by comparing each faction’s newspapers from the year 1792. While the Federalist *Gazette of the United States* and the Republican *National Gazette*, both located in the capital, Philadelphia, oftentimes printed the same stories from overseas sources,³¹¹ occasionally they added their own commentary to the

³⁰⁸ See, for example, “Siege of the Bastille,” *The Herald of Freedom, and the Federal Advertiser*, vol. 3, iss. 4, September 25, 1789, 14; “July 17, 1789,” *The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. 1, 132; “Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, June 17, 1789,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 15, 187–191.

³⁰⁹ Sommer, “‘Great and beloved friend and ally’: Louis XVI and the Americans,” work in progress.

³¹⁰ The Federal Judicial Center, “The Sedition Act Trials – Historical Background and Documents,” *History of the Federal Judiciary* (Web, The Federal Judicial Center Foundation, 2013), 1.

³¹¹ “London, November 1,” *The Gazette of the United States*, vol. 3, iss. 77, January 21, 1792, 305; “The Protest of the Princes of the House of Bourbon, Against the Acceptance of the Constitution Letters,” *National Gazette*, vol. 1, iss. 26, January 26, 1792, 104.

reports, which reflected their beliefs about the condition of France and its struggling king. In response to Louis' acceptance of the French Constitution in September 1791, for instance, the *Gazette of the United States* reported that the monarch willingly approved the document and “feels profoundly how glorious it is to be the king of a free people.”³¹² The *National Gazette* conversely claimed that “Louis the 16th has no sincere love of the new constitution” and that his “hypocritical submission and coaxing patriotism will only be the more dangerous to the nation.”³¹³ Other newspapers aligned with a particular faction followed the same example.

It is no contradiction to note that while the Federalists very much sympathized with Louis XVI, they believed he could have done better. They supported the ideals behind the Revolution in relation to government reform, liberalization, and democracy, but also believed that Louis XVI was a good and honest man who sincerely supported the reform and would lead France's transition from an absolute monarchy to a more autonomous state. The Federalists respected the king despite his indecisiveness and mishandling of the escalating mayhem that surrounded the reforms.³¹⁴ While the *Gazette of the United States* consistently spoke in support of Louis XVI, the *National Gazette* published more disparaging statements about the monarch, including a claim that he and the “existing race of Kings are generally ideots, sap-heads, gluttons, or soakers.”³¹⁵ The Republican editor considered the king's situation trivial compared to other events in France, such as the threat of invasion by foreign monarchical powers bent upon destroying the Revolution, which were more critical to the interests of the French revolutionaries.³¹⁶ The newspaper turned its attention back to the monarch when the

³¹² “Philadelphia, March 17,” *The Gazette of the United States*, vol. 3, iss. 93, March 17, 1792, 371.

³¹³ “London, Nov. 15,” *National Gazette*, vol. 1, iss. 25, January 23, 1792, 97.

³¹⁴ “August 16. War with Russia,” *The Gazette of the United States*, vol. 4, iss. 38, October 10, 1792, 150.

³¹⁵ “Letters from Pittsburgh,” *National Gazette*, vol. 1, iss. 55, May 7, 1792, 219. All quotes are depicted in their original form, including archaic or incorrect spellings, punctuation, and capitalization.

³¹⁶ “Philadelphia. September 26, 1792,” *National Gazette*, vol. 1, iss. 95, September 26, 1792, 379.

revolutionaries suspected he had aligned himself with foreign powers in a conspiracy against his own country. The French revolutionaries believed this act of treason warranted the overthrow of Louis XVI, and the *National Gazette* claimed that the French people were justified in their stance.³¹⁷

The remainder of 1792 continued to be filled with the accounts of France's increased bloodshed, morphing administration, and trial of Louis XVI. Americans watched as the French government became increasingly republican and ultimately extinguished Louis XVI's power.³¹⁸ The failed Flight to Varennes, among other scandals, led to the monarch's arrest and imprisonment in Paris. On September 21, 1792, the National Assembly formally reduced the king of France to a simple citizen, and dubbed him "Citizen Louis Capet." Many Americans at home and abroad anxiously awaited news about their ally.

