“Who Has the Youth, Has the Future”: Youth and the State in the German Democratic Republic

By Jeff Robson
University of Calgary

The 1949 foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from Soviet-occupied territory in East Germany ushered in a new era. Under the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), the East German state began a concerted effort to instil its brand of German socialism into the hearts and minds of citizens previously under National Socialist domination. The most targeted demographic of the East German population was its youth, as the older German generations were considered lost to the taint of Nazism. In contrast, the youth of the country presented an ideal opportunity to create the model socialist citizen.[1] In its ambition to inculcate younger generations with pro-Soviet, German socialist values, the state became an omnipresent force in the education and socialization of the nation’s children. The state accomplished this through incorporating strict control and Party ideology into both the country’s public education system and the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the foremost youth movement in the GDR.

Against a backdrop of mounting Cold War tensions, the ideological mobilization of youth in the German Democratic Republic created conditions to raise the ideal socialist citizen, in order to secure the health and survival of the state. The policies and actions of the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* youth movement and the East German education system were designed to engender the individual youth with class-consciousness, present socialism as a youthful ideology with no alternative, and mobilize the state’s youth in the preservation and defence of East German socialism against the capitalist West. In assessing this effort, attention will be focused on the presentation of socialism to the youth in the GDR, the use of the education system as a method of propaganda, and the mobilization of youth under the FDJ banner.

After the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, military officials in the Soviet Union drew inspiration from the fallen Nazi bureaucracy’s education policies. Though ideologically polarized, the occupying Soviet government found that Nazi education reforms were useful as a means of social control, stressing a strict rigidity and subservience to the state.[2] Indeed, while the Soviet military government sought to sweep away the vestiges of Nazism in their occupation zone, they used the previous education system as a basis for the implementation of their own. This similarity can be attributed to a strong favour for propaganda via education that emanated from both Nazi and Soviet leadership. Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin, despite their differences,

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[1] John Rodden, *Textbook Reds: Schoolbooks, Ideology, and East German Identity* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 3.
[2] John Rodden, *Repainting the Little Red Schoolhouse: a History of East German Education, 1945-1955* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 33.

viewed the state education system as a supreme means to impart a ruling ideology into German youth.[3] However, the Soviet Union's approach to education reform and youth indoctrination in occupied Germany differed from earlier protocols through its ostensible neutrality. Both the re-established education system and youth organization were careful to conceal their true objectives,[4] as there were worries that German parents would "[baulk] at seeing their children once more in line and marching."[5]

Throughout the existence of the GDR, the SED made an explicit call for the participation of youth in the socialist *Weltanschauung*, or world-view, associating the health of the nation with the level of youth involvement in the state. The state was quick to portray the nation's younger generations as a key component to the success of socialism in the GDR. In a 1989 speech to members of the FDJ, General Secretary Erich Honecker referred to the nation as a "republic of youth," pronouncing that the state had "changed for the better, thanks to the strength of our people, the strength of our youth."[6] While such proclamations were attempts at evoking feelings of pride and responsibility in the state's young demographic, the socialist enculturation was also aimed at providing motivation for pro-government youth activism.

While the youth were tasked with socialist nation building, they were also called to become the GDR's citizen defence against foreign militarism, "always in the front ranks of the struggle against imperialist war policies and for the happiness of nations."[7] The potential destruction of German socialism by "foreign imperialists" weighed heavily in youth-targeted state propaganda. The method in which propaganda messages were phrased explicitly linked the fortunes of the young generation with the nation's socialist ideology. This implication made a coercive argument for the defence of socialism; SED propaganda asserted that the downfall of German socialism would negatively impact the lives of the youth cohort. A GDR propaganda manual, *Jugend Weltanschauung Aktivität* reinforced this attitude, stating that children born under socialism were "firmly bound to it, seeing socialism's goals and ideals as [their] own."[8]

Past socialist and communist figures were a significant part of the propaganda effort towards youth. Their personas were commonly used to glorify socialism while portraying the GDR's foundation as a heroic culmination of years of struggle against Nazi totalitarianism.[9] The glorification of socialist figures was also an integral part of the imagery found in the organization of the youth movement. The Thälmann Pioneers, a subset of the FDJ for schoolchildren aged 6 to 14, took their name from Ernst Thälmann, a leader of the Communist Party of Germany executed by the Nazis in 1944. While honouring Thälmann, the organization also used the slain communist figure as a role model for its junior charges; one of the rules for the Pioneers

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[3] Rodden, *Little Red Schoolhouse*, 34.
[4] Rodden, *Little Red Schoolhouse*, 43-4.
[5] Anna Funder, *Stasiland: Stories from Behind the Berlin Wall* (London: Granta Books, 2004), 165.
[6] Erich Honecker, "The FDJ – A Reliable Partner in Struggle of our Party," *Neues Deutschland,* 13/14 May 1989, 1. Trans. Randall Bytwerk, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/fdj.htm (accessed 3 April 2007).
[7] Erich Honecker, "Party and Revolutionary Guard Firmly Allied," *Neues Deutschland,* 9/10 June 1984, 1. Trans. Randall Bytwerk, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/fdj.htm (accessed 3 April 2007).
[8] *Jugend Weltanschauung Aktivität. Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen in der ideologischen Arbeit mit der Jugend* (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1980). Trans. Randall Bytwerk, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/worldview.htm (accessed 3 April 2007).
[9] Gregory Wegner, "The Legacy of Nazism and the History Curriculum in the East German Secondary Schools," *The History Teacher* 25.4 (1992): 480.

promised that they were to "work and fight as Ernst Thälmann teaches…ready to support peace and socialism."[10]

The presentation of communist heroism was a strong undercurrent in GDR propaganda. The state relied on the virtues of both German and Soviet figures to promote socialist ideology while also preserving the "revolutionary heritage of the people" in opposition to Western capitalism.[11] Communist heroism against Nazism was recast in a Cold War context, encouraging youth to employ the same steadfast courage against the "Western imperialists" who had succeeded the Nazis in GDR propaganda. The SED portrayed the Party as an extension of German socialist ambitions. This is particularly demonstrated by Erich Honecker's statement that the SED was "the Party of Karl [Liebknecht], Rosa [Luxemburg], Ernst Thälmann, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, [and] Walter Ulbricht" - a Party "guided in its every action by the immortal teaching of the great German scientists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels."[12] The use of socialist heroes in GDR propaganda was as pragmatic as it was idealistic, implying that the SED was the direct result of the actions of the communist figures, attributing their heroism to the Party by association.

Propaganda aimed at youth was as much anti-capitalist as it was pro-socialist. It portrayed the West, especially the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as militaristic imperialists. At the same time, it characterized the German Democratic Republic and its Eastern Bloc allies as defenders of peace. This perspective was linked to propaganda aimed at mobilizing youth as "guards on the front line" while simultaneously portraying the youth movement and the government itself as peaceable. In a public call for the removal of nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe, Erich Honecker stated: "we reiterate our proposal, supported by the appeal of our youth that the Pershing II and Cruise missiles stationed in Western Europe…be removed." According to Honecker, the regime's ultimate goal was to "create peace in the face of NATO's weapons,"[13] referencing the increase in NATO's European nuclear arms strength, with the addition of American cruise missiles in the early 1980s.[14]

The state's primary method of ideological mobilization was the East German school system, which provided the state with the ability to teach the socialist *Weltanschauung* as fact. The state's highest goal was the creation of the "model socialist" through education and the preparation of a new generation to continue socialist progress in East Germany. While the GDR curriculum sought to educate children in traditional subjects, a substantial focus was placed on the development of personal qualities considered essential to the advancement of socialism. These qualities included "team spirit, sobriety, industriousness, a high sense of public duty…and respect for manual labour;"[15] qualities which would form the basis of the FDJ youth movement, to be examined later.

Part of this education was aimed at explaining the result of such qualities put into practice, to illustrate the benefits of engaging in the socialist worldview. In the GDR civics textbook *Staatsbürgerkunde*, the dedicated, sober socialist workers were at the forefront of human progress. They maintained peace in a chaotic world, while enjoying a high standard of

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[10] "The Rules of the Thälmann Pioneers." Trans. Randall Bytwerk, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/tp.htm (accessed 3 April 2007).
[11] Gregory Wegner, "In The Shadow of the Third Reich: The *Jugendstunde* and the Legitimation of Anti-Fascist Heroes for East German Youth," *German Studies Review* 19.1 (1996): 131.
[12] Honecker, 1984.
[13] Honecker, 1989.
[14] Vojtech Mastny, "Did NATO Win the Cold War?" *Foreign Affairs* 78.3 (1999): 185.
[15] Rodden, *Textbook Reds*, 14.

living as a result of their industriousness and sense of collective welfare. This socialist work ethic, *Staatsbürgerkunde* writes, was essential to "restrain those circles of imperialism that are ready to use the great accomplishments of the human spirit against humanity." [16] According to the GDR education programme, collective happiness took precedence over all else, encouraging the socialist youth to transcend individual goals in favour of providing for the collective good.

Propaganda in GDR school textbooks was even more explicit in its attack against the capitalist West, providing a pedagogical opportunity to instil a dislike of the West in receptive minds. While Marxist-Leninism was a prevalent force in all school subjects, civics class presented the best opportunity to employ Party ideology. The material in *Staatsbürgerkunde* adhered to Party policy of smearing capitalism and glorifying socialism. However, where Party speeches to youth stressed the importance of defending socialism against a powerful capitalist order, textbooks depicted the West as "on the defensive, doomed to inevitable collapse, while socialism…will ultimately triumph throughout the whole world."[17] Through a more extreme view of the conflict between the two ideologies, *Staatsbürgerkunde* removed any possibility of a capitalist victory over the forces of socialism. The state-sanctioned textbook presented the former as an ideology in utter decay, and consequently not worth supporting.

History was not spared from the East German state's ideological revisionism, as the distortion of the subject became a cornerstone of the GDR curriculum. History in the GDR aligned closely with the socialist *Weltanschauung*, and the lessons of history were couched in Marxist ideology.[18] The subject curriculum was designed to instil in the pupil a sense of socialist patriotism and the belief that history was a series of interconnected events demonstrating the evils of the exploitive pre-capitalist and capitalist systems. History in the GDR was restructured by state historians to cast socialism as the natural progression of the nation's development. However, history previous to Karl Marx and the formation of socialism was portrayed exclusively as a history of exploitation. By contrast, the state viewed the spread of socialism as a victory for the forces of progress and the culmination of a long proletarian struggle.[19]

The manipulation of history in the GDR also served a more immediate goal; demonstrating to the youth the duplicity and moral corruption of the capitalist Western world. Though proletariat attacks against ruling classes spanned the entirety of recorded human history in GDR historiography, special attention was reserved for the post-1939 period. With the role of Germany in the Second World War, GDR historians were tasked with portraying the horrors of the capitalist-assisted Nazis while exonerating the East German citizens from complicity in the Nazi regime. The rise of Hitler during the 1930s was attributed to the "decay of a rotting capitalism,"[20] while the leading western Allies, the United States and Great Britain, were portrayed as "reactionary, aggressive, and imperialistic."[21] Historical examples of the untrustworthy nature of the western Allies were provided in conjunction with this assessment. GDR historians criticized alleged Allied inaction in opening a second European front to relieve pressure on the Soviets, unnecessary Allied strategic bombing intended to hinder Soviet post-war

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[16] *Staatsbürgerkunde 10*, (Berlin: Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, 1988). Trans. Randall Bytwerk and Katherine Lynch, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/sbk.htm (accessed 3 April 2007).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Rodden, *Textbook Reds*, 113.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Wegner, "The Legacy of Nazism and the History Curriculum," 476.
[21] Rodden, *Textbook Reds*, 130.

reconstruction, and indeed, the Western war effort as a whole, writing that "the Western Allies played no decisive role in the war."[22]

GDR historians also addressed contemporary history, incorporating their analysis into the larger complexion of the Cold War. The beginning of the Cold War, writes the GDR history text *Geschichte 9*, began with the American strategic nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an action that was immaterial to Allied victory in the Second World War but was instead designed to warn the Soviet Union.[23] Continuing the theme of anti-West propaganda, GDR textbook historians revised the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, writing that it was "completely unnecessary since the USSR had offered to take over the care of the Western sectors of Berlin."[24] GDR history curriculum also addressed the state of affairs in divided Germany, citing the construction of the Berlin Wall as a necessary response to West German aggressiveness, instigated by the militaristic West German Bundeswehr, successor to the Nazi Wehrmacht.[25]

Historical revisionism was a powerful Cold War tool, portraying historical arguments as one-sided glorifications of the supremacy of the socialist *Weltanschauung* against the corruption and militarism of the capitalist West. This educational perspective served to eliminate any dissent in the policies and living standard of the GDR, providing East German youth with a slanted perspective that demonstrated the inferiority of the Western lifestyle when set against its socialist rival. The state's revision of history was also complicit in the rearing of the model socialist citizen, providing tangible, codified "facts" that demonstrated the benefits of living one's life according to the precepts espoused by the state. Finally, historical revisionism in the GDR provided youth with constant examples of the victories of socialism and the subsequent decay of capitalism, presenting a future dominated by the inevitable socialist victory.

State control over German youth organizations also provided an excellent opportunity to introduce children and adolescents alike to socialist values, instilling in them a love for solidarity and community and a desire to become the Party's ideal of a model German citizen. The FDJ was a practical opportunity for East German students to put into action what they had been taught so thoroughly during the course of their education. Jana Hensel, in her memoir of life in the GDR, writes: "I was a young citizen in a young nation, and it was my duty to advance the cause of socialism so that it would…achieve the great ideal of a Marxist-Leninist worker's paradise."[26] In this way, efforts at mobilizing the younger generations through membership in the FDJ were part of a larger design to educate children and give them practical experience with the socialist *Weltanschauung*.