Not all Americans depended on newspaper reports for news about the king. William Short, a Republican diplomat stationed in France as America's *chargé d'affaires*, kept top officials in the U.S. government informed about Louis XVI during the French Revolution. Short was critical of the Revolutionaries, whom he referred to as a "race of miscreants," and was appalled by their vile treatment of the monarch.³¹⁹ Short greatly feared for the king's safety amongst the "monsters" leading the Revolution and the "howling mob" under their influence.³²⁰ After the National Assembly imprisoned Louis and his family, Short reported, "They are still alive, but suffer a thousand deaths daily."³²¹

³¹⁷ "Foreign Affairs. Paris, Aug. 11," *National Gazette*, vol. 1, iss. 99, October 10, 1792, 394.

³¹⁸ "Paris, March 27," *The Virginia Gazette, and Agricultural Repository*, vol. 2, iss. 38, June 14, 1792, 2.

³¹⁹ "To Alexander Hamilton from William Short, 28 June 1792," *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 11, 593–600.

³²⁰ "To Thomas Jefferson from William Short, 18 September 1792," *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 24, 390–402.

³²¹ "To Thomas Jefferson from William Short, 15 August 1792," *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 24, 298–299.

Like Short, Gouverneur Morris, a Federalist and the U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to France, was also disheartened by the king's position. He continued to believe that Louis tried to provide the best for his subjects, but feared that he would never regain the trust of the French people. In a letter to President George Washington, Morris attempted to predict the course of the French Revolution so that the U.S. government could plan for the future. One such forecast included the fate of the king:

You will have seen that the King is accused of high crimes and misdemeanors, but I verily believe that he wished sincerely for this nation the enjoyment of the utmost degree of liberty which the situation of circumstances will permit. What may be his fate God only knows, but history informs us that the passage of dethroned monarchs is short from the prison to the grave.³²²

In responding to Morris' letter, Washington made no direct mention of Louis XVI. He did, however, declare that no one could accurately foresee the future of the French Revolution and that the United States should not act on mere assumptions.³²³ Unfortunately for the deposed king, Morris' conjecture correctly predicted the monarch's destiny.

The radical American patriot Thomas Paine was also in France at this time, but held a less favorable view of the king than did Morris. Paine, a staunch Republican and a fervent supporter of the French Revolution, wished to bring liberty to France as he had helped to do in the United States. Although he did not speak French, he had been granted honorary French citizenship and, in 1792, was elected to the French parliament, the newly formed National

³²² "Gouverneur Morris to Washington, September 22, 1792," *The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. 1, 589-590.

³²³ "From George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 25 March 1793," *The Papers of George Washington*, Presidential Series, vol. 12, 380-381.

Convention of France, successor to the Estates-General.³²⁴ Paine believed that Louis XVI acted unlawfully against the French nation when he beseeched other monarchies to intervene in the Revolution on his behalf. In a letter to the National Convention written November 20, 1792, Paine requested that the king stand trial.³²⁵ Paine also argued against the inviolability of the king, stating that he should be tried like any other French citizen.³²⁶

In December 1792, the National Convention did put Louis XVI on trial, charging him with high treason for his attempt to flee France, gain assistance from other monarchial powers, and hinder the Revolution. After the National Convention sentenced the king to death, Paine delivered a speech on behalf of the American people. Although he fervently supported the end of the monarchy and the rise of a French republic, Paine asked his fellow Revolutionaries to spare the king's life for the sake of France's American allies: "Louis is the best friend of these [American] people," he argued. They "consider themselves as indebted to him for their liberty" and "news of his execution will give great pain to these sons of freedom." To assuage the Americans, Paine said, "I demand then, that Louis may be banished with all of his family to the American States."³²⁷ Paine's plea was to no avail. The National Convention upheld the death sentence.³²⁸

On the other side of the political spectrum, Gouverneur Morris shared Paine's distress at the verdict. He defended Louis, arguing in a letter to Secretary of State Jefferson penned soon after the trial that the only reason the king now faced execution was "because he would not adopt the harsh measures of his predecessors." Morris lamented his fate: "[I]t would seem strange that

³²⁴ Jack Fruchtman, *The Political Philosophy of Thomas Paine*, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 192.

³²⁵ "On the Propriety of Bringing Louis XVI to Trial," *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, vol. 3, 114–118.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ "The Speech of Thomas Paine in the National Convention of France," *The Virginia Gazette, and Agricultural Repository*, vol. 2, iss. 72, April 11, 1793, 3.

³²⁸ Paine was later arrested for this and other heresies. He was within days of his own execution when the Jacobin government was overthrown.

the mildest monarch who ever filled the French throne... should be prosecuted as one of the most nefarious tyrants that ever disgraced the annals of human nature.”³²⁹

Federalist newspapers were quick to comment about the National Convention’s ruling. The *Connecticut Journal* referred to the verdict as an “unjust and iniquitous Judgment.”³³⁰ The people of Paris, however, did not share the American Federalists’ sentiments. The mobs of the French Republic shouted down the king’s final testament on the day of his execution, January 21, 1793, and cheered when the executioner triumphantly displayed Louis XVI’s severed head.³³¹ But many Americans lamented the loss of their hero and friend.