The formation of the FDJ in March 1946 marked the culmination of several years of effort from the political left in Germany to form a socially inclusive leftist youth organization. The German Communist Party advanced plans for such an organization as early as 1930, but they fell afoul of sectarian differences between socialists and Communists.[27] After the fall of the Third Reich and the formation of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) in

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[22] Bodo von Borries, "The Third Reich in German History Textbooks since 1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38.2 (2003): 46.
[23] Rodden, *Textbook Reds*, 131.
[24] Scott Darwin, "A Sampling of Textbooks from the Former German Democratic Republic: A Personal View," *Die Unterrichtspraxis / Teaching German* 27.2 (1994): 70.
[25] See for instance: Rodden, *Textbook Reds*, 134; von Borries, 49.
[26] Jana Hensel, *After the Wall: Confessions From an East German Childhood and the Life That Came Next* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 83.
[27] Alan McDougall, *Youth Politics in East Germany: the Free German Youth Movement, 1946-1968* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 1.

1945, conditions were in place for the creation of what was to become the FDJ. The organization, formed on 7 March 1946, was projected as a "non-partisan, united, and democratic" youth organization, ostensibly formed for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged nation, but in truth was an effort at reconciliation between the various elements of the German left.[28] Though initially small in size, the organization would grow to 950,000 in November 1949, and its survival would be ensured by its integration into the SED at the 3rd FDJ Parliament in June of that year.[29]

While the SED used the FDJ to educate youth in the virtues of socialism and the qualities possessed by an ideal socialist, the FDJ also guarded its members from influences that countered their socialist indoctrination or caused dissent in the GDR. The two most powerful influences outside of state control were religion and "creeping Westernism." Initially, the state had an uneasy but tolerant relationship with the Protestant Church in the country. Only after the "Stalinization" of the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1949 did state opposition to the church become overt.[30] This broader conflict between church and state was reflected in actions taken against church youth movements, seen as competition to the FDJ. The SED criminalized the Protestant church youth group *Junge Gemeinden* (JG) in the summer of 1952, declaring them a "fifth-column" that threatened the "organizational monopoly the FDJ was intended to enjoy."[31] By December 1952, the GDR Politburo issued a directive designating the JG as an American-sponsored "terror group," banning JG meetings in the country and purging members from FDJ academic leadership.[32] Though the directive was later rescinded by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership in June 1953, by that time it had alienated several thousand pacifist Christian youth from the FDJ and, ultimately, German socialism.

Due to the failure of the FDJ to eliminate church opposition by rendering church youth groups illegal, the socialist movement shifted its attention to competing against the church by transforming religious sacraments into socialist rituals. Beginning in 1954, the FDJ introduced the *Jugendweihe* or "youth consecration," a secular ritual aimed at competition with church confirmation. The ceremony acted to draw East German youth away from the church and, as Hensel notes, to mark a progression into socialist maturity as the youth "emancipated him- or herself from the false consciousness of capitalist exploitation and embraced his or her working-class identity."[33] Though the *Jugendweihe* initially failed to draw significant numbers of youth to its cause, by 1959 youth participation in the temporal ceremony reached 80.4 percent,[34] thus diminishing the influence of religion in favour of the state.

While the SED's campaign against religious influence in the GDR was largely successful, Western culture was a greater threat to its control over the country's youth, especially before the August 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall. The FDJ, in its attempt to reinforce socialist values, faced a growing problem as Western music, films, books, and television found their way into the GDR. Not only did Western artifacts compete directly with GDR socialism, they also illustrated contradictions in the socialist *Weltanschauung*. Western culture proved extremely popular with East German youth, as East German movie houses played Western films,

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[28] Ibid, 2.
[29] Ibid, 4.
[30] Corey Ross, *Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots: The Transformation of East Germany, 1945-1965* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), 78.
[31] Ibid, 80.
[32] McDougall, 42.
[33] Hensel, 94.
[34] Ross, 138.

West German spy novels were traded secretly, and Radio Luxemburg, RIAS, and "Freies Berlin" played American rock-and-roll to a generation of youth rebelling against state control.[35]

The FDJ's initial response was to completely prevent Western culture from reaching the GDR. This objective is best exemplified by the September 1961 *Operation Strike Against NATO-stations*, wherein 25,000 FDJ members pointed thousands of receptive TV and radio antennae towards the east.[36] However, such disruption efforts did not halt the growing fascination with Western culture in the GDR. By 1963, the FDJ met Western culture with accommodation, providing East German *ersatz* versions of rock-and-roll music and other elements of Western culture to varying degrees of success. Combating this culture proved to be more difficult than reducing religious influence in East Germany. This was in part due to the influence of West Berlin in the midst of the socialist GDR, the spirit of rebellion fostered by (primarily American) rock-and-roll music, and the inability of the Party to provide a legitimate alternative.

Television provided East German youth with the most consistent exposure to Western culture. While border patrols and the Berlin Wall could control the spread of physical information, television broadcasts represented an unchallenged flow of culture. By 1961, after the Berlin Wall had been erected, West German television stations began to air television programs specifically targeted at viewers in East Germany.[37] The airing of Western entertainment, news, and sports programs presented a sharp break from GDR-broadcast programs that reaffirmed the glories of socialism and the horrors of capitalism. This divergence between people and their government often resulted in private criticism and discontent directed at the state.[38] In offsetting this transmission of Western culture, the infiltration of "enemy" television into the cultural geography of East German youth was checked by the state through its traditional controls. As East German youth viewership of Western television reached eighty percent in 1981, the government responded with a barrage of vehement anti-Western denouncements embedded in the state education system, the FDJ, and state-run leisure activities.[39]

One of the strongest messages espoused by the FDJ was socialist solidarity at home and abroad. Solidarity in the GDR took on several different forms. It was expressed by both workers in established socialist countries and by "peoples struggling for their freedom and independence."[40] The expression of solidarity towards these various groups was a means of mobilizing youth towards the socialist *Weltanschauung*. Socialism was presented as a non-exploitive, industrious ideology devoted to the common good of all people of the world, while capitalism was portrayed often as an exploitive force threatening the aspirations of progressive movements. Hensel, in her experiences with GDR youth programs during the mid-1980s, writes: "we sold flowers from our school garden…and donated the proceeds to help napalm victims in Vietnam."[41] This passage demonstrates both the efforts towards engendering solidarity while

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[35] Ibid, 139.
[36] Ibid, 175.
[37] Claudia Dittmar, "GDR Television in Competition with West German Programming," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television* 24.3 (2004): 328.
[38] Dieter Wiedemann and Falk Tennert, "Children's Television in the GDR," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television* 24.3 (2004): 430.
[39] Anna Saunders, *Honecker's Children: Youth and Patriotism in East(ern) Germany, 1979-2002* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), 39.
[40] "The Rules of the Thälmann Pioneers"
[41] Hensel, 81.