William Short, who had fled from France to Spain in light of the growing mayhem, called the execution a “horrible catastrophe.”³³² Although he disapproved of France putting the king to death, he focused on the foreign policy implications of the event more than his personal feelings. In a letter to Jefferson, Short explained that the “assassination” of Louis XVI made France a common enemy against Spain and England, and consequently made war between the European nations inevitable. He felt that the United States should not get involved in these affairs, but rather must focus on building a closer friendship with Spain without engaging in any military alliances.³³³

Federalist leaders and opinion makers across the United States published Louis XVI’s testament as soon as they received it.³³⁴ Their judgment against the Revolution was harsh. On April 6, 1793, the *Gazette of the United States* voiced its dismay, calling Louis’ execution “MURDER” and noting that the people of Providence “shewed their feelings on the melancholy

³²⁹ “Gouverneur Morris to Jefferson, December 21, 1792,” *The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. 2. 9.

³³⁰ “Death Shall be Inflicted on His Most Christian Majesty,” *Connecticut Journal*, iss. 1326, March 28, 1793, 2.

³³¹ Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution: A History*, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1902), 648.

³³² “To Thomas Jefferson from William Short, 6 March 1793,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 25, 321–331.

³³³ “To Thomas Jefferson from William Short, 3 February 1793,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 25, 139–142.

³³⁴ “Testament of Louis XVI,” *The Virginia Gazette, and Agricultural Repository*, vol. 2, iss. 72, April 11, 1793, 2–3.

occasion” by tolling the bells in the houses of worship “all the evening.”³³⁵ Vice President John Adams referred to the fallen monarch as a “martyr.”³³⁶ Chief Justice of the United States John Jay lamented the king’s “disastrous fate.”³³⁷ Alexander Hamilton strongly defended the king after his execution, stating that Americans had yet to receive satisfactory evidence to prove him guilty, and reminded Americans of the crucial role that Louis XVI’s benevolence had played when he personally aided the United States during the American Revolution.³³⁸ Writing as “Pacificus” for the *Gazette of the United States*, Hamilton called the execution “the result of a supposed political expediency, rather than of real criminality.”³³⁹

As president of the United States, George Washington was in the midst of a foreign policy crisis with France and was therefore very hesitant to voice his opinion after the untimely death of the man whom only a few years before he had characterized as America’s “great and beloved friend and ally.”³⁴⁰ Instead, Washington and Jay drafted a declaration of neutrality in light of the destruction of the monarchy under the new French Republic. In their initial blaze of emotion, Washington and Jay wrote that the king’s execution was “regretted by the friends of Humanity, and particularly by the People of America, to whom both the king and that Nation has done essential services,”³⁴¹ but apparently after reflection, they decided not to inflame relations with France, and edited it out.³⁴² All mention of Louis XVI may have been cut at the request of Thomas Jefferson, who did not want to further estrange the U.S. relationship with France now

³³⁵ “Providence, (R.I.) March 28.” *The Gazette of the United States*, vol. 4, iss. 89, April 6, 1793, 355.

³³⁶ “John Adams to John Stockdale, May 12, 1793,” *The Adams Papers*, reel 376, microfilm.

³³⁷ “Jay to Robert Goodloe Harper, January 19, 1796,” *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, vol. 4, 201.

³³⁸ “On the Reception of Edmond Charles Genet in Philadelphia, May 14–16, 1793,” *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 14, 449–450.

³³⁹ “Pacificus No. VI, July 17, 1793,” *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 15, 100–106.

³⁴⁰ “George Washington to Louis XVI, October 9, 1789,” *The Papers of George Washington*, vol. 4, 152–153.

³⁴¹ Jay, John, and George Washington. “Enclosure: [Proclamation by George Washington], April 1793,” *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 14, 308–310.

³⁴² “Neutrality Proclamation, April 22, 1793,” *The Papers of George Washington*, vol. 12, 472–474.

that the Neutrality Proclamation had effectively nullified the American-French treaties of 1778.³⁴³

Beyond this early excited draft, Washington remained virtually silent about the escalating crises in France, let alone the fate of the king. When Governor Henry Lee of Virginia inquired about Washington's opinion on the current state of France shortly after the king's execution,³⁴⁴ the president responded: "As a public character, I can say nothing on the subject of it. As a private man, I am unwilling to say much."³⁴⁵ Washington did hesitantly share his misgivings about the French Revolution with Lee, stating that the Revolutionary leaders in control of the French government would "more than probably prove [to be] the worst foes" of their own nation.³⁴⁶

In a time of great partisanship between factions, the Federalists' support for Louis XVI was so great that their newspapers strongly supported the radical Republican Thomas Paine and his attempt to save "the first Princely Hand which was stretched forth to relieve America in the hour of her distress."³⁴⁷ *The Gazette of the United States* published a "Tribute of Respect," honoring the king and commemorating Paine's unsuccessful efforts to save him.³⁴⁸ The Republican *National Gazette* also commented on Paine's plea to the National Convention, but its editor neither praised nor chastised his attempt to save Louis XVI's life. Instead the Republicans focused on Paine's acknowledgement of the king's guilt and the folly of the National Assembly for upholding the constitutional monarchy for as long as they did.³⁴⁹

³⁴³ Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, (New York, The Penguin Press, 2004) 436.

³⁴⁴ "To George Washington from Henry Lee, 29 April 1793," *The Papers of George Washington*, vol. 12, 493–495.

³⁴⁵ "George Washington to Henry Lee, May 6, 1793," *The Papers of George Washington*, vol. 12, 532–534.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ "Tribute of Respect," *The Gazette of the United States*, vol. 4, iss. 91, April 13, 1793, 363.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 363.

³⁴⁹ "No. 1 Cool Reflections relative to the French Revolution," *National Gazette* (Philadelphia), vol. 2, iss. 64, June 8, 1793, 254.

While some Republicans agreed with Paine and regretted the loss of their ally, they were hesitant to sympathize too strongly. What sentiments they did share were largely private. James Monroe refused to criticize the king too harshly, yet did not express the sort of anguish or even regret that many Federalists had. While the *Gazette of the United States* had claimed that the unfortunate death of Louis XVI greatly pained the American people, Monroe observed a less distraught reaction among Americans: “I scarcely find a man unfriendly to the French Revolution as now modified. Many regret... the execution of the king. But they seem to consider these events to a much greater one, and which they wish to see accomplished.”³⁵⁰ In his later years, Monroe revealed that he too regretted the monarch’s fate but, unlike the Federalists, he did not turn his back on the Revolution that took the king’s life.³⁵¹

Thomas Jefferson too was hesitant to grieve too deeply for America’s fallen ally. Though he had spoken amicably about the king during his time as the U.S. ambassador to France,³⁵² Jefferson hoped the king’s unfortunate end would serve as a warning to other monarchs who believed they were above the law.³⁵³ Jefferson’s mindset in 1793 prevented him from grieving over the king when more innocent Frenchmen had died in the wake of the Revolution.³⁵⁴

As time passed and the French Revolution culminated in the rise of Napoleon’s imperium, Jefferson’s harsh judgment against the monarch softened. Writing sixteen years after the king’s execution, Jefferson revealed a fondness for Louis XVI that likely would have brought scorn from more radical Republicans. He remembered: “I recognise in Louis that purity of virtue,

³⁵⁰ “To Thomas Jefferson from James Monroe, 9 May 1793,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 25, 696–698.

³⁵¹ James Monroe, *The People the Sovereigns*, (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & CO., 1867) 89.

³⁵² “Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, March 18, 1785,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 8, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 42–45; “Thomas Jefferson to John Brown Cutting, August 23, 1788,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 13, 538–539; “Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, May 9, 1789,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 15, 110–113.

³⁵³ “From Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Fay, 18 March 1793,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 25, 402.

³⁵⁴ Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty*, vol. 3, (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1962) 61.

of sincere patriotism which I knew made a part of his real character.”³⁵⁵ Jefferson retained this sentiment throughout his later years, and even had an engraving of Louis XVI hanging in the parlor of Monticello.³⁵⁶ In his autobiography, he wrote that the execution had been a mistake: if the king had not been beheaded, he would have eagerly cooperated with the National Assembly to create a constitutional monarchy “with powers so large as to enable him to do all the good of his station, and so limited as to restrain him from it’s abuse.”³⁵⁷

Both Jefferson and Monroe were more critical of Louis XVI in the months after his death than they were long after the French Revolution. They clearly felt that they needed to push aside their humanity for the sake of liberty in France and beyond. Like Washington, Jefferson and Monroe also may have concealed their true feelings for the monarch for political reasons. These Republicans, however, likely detached themselves from their moral compulsions in order to facilitate their continual support of the Revolution, whereas Washington wished to remain impartial. It was not until the Revolution and their respective presidencies came to a close that Jefferson and Monroe expressed remorse for the loss of their former ally.