providing American involvement in Vietnam as an example of the "horrors" of capitalism. Solidarity with the GDR's Eastern Bloc allies was also a common theme in East German propaganda, as the GDR's geographic position adjacent to the NATO powers in Western Europe often prompted the SED to stress that the country was "not alone in the world," possessing "powerful allies…in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, [and] in the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic."[42]

The Party ideal of solidarity was not limited strictly to external concerns, as youth organizations promoted solidarity among their peers and workers in the GDR. Aside from providing youth with socialist role models to emulate, local solidarity stressed the importance of strengthening communal bonds and maintaining social cohesion in GDR society. In his 1989 address to the FDJ, Honecker's commentary on workers in the GDR underlined the important role they played in the success of the country. He stated: "in the 40th year of the existence of the GDR, we can proudly see that all labour has paid off."[43] Hensel notes smaller-scale expressions of solidarity encouraged in youth, writing: "to honour working classes on May 1, we…helped weaker pupils with their math homework."[44]

Though the GDR disappeared into the annals of history with the reunification of the two German nations in 1990, the influence of the East German state's attempts to construct the ideal socialist generation through mobilization and education remains an important part of German society to present. Significantly, GDR educational reform created generations of citizens oriented to a world-view no longer prominent in the post-Cold War world, while the collapse of the traditional East German professions after reunification has further alienated former GDR citizens from their new country. Despite existing as one entity, the Federal Republic of Germany now contains two very different types of German citizen. At time of writing, significant cleavages in political and cultural outlooks, resultant of forty-five years of ideological separation, remain an undercurrent in German society.[45] With the GDR relegated to a historical curio, the downfall of the socialist *Weltanschauung* has created tremendous economic, social, and political implications for the reunited nation, as each group looks for its place in the life of the other.

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[42] Honecker, 1989.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Hensel, 81-2.
[45] Joseph F. Jozwiak and Elisabeth Mermann, "The Wall in Our Minds? Colonization, Integration, and Nostalgia," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 39.5 (2006): 781-2, 785.

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The Falkland Islands War: Diplomatic Failure in April 1982

By Joseph Mauro
Wake Forest University

The fate of over 1,000 souls was decided in April 1982. On April 2, Argentine Special Forces invaded and occupied the British Falkland Islands. For the next month, Britain and Argentina tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically. United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig served as mediator, shuttling multiple times between London and Buenos Aires. Haig and his team tried to develop a document to which both the Argentine military junta, led by President Leopoldo Galtieri, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could agree. However, despite long hours in negotiations and a genuine desire of both sides to avoid war, agreement was never reached. The British counterattacked on May 1, and the fighting that resulted saw 1,054 soldiers and seamen die.[1]

Diplomacy in the Falkland Islands failed for a number of reasons. First, the negotiations were flawed, both in Haig's uneasy position as mediator and the junta's unreliable decision-making process. In addition, each side misunderstood the other. The Argentines never believed the British would counterattack and the British struggled to believe that Argentina wanted a peaceful solution. The possibility of oil under the islands also may have played a role. However, the most important impediment to diplomatic success was the fact that neither side was able to compromise enough to prevent war. The main reasons for this inflexibility were two-fold: both leaders needed to appear strong to remain in power, and the political climate at the time, especially in terms of diplomatic principles relating to the Cold War, prevented the British from yielding to the minimum Argentine demands. In this way, concern for political self-preservation and diplomatic principle combined with practical impediments to prevent a diplomatic solution from being reached in the Falklands in April 1982.

Background

A brief overview of the territorial conflict will be instructive for understanding the arguments and tactics used during April 1982. Before being claimed by Britain or Argentina, the Falkland Islands – a small group of islands in the South Atlantic about 480 kilometers off the Argentine coast – were divided among the British, Spanish, and French. According to British accounts (the Argentines have no competing claim) the first people to set foot on the islands were Elizabethan navigators, who ran ashore in 1690. These men did not settle the islands, and it would be another 75 years before France established the first settlement in 1765. The French,

[1] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984); "Falklands War," in David Cristal (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia, 4th Edition*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 403. [I have found varying numbers for the death total, but I have decided to accept this encyclopedia's estimate because it is one of the latest of the sources I have found (allowing for counting to be rechecked) and it is more reputable than most. The number 1,054 comes from 254 British and 750 Argentine deaths.]

however, did not want to keep the colony, so they gave it to Spanish King Charles III in 1767. From this time forward, Spain claimed sovereignty over the islands. Argentina's claim rests on the fact that sovereignty passed from Spain to Argentina when the latter declared independence from the empire. However, the Falklands are composed of two large islands, western and eastern, and the Spanish only controlled the western half. By 1770, the British had begun a settlement on the eastern half. Neither the British nor the Spanish knew the other was on the islands until both colonies had been established.[2]

War almost broke out over the islands in 1770 when Spanish governor Juan Ignacio Madriarga attempted to expel the British settlement, which was led by George Farmer. Some British wanted war at the time, but King George III decided the islands were too expensive to keep, and the English abandoned the settlement in 1774. Some historians claim the British left with an oral agreement to cede sovereignty over the islands, but the British also left behind a plaque claiming ownership, which read: "His Britannic Majesty's colours left flying as a mark of possession." From the southern reaches of the New World in the eighteenth century, no document survives to describe exactly how the situation was left.[3]

Sovereignty over the islands changed hands several times in the early nineteenth century. The Spanish administered the islands until Argentina declared independence from Spain in 1810. The Argentines took control of the islands in 1811. In 1816, the forerunner of the Argentine government, the Government of Buenos Aires for the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, established an administration on the islands, and by 1820 the Spanish had been driven out completely. Although the newly-created Argentina claimed sovereignty over the islands in 1829, the British never abandoned their claim of ownership. Just two years later, the British had the opportunity to reassert their claim. In 1831, the Argentine governor of the islands, Governor Vernet, seized a United States ship, which he claimed had been sailing too close to the islands. This so angered the Americans that the United States sent the USS Lexington to the islands in 1833, expelling everyone. The British took advantage of the resulting power vacuum and occupied the islands later that year.[4]

The British controlled the islands from 1833 until the Argentine invasion on April 2, 1982, but during that time Argentina never renounced its claim of sovereignty. In 1840, Britain formally declared that the islands were a colony and sent British citizens to live there. These were the first people to establish their livelihoods on the islands. Throughout the nineteenth century, no naval power in the world was strong enough to challenge the British, much less the fledgling Argentine fleet. Thus, Argentina never mounted a serious challenge to the British settlement. Argentina did continue to claim the islands, however, and in 1927 it also claimed South Georgia Island, an island about 1,200km southeast of the Falklands, first occupied by the British in 1909. Argentina continued to protest British control of the islands, frequently under

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[2] "Falklands," in *A Dictionary of World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Encyclopedia.org. (accessed November 2, 2007).; John Biggs-Davison, "Claim to the Falklands is Justified, Briton Says," *The Globe and Mail* (27 Apr. 1982).; Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988), pp. 39-43.

[3] Laurent Belsie, "A 212-Year Tug of War over Falklands; Sovereignty vs. Self-Determination," *The Christian Science Monitor* 12 (9 Apr. 1982); Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War*, p.19-20; quote: David Tonge, "Never Has So Much Diplomacy been Expended for So Few," *The Financial Times* 1:2 (3 Apr. 1982)

[4] "212-Year Tug of War," *The Christian Science Monitor* (4 Apr. 1982); Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War*, p.19-20; "212-Year Tug of War," *The Christian Science Monitor* (4 Apr. 1982); "Claim to the Falklands is Justified," *The Globe and Mail* (27 Apr. 1982); Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War*, p. 19-20.

some governments and not at all under others, until it brought the question before the United Nations in 1965.

The next seventeen years would see negotiations that, while seeming to make progress, never solved the dispute. In 1967, the Labour Government in Britain said it would cede sovereignty given certain conditions. This claim angered the islanders because 97% of them were British and wanted to remain as such. They continued to voice their position in Parliament, and in 1973 they formed the UK Falkland Islands Committee, designed to protect the interest of the islanders. While it appears the British Foreign Office would have liked to give sovereignty to the Argentines, the committee and the powerful Falkland Islands Lobby successfully shot down every such proposal. For example, in 1980, Nicholas Ridley, the Foreign Office minister responsible for the islands, traveled to the Falklands' capital of Stanley and convinced many islanders of the value of a lease-back agreement, under which Argentine sovereignty would be recognized immediately but control would not pass to them for 99 years. However, even this proposal was beaten by the Falkland Islands Lobby in London. In this way, no meaningful progress was made.[5]

Probably in an attempt to unify its increasingly discontent populace and save its failing government, the military junta ruling Argentina invaded and occupied the islands on April 2, 1982. British resistance was so light that the Argentines did not even fire their guns. On April 3, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 502, which called for both sides to refrain from using military force and for Argentina to withdraw its forces. Argentina refused, and in the next three days Britain dispatched two carriers, eleven destroyers, an amphibious force, and a supply chain to the South Atlantic. Haig flew to Britain on April 8.[6] Thus began the month of crucial negotiations.

Before examining the reasons for which negotiation failed, two questions must be addressed. The first involves the source material used for this paper. Given the limited availability of primary sources from Argentina, especially during the period of the junta, this investigation relies heavily on British and American sources. While such an imbalance necessarily creates some measure of bias, there are two ways in which this paper hopes to avoid a wholly unfair treatment of the issues. First, a large portion of the source material is comprised of periodical publications from various countries and of various political persuasions. While most of these periodicals are from the northern hemisphere, the nature of the press to be critical of its own government should help to guarantee that the facts and reasoning presented here are not unduly biased. Second, this paper does not seek to assign blame, but instead to track the various historical forces that led to the impasse. In this way, even biased sources which blame a certain party will be extracted and placed within the larger context of historical force. Combined with the fact that much of the paper centers on Haig, who was fiercely neutral even to the point of losing his job, one hopes that bias will be neutralized to a sufficient extent despite the imbalance in source material.[7]

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[5] Ian Davidson, "A Principle is a Principle," *Financial Times* 1:15 (7 Apr. 1982); *Britain and the Falklands Crisis: a documentary record,* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1982), p. 19; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 262; Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and the Falklands War*, p.27-28.; "212-Year Tug of War," *The Christian Science Monitor* (4 Apr. 1982).

[6] "Soviet Union Sways along Political Tightrope," *The Globe and Mail,* (15 Apr. 1982); Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 199; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 403.

[7] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 298

The second question involves the possibility of oil in the Falklands. If the islands or their surrounding waters were rich in oil, then that would have helped to explain why neither side was willing to yield in negotiations. After all, oil had become an even greater concern following the oil crises of 1973 and 1980-81. Furthermore, Argentina needed some form of revenue to help pay off its increasing foreign debt.

At the beginning of April 1982, many believed oil was the reason for the Argentinian invasion, and possibly also for Britain's unwillingness to compromise. According to articles written in the *Christian Science Monitor* on April 5 and 6, many believed that up to two million barrels of oil might be found under the islands. The Argentines had successfully extracted carbon fuels in the San Jorge Basin, thus making the whole area appear promising. Exxon and Arco, as well as other leading international corporations, had expressed interest in doing exploratory work in the area. Finally, the Falklands could serve as an important stepping stone to Antarctic bases, where prospects for oil were believed to be promising. Initially, it seemed that the thirst for oil was causing another territorial dispute which otherwise would have been unimportant.[8]

As time went on, however, the prospect of significant drilling in the area seemed to fade. The United States Department of Energy did a study which concluded that areas of drillable oil ended half way between the Argentinian coast and the islands. Since the Argentines already controlled their half of the water, this would not have given them reason to invade. Similarly, on April 12, the *Oil and Gas Journal* reported that it was uncertain whether oil would be found on or around the islands. The only meaningful evidence was a sedimentary rock pattern that may have indicated oil. As Chris Hedges argued in an April 8 editorial in the Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail*, oil could not have been a reason for Argentina to invade because Argentina was already self-sufficient in oil and was occupied at the time with an expensive project to convert to nuclear power. Combined with international doubts about the area's oil prospects, Hedges' analysis seems to rule out oil as a meaningful impediment to compromise during April's negotiations.[9] While the importance of oil should never be discounted in international politics, other factors almost certainly played a larger role in hampering negotiations during that month.

Mutual Misunderstanding

Alexander Haig characterized the Falklands Islands conflict as a clear example of two opponents who did not understand each other. As he says in his memoirs, it was "a case study in miscalculation."[10] Perhaps most importantly, Argentina never believed the British would counterattack until British helicopters were bombarding the Argentine Navy off the coast of South Georgia Island. Similarly, Britain did not understand the nature of the military junta that ruled Argentina. Whereas the junta's inconsistent proposals were actually the result of a flawed decision-making procedure, the British government took them as evidence of malice. Reasons for mutual misunderstanding ranged from simple ignorance to intentionally misleading

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[8] Jonathan Harsch, "Why Argentina Invaded: Politics, Thirst for Oil," *Christian Science Monitor* 3 (5 Apr. 1982); Jonathan Harsch, "Falklands Dispute and Oil," *Oil and Gas Journal* 6 (6 Apr. 1982); John C. McCaslin, "Falklands Seen as Attractive Wildcat Target," *Oil and Gas Journal* (26 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "In the Falklands' Shadow: Claims to Antarctic," *Christian Science Monitor* 4 (7 Apr. 1982).