Other Republicans were neither as restrained nor as sympathetic for Louis XVI after his execution. They used platitudes to assert that the king’s shortcomings had led him to the scaffold, and argued that America could not have prevented it. On May 11, 1793, the Republican *National Gazette* acknowledged the assistance that Louis had given to the cause of liberty in the United States, but added, “we are not in gratitude bound to support him in a wrong thing,” like opposing his own people’s revolution for liberty. Summing up, the writer hard-heartedly

³⁵⁵ “Thomas Jefferson to Ireneé Amelot De Lacroix, February 3, 1809,” *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Founders Online, National Archives, 1.

³⁵⁶ “Louis XVI (Engraving),” *The Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia*, Monticello.org. Accessed July 29, 2015.

³⁵⁷ Thomas Jefferson, *The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 149.

concluded: “To weep over his faults and his fate, is to weep over the weaknesses and misfortunes of the human race.”³⁵⁸

The harshest newspaper comments came from articles written by radical Republican correspondents and published by Philip Freneau, the editor of the *National Gazette*. In an article sardonically titled “Louis Capet has lost his Caput,” a *National Gazette* author fully supported the execution on behalf of democracy.³⁵⁹ Yet even the most raucous Republican articles recognized the king’s humanity. Despite these remarks, the writer did not suggest Louis was a cold-blooded tyrant: “To a certain extent Louis was sincere. He was willing: nay anxious, to produce for the people all the happiness he could give them under deposition.... But he had no idea of retrenching his prerogative.”³⁶⁰

The *National Gazette* had been founded by Republicans to counter the influence of the Federalist *Gazette of the United States*. The matter of Louis XVI turned, perhaps by design, into a partisan weapon used against the Federalists. Articles denounced the king for hindering the French Republic and mocked his sympathizers.³⁶¹ The radicals said the Federalists were foolish to mourn the execution, for the king had broken the oath he had taken under the new constitution. They also claimed that there could be no free people under a king, and nothing should stand in the way of liberty.³⁶²

The fierce Republican editor Freneau, who demanded that the United States Senate remove the portraits of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette from its chambers after the fall of the

³⁵⁸ “For the National Gazette. to the Citizens of the United States,” *National Gazette*, vol. 2, iss. 56, May 11, 1793, 221.

³⁵⁹ “Louis Capet has lost his Caput,” *National Gazette*, vol. 2, iss. 50, April 20, 1793, 197.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ “From a Correspondent,” *National Gazette*, vol. 2, iss. 41, March 20, 1793, 163; “From a Correspondent,” *National Gazette*, vol. 2, iss. 42, March 23, 1793, 167. The radical Republicans may have targeted Lafayette because of his closeness to George Washington.

³⁶² “New-York, April 15,” *National Gazette*, vol. 2, iss. 50, April 20, 1793, 198.

French monarchy,³⁶³ eagerly published articles in the *National Gazette* that labeled Federalists as monarchists. While he did not hesitate to criticize the dead king, Freneau aimed his articles more toward the “degenerate class” of Federalists than toward the monarch himself.³⁶⁴ Freneau saw the Federalists’ repeated expressions of gratitude toward Louis XVI when they lamented his execution as indicative of their true royalist leanings.³⁶⁵

The Federalists retorted to the radicals’ jeers. To the Republican extremists’ claims that the late king had supported the American Revolution solely for state policy and that an absolute monarch could not love liberty,³⁶⁶ Hamilton emphasized that the king himself had decided to aid the American Revolutionaries.³⁶⁷ In his *Pacificus* essays, Hamilton made the case that the alliance with France signed during the American Revolution was with Louis XVI, not France itself. Therefore, the execution of Louis abrogated the treaty. On relations with France, Hamilton went so far as to claim that “there was no man in France more personally friendly to the cause of this country than Louis the 16th.”³⁶⁸

Republican House speaker James Madison recognized that the majority of American citizens lamented the fate of Louis XVI, but believed their pity related merely to the man, not the monarch. Doubtful that the king was blameless, Madison wrote to Secretary of State Jefferson: “If he were a Traytor, he ought to be punished as well as any other man.”³⁶⁹ Writing as *Helvidius* to counter Hamilton’s *Pacificus*, Madison rebuked Hamilton’s implication that the treaty of alliance signed during the American Revolution was with Louis XVI and not the French people.

³⁶³ Marcus Daniel, *Scandal and Civility: Journalism and the Birth of American Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 101.

³⁶⁴ “[United States; Louis; America; England],” *National Gazette* (Philadelphia), vol. 2, iss. 44, March 30, 1793, 175.

³⁶⁵ “For the National Gazette,” *National Gazette* (Philadelphia), vol. 2, iss. 41, March 20, 1793, 162.

³⁶⁶ “*Pacificus* no. V, July 13-17, 1793,” *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 15, 90-95.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁸ “*Pacificus* no. V, July 13-17, 1793,” *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 15, 90-95.

³⁶⁹ “From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 12 April 1793,” *The Papers of James Madison*, vol. 15, 6–9.

Madison argued that the change in France's government could not be used to nullify treaties with the French Republic³⁷⁰ and that the treaty was with the French nation rather than the sovereign. He criticized the former French monarchy as an establishment, although he did not criticize Louis XVI himself.³⁷¹

As reflected in each faction's conflicting viewpoints, American opinions on Louis XVI between 1792 and 1793 were both complicated and sincere. Although few supported him as an absolute monarch, most of the U.S. political elite viewed Louis XVI as a champion who had helped pave the way for American independence. The French Revolution proved to be a source of conflict among Americans who were torn between France's fight for liberty and their own affection and gratefulness for the monarch and his role in the American Revolution.

While Federalists and Republicans held opposing opinions regarding the French Revolution, many shared similar thoughts about Louis XVI. The Federalists were more accepting of the order exemplified by the French monarchy than were the Republicans, and were made nervous by the disruptive radicalism that Republicans embraced. The Federalists vocalized their support for the king more frequently than did the Republicans, and adamantly protested his execution. It is evident that some radical Republicans supported the execution for the advance of democracy in France, but they still recognized and appreciated the role that the king had played in the fight for American independence.

The fate of Louis XVI was a touchy subject for foreign policy reasons. For the most part, political leaders refrained from voicing their opinions in public about how he met his end. Just as Republican leaders were hesitant to speak out against their former ally, some Federalist leaders

³⁷⁰ "Helvidius III," *The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794: Toward the Completion of the American Founding*, 78 – 79.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

like Washington were reluctant to openly support the monarch because of the U.S.'s precarious relationship with the Republic, which had sent Louis to the guillotine. The Republicans, however, kept silent for ideological reasons more than for matters of state. Republicans believed that criticizing the French Revolutionaries would suggest that the struggle for democracy and liberty could go too far, which was the sort of accusation the more order-conscious and hierarchical Federalists often made. The argument over Louis XVI's execution led to further division between the Federalists and Republicans, for Republicans did not let the king's death stop them from supporting the French Revolution, while Federalists cited the execution as one more piece of evidence about the Revolutionaries' desire for unbridled chaos. Republicans wished for the United States to continue the relationship with France that had been established during the American Revolution, but Federalists were more eager to cut ties with the new Republic.

The American reaction to Louis XVI's execution also had domestic implications. The American press was far less restrained than political leaders in expressing their opinions about the monarch. Both factions freely articulated displeasure for or approval of the king's fate through their newspapers with little fear of censure. The radical Republicans in particular used the topic to instigate animosity toward Federalists, whom they believed betrayed republican principles by mourning for the fallen king, but they did not condemn fellow Republicans for expressing the same sentiments. It may be that Republican politicians were particularly cautious about stating their opinions outright, for they did not want to provoke radical egalitarian Republicans who were quick to vilify their opponents in print. It is also possible that the Republicans feared fragmentation in their own faction, for expressing sympathy for Louis would have alienated members of their radical wing who celebrated reading about Louis' beheading.

The radical Republicans assumed that Federalists grieved more for the fall of the monarchical institution than for the man behind the crown; they used the Federalists' sorrow as evidence that they were in fact monarchists. This was not the case, as Federalists repeatedly stated that they regretted the loss of Louis XVI as the person who assisted them in their fight for liberty.

While the American elite did not approve of Louis XVI's misguided policies that led him to the scaffold, Federalists and many Republicans consistently spoke amicably about the person of their one-time advocate. The great majority wished to see France transition to a democratic government without inflicting harm on their friend and ally. The Americans chanted neither "*Vive le Roi!*" nor "*Vive la Liberté!*" They longed for a humane compromise that never came to be.

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