[9] "Falklands Dispute and Oil," *Oil and Gas Journal* 6 (6 Apr. 1982); "Falkland Islands Seized; Oil, Gas Potential Hazy," *Oil and Gas Journal* 63 (12 Apr. 1982); Chris Hedges, "Falkalnds Issue Exploited for Years by Argentines," *The Globe and Mail* (8 Apr. 1982).

[10] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 262

statements.[11] No matter the cause, however, mutual misunderstanding was one of the most important practical impediments to effective negotiation.

In fact, Argentina misunderstood the United States' position as much as it did Great Britain's. According to Haig, Argentina had always believed the United States would be willing to trade acceptance of the invasion for Argentina's help in pressuring the new socialist Nicaraguan government, the Sandinistas. While it is true that President Reagan had been developing closer relations with the junta to help assure that its powerful sway in Latin America would be used against the Sandinistas, the United States could never have supported an armed takeover by an undemocratic government against its most important ally.[12] The reasons the United States had to side with Britain will be discussed at length with regard to the influence of the Cold War, but for now suffice it to say that Argentina's misunderstanding of the United States' allegiances contributed to its hubris in claiming and occupying the islands.

Argentina's most unfortunate misunderstanding, however, was its belief that the British would not counterattack. According to Haig's analysis, the Argentines believed that Great Britain was too weak to fight back. Since Britain had continued to lose parts of its empire throughout the twentieth century, Argentina considered the Falklands to be just another example of a British colony that the Royal Navy could no longer defend and which the British considered not worth their effort. As Haig puts it, this "xenophobic" attitude in Argentina also saw the up-and-coming Americas as rising in world stature, eventually overtaking the declining European powers. Here, Haig may be overstepping his knowledge. Whether the Argentines believed Latin America would become more prominent than Europe is not something Haig could have known with certainty. As with all memoirs, Haig's analysis is based on his limited perspective, and memoirs often frame events in a light favorable to the author. Still, whether Haig's larger claim about xenophobia is correct or not, it is undoubtedly true that Argentina did not think it would be attacked. Even when Haig told President Galtieri that Britain would fight and win and would have U.S. support, Galtieri responded by saying the British would never fight.[13] Because Argentina was convinced there would be no repercussions for taking a firm stance, it had no reason to compromise beyond the bare minimum during April's negotiations.

There are a number of possible reasons for Argentina's misunderstanding of its foe. First, the British government had for years been open to the idea of handing the islands back to Argentina, and Britain had made this openness known to the Argentinian government. As Anthony Sampson argued in an opinion piece in the April 19 edition of *Newsweek*, the British Foreign Office would not have been negotiating about the Falklands for the past two decades if it did not eventually want to rid itself of the islands, which were becoming a burden to govern and were realistically too distant to defend. Whereas the islanders vociferously clung to notions of the British Empire – being, as Sampson called them, "more British than the British" – Britain itself had abandoned notions of empire long ago.[14] In as much as the Argentines understood the British desire to shed the burdensome colony, they were less convinced of Thatcher's warnings about the use of force to defend the islands.

Another explanation of why the Argentines miscalculated British resolve is that, at least as late as April 14, they had reason to believe that Britain was not unified enough to mount a

[11] Ibid.
[12] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 275-276
[13] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 267, 280
[14] Anthony Sampson, "Of Principle and Power," *Newsweek* 47 (19 Apr. 1982)

serious counterattack. On April 14, the *Financial Times* reported that the Labour Party had organized a meeting to discuss opposing Thatcher's decision to send the naval force, called the Task Force, to the South Atlantic. Tam Dalyell, one of the meeting's organizers, said that the meeting was designed to show the Argentines that Great Britain was not the united front that Thatcher and the Foreign Office were claiming it was. Probably as part of an effort to mar the Conservative government, Dalyell and other Labour MPs hoped to show the Argentines that Britain was a "deeply divided country." Although the Labour Party would eventually come to support the military mission, such a vocal expression of disunity early on must have contributed to Argentina's belief that Britain was not willing to defend its distant territory.[15]

Whatever the causes of the misunderstanding, there is no doubt that Argentina believed Britain was weak and divided. Although the *Financial Times* reported on April 17 that there was some disagreement within the junta as to how wise it would be to engage the British Navy, the prevailing opinion in Argentina was still that Britain would not fight back. Even later in the month, as the British rallied behind Thatcher's mission, Argentina still clung to its belief in British weakness. Haig reports that as late as April 27, one day after Britain recaptured South Georgia and when its intention to attack the Falklands was clear, Galtieri lamented to him on the phone, "I do not understand why the United States government, with all its resources, cannot stop Mrs. Thatcher from launching this attack." British resolve was too strong and the United States too strongly aligned with NATO for either party to stop the counterattack.[16]

Britain also misunderstood the Argentinian position, which prevented it from negotiating more effectively. Many in Britain overestimated Argentina's military capabilities, which made them more fearful than they should have been, thus making Argentina too confident. Especially after Bolivia offered its air force to Argentina, many in Britain worried about their ability to beat Argentina in an all-out war. In reality, Argentina's support within Latin America was shaky at best, as demonstrated by the resolution passed at the Organization of American States, which was carefully worded to support Argentina's claim but not its invasion. However, the British overestimated Latin American unity. The possibility of a united South America fighting a stranded British force in the South Atlantic frightened them. British worries about their chances of success, from opinion pieces in periodicals to statements by government officials, contributed to Argentinian resolve and encouraged the British to send more forces to the South Atlantic.[17] Both of these results probably contributed to the outbreak of fighting, for Argentina continued to be inflexible in negotiations and the British were more invested with each ship that sailed south, making withdrawal that much more embarrassing for the government.

The most important way in which the British misunderstood the Argentines, however, was with regard to the junta's position in its own country. On April 5, British Defense Secretary John Nott stated that a good British strategy would be to sink Argentinian ships until public opinion in Argentina turned against the ruling junta. What Nott failed to understand was that the Argentinian people already did not support their own government. Oakland Ross, a Canadian journalist stationed in Buenos Aires, reported that most people with whom he spoke on the street supported Argentina's claim to the islands and approved of the takeover, but they made certain to point out that they were unhappy being ruled by a military dictatorship and that their support of

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[15] Elinor Goodman, "Misgivings Grow in Tory Ranks," *Financial Times* 1:4 (14 Apr. 1982).

[16] Jimmy Burns and Andrew Whitley, "Hope for Falklands Peace Efforts Improve," *Financial Times* 1:1 (17 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 292.

[17] "Bolivia Would Fight for Argentina, Haig Returns to Washington as Peace Talks Break Down," *The Globe and Mail* (14 Apr. 1982); Davidson, Ian, "A Principle is a Principle," *Financial Times* 1:15 (7 Apr. 1982).

Argentina's claim to the islands was not to be misunderstood as support for the ruling government. A military junta is not a democratic government and is not concerned with public opinion except in as much as it fears being sacked. In fact, if anything, the more Britain turned Argentine public opinion against the junta, the more strongly the junta would claim sovereignty over the islands, because the invasion itself was almost certainly an attempt to use patriotism to distract the people from the country's political and economic troubles. If the junta had been able to keep the islands, it would certainly have helped its position domestically, which helps explain why the Argentines were so unwilling to yield in negotiations.[18] The British also misunderstood the junta's diffuse and unreliable decision-making process. This important misunderstanding will be discussed at length when analyzing Argentina's inability to negotiate effectively, but for now it is safe to say that each side misunderstood the other and thus did not employ the most effective kinds of diplomacy. In this way, mutual misunderstanding was an important impediment to effective negotiation and one of the most important reasons that war in the Falklands was not avoided.

Difficulties for Haig's Mission

United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig faced a number of obstacles as he tried to arbitrate for Argentina and Britain. In a sense, every obstacle for negotiations in general was an obstacle for Haig, but among these were specific problems with his mission which prevented him from being as effective as he could have been. The most important of these problems include the sheer distance between Argentina and Britain, the unsteady support that Haig received in the United States, the fact that Argentina grew increasingly distrustful of Haig's neutrality, the Argentine's belief that they would receive international support for the invasion, and the difficulty Haig experienced working with an indecisive junta.

An editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor* on April 15 suggested that Haig had not been successful because he had too far to travel between Buenos Aires and London. According to the editorial, Haig was attempting to follow the example of Henry Kissinger, who had successfully negotiated peace settlements in the Middle East. The difference being, while Kissinger spent only a few hours on each flight, Haig spent eighteen hours in the air each time he traveled between the two capitals. Indeed, Haig arrived for the second time in Buenos Aires on April 16, and when he got there, he was told by Argentinian Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez that no progress had been made over the past few days while he had been absent.[19] One of the advantages a negotiator can possess is to apply constant pressure on a government to continue thinking about acceptable proposals. However, Haig could not apply constant pressure on the junta because, when he was gone, he was so far away that the military leaders could disregard him.

Haig also suffered from less-than-perfect support in his own country. Jean Kirkpatrick, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, was his most vocal opponent. She consistently and publicly opposed the official U.S. stance, which demanded that the Argentines withdraw their forces, although the U.S. position aligned with U.N. Resolution 502. Kirkpatrick feared that the U.S. would garner too much resentment in Latin America. According to Haig, her vocal protests would not have had much effect if she had not been a cabinet member in Reagan's government. However, because she was a member of the president's inner circle, Britain had to

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[18] David K. Willis, "Diplomats Race Clock in Falklands Showdown," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (5 Apr. 1982); Oakland Ross, "A Mixture of Contradiction and Pride," *The Globe and Mail* (22 Apr. 1982); Chris Hedges, "Latin Regimes Face Dread Possibility of Argentine Defeat," *The Globe and Mail* (16 Apr. 1982).

[19] "Falklands: A Better Way?" *Christian Science Monitor* 24 (15 Apr. 1982); Jimmy Burns and Andrew Whitley, "Haig Back to Buenos Aires for 'Decisive' Peace Talks," *Financial Times* 1:1 (16 Apr. 1982).

take her seriously every time she said Haig's position was incorrect. Thus, Haig was hampered every time he dealt with Britain because Britain doubted that his statements could be taken as representative of the official U.S. position. In addition, ABC's "Nightline" aired a false story which claimed the U.S. was offering Great Britain secret military intelligence about the Argentines, an incident that nearly prevented Haig from returning to Buenos Aires. With such unsteady support at home, it is not surprising that Haig had trouble earning confidence abroad.[20]

If Haig was somewhat doubted in Britain, then he was severely mistrusted in Argentina. As April progressed, the junta became increasingly convinced that he was supplying Britain with information and could not be trusted. Haig admits in his memoirs that his sympathies lay with the British, but he affirms that he decided to stay neutral in order to negotiate as effectively as possible. Still, his nation's position suggested that he could not have been completely neutral. After all, Reagan and Thatcher were great friends while Reagan and Galtieri were tense allies at best, and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told Thatcher that he would never put a NATO ally on the same level as Argentina. Indeed, Haig was chosen for the mission over Kirkpatrick because he was the one who supported Britain's claim.[21] Hence, this implicit bias was probably evident at negotiations in Buenos Aires, thus hampering his ability to negotiate effectively.

In fact, Argentina had good reason to suspect that he was secretly informing the British, although by all accounts he was not. In a desperate moment on April 18, he pretended, in a wire-tapped conversation in Buenos Aires, that he had secret military information about an imminent British attack. He was trying to scare the Argentines and make them more willing to consider his proposals, but his plan backfired. The next day, he and his aides were treated like enemies. They were escorted by armed guards everywhere they went and were deprived of food for twelve hours. That day, Argentinian Admiral Jorge Anaya told Haig that he doubted his neutrality, and he was never allowed to return to Buenos Aires again. On the other side, Thatcher called Haig's mission "misguided."[22] Neither Argentina nor Britain respected or trusted Haig enough for his mission to be successful.

Another impediment to Haig's mission was the international support that Argentina received. Although the Latin American countries would eventually withdraw support for the invasion, their initial support added to the junta's confidence during April's negotiations. This added confidence made the junta less willing to yield to Britain's minimum demands, which were to remove its occupying forces before talks about the future of the islands could continue. In this way, Argentina's confidence in receiving international support made it more difficult for Haig to negotiate.

Initially, it seemed that Argentina would receive widespread support from Latin America. On April 3, the U.N. Security Council voted on Resolution 502, which ordered Argentina to remove its troops, and Panama, the only Latin American country on the Security Council, voted against the resolution. Also, on April 6, Nicaragua expressed support for Argentina, which had

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[20] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 269, 285

[21] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 266, 270; Jimmy Burns and Andrew Whitley, "Haig Tries to Save Peace Mission as Attitudes Harden," *Financial Times* 1:1 (19 Apr. 1982)

[22] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 266, 270; Andrew Whitley and Jimmy Burns, "Buenos Aires Rejects New Visit by Haig," *Financial Times* 1:1 (28 Apr. 1982); Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 200, 204, 210, quote: 190.

important consequences for U.S. policy as well because Reagan had befriended the junta to receive its support against Nicaragua's Socialist government. On April 14, Bolivia publicly offered its air force to fight for Argentina, and on April 21 the Organization of American States (OAS), against the request of the United States, agreed to meet to discuss the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a treaty from 1947 which called for all American countries to view an attack against one of their members as an attack against every member. If invoked, this treaty could have required every Latin American country to support Argentina in every way except militarily. Spain, currently in a dispute with Britain over Gibraltar, even voiced its support for Argentina's claim.[23] In general, it seemed that Argentina was going to receive substantial support from its neighbors and allies, which gave the junta the confidence to be inflexible in negotiations.

In the end, however, this confidence was misplaced. Far from uniting the continent to oppose Britain, the resolution passed by the OAS actually called for Argentina to respect the interests of the islanders, who would never have agreed to become Argentine. The resolution also failed to impose sanctions against Britain, which Argentina desired. It did condemn the economic sanctions that Britain's European allies had imposed on Argentina, and it called for Britain not to counterattack, but this was nowhere near the statement of Argentina's "undeniable right" to the islands that the Argentines had hoped for. Finally, some of most influential OAS nations, including Colombia and Chile, abstained from the vote. Argentina had counted on strong support from its neighbors and had negotiated assuming it would receive this. By April 16, Argentina had even sent additional ships to the South Atlantic and added troops to the southern bases of Ushuaia and Puerto Belgrano.[24] It seems that the junta was focused on military preparations, having taken diplomacy for granted. If Argentina had not been so sure of receiving international support, perhaps it would have more willing to negotiate. As it was, however, the junta's belief in international support made Haig's job even more difficult.

As April drew to a close, the junta began to realize that Britain was going to counterattack and that Argentina's forces would probably be overcome. Some members of the ruling government, probably including Galtieri himself, would have preferred a peaceful solution to war. However, as Haig explains in his memoirs, the junta was unsure about every position upon which it hesitantly agreed, which made negotiating basically impossible. Argentina's flawed decision-making procedure impaired its ability to negotiate, which was another serious impediment to Haig's diplomatic mission.

One explanation for Argentina's inability to negotiate was the disunity of the junta. For example, Haig recounts in his memoirs that four out of five army commanders did not know the April 2 invasion was going to happen until Argentine troops were already storming the islands. He also mentions that there were divisions among the three branches of the military about the wisdom of going to war with Britain: the navy and some elements of the army supported war, but the air force was resolutely against it. In fact, the head of the Air Force, Brigadier General

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[23] "Mixed Reaction Among Latin American Countries," *Financial Times* 1:2 (5 Apr. 1982); Chris Hedges, "Latin regimes face dread possibility of Argentine defeat," *Globe and Mail* (16 Apr. 1982); "Argentina Receives Guarded Support," *Globe and Mail* (14 Apr. 1982); "Bolivia Would Fight for Argentina, Haig Returns to Washington as Peace Talks Break Down," *Globe and Mail* (14 Apr. 1982); Harry B. Ellis, "OAS Says 'Yea' to Process that could Help Argentina," *Christian Science Monitor* 13 (21 Apr. 1982); John King, "Argentina Still Talking of Peace," *Globe and Mail* (29 Apr. 1982); Robert Graham, "Spain Gives Veiled Backing to Argentina," *Financial Times* 1:2 (5 Apr. 1982).

[24] Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,* p. 6; "Argentina Still Talking of Peace," *Globe and Mail* (29 Apr. 1982).

Basilio Lami Dozo, expressed his desire to withdraw all Argentinian forces from the islands, which was the one requirement upon which the British were insisting before continuing peaceful negotiations.[25]

However, peace proved unattainable because the junta could never agree on what to compromise. Even when President Galtieri or the three leading members of the junta agreed to a workable compromise, their word could not be trusted. As more members of the military found out about a compromise, one member would inevitably reject it and call for war, which forced the other members to affirm their patriotism by calling for war as well. In this way, Haig was fooled twice by the junta. After reaching what seemed like a promising compromise during negotiations, he was twice handed a letter the next morning, both times while boarding the plane for London, which erased the progress made the night before. The letters expressed the junta's unwillingness to compromise on Britain's minimum demands, which included lowering the Argentine flag on the islands before negotiations could continue and leaving the door open for the islanders to have some say in their future.[26] The junta's disunity and diffuse decision-making process made negotiations with Haig nearly impossible, which was just another obstacle among the many that he had to face on his diplomatic mission.

Political Self-Preservation

When Haig first met Thatcher after the Argentine invasion, he told her that President Galtieri would not survive in office if the British Task Force made it all the way to the Falkland Islands. Thatcher responded by saying that she would not survive if the force were stopped. While Galtieri did, in fact, survive in office until Argentina was defeated, Haig's point about his precarious political position was still true. The desire for political self-preservation greatly influenced not only Thatcher and Galtieri, but also other political actors who played a role in the negotiations, including British Defense Secretary John Nott, British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, and even Haig himself.[27] Most often, these actors took tougher positions than they otherwise might have because their superiors, colleagues, or constituents were pressuring them to stand up to the enemy. In the end, the need for political self-preservation probably played as large a role as any other factor in hampering effective negotiations.

The Argentine invasion was an attempt at political self-preservation by the ruling junta. The government was trying to deal with an increasingly discontented populace. On March 30, 1982, a number of Argentinian unions called a general strike. The resulting marches quickly turned into a mass demonstration by various leftist groups demanding information about members of their ranks who had "disappeared," that is, been arrested and never heard from again. The demonstrations became so large that the police opened fire into the crowd in downtown Buenos Aires. More than 2,000 people were arrested and six were wounded. The junta had been growing increasingly unpopular and was in danger of being overthrown, but on the Friday after the invasion, various leftist leaders who had been arrested at the protest were shown on television

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[25] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 277-289; "Maj. Gen. Cristino Nicoliades…," *New York Times* (19 Jun. 1982); Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 194.

[26] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 282, 283, 286, 290.

[27] Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 197; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 274.

publicly supporting the junta's decision to invade. In fact, the leaders of all thirteen major Argentine political parties met with the junta's interior minister a few days after the invasion and officially offered their support.[28] From the very beginning, the invasion was an attempt to patch over divisions in Argentinian society. The result, however, was that the junta's survival came to depend entirely on success in the Falklands. This tight situation certainly affected its ability to compromise.

The patriotic frenzy created by the invasion grew so large that the military leaders had to take a hard line on the Falklands even after they realized their forces would probably be defeated. Newspapers in Buenos Aires became increasingly militaristic and anti-British during April. For example, one paper commented on Spain's dispute with Britain over Gibralter with the headline, "What are you waiting for? Throw out the English!" The junta was clearly concerned with public opinion during this period, for instead of evaluating Haig's proposal that Britain and Argentina share administration of the islands until sovereignty could be worked out, the junta printed the proposal in the newspapers to gauge public opinion.[29] Public opinion had become one of the most important considerations for the junta, and the public was clamoring for war.

Haig describes Galtieri's manner as being full of patriotic bravado, but says this was merely a pretense of strength when weakness was the reality. Were the Falklands to be abandoned, the Argentine public would soon remember the injustice of its military government and the economic woes of the country. Thus, Haig argues that Galtieri was not a malicious backstabber but simply a leader who could not compromise without losing his job. Given its domestic position, it is not surprising that the junta continued to refuse to meet Britain's minimum requirements for continuing negotiations, even after South Georgia had been retaken and when most observers knew that Argentina would probably lose to the British.[30]

This refusal might even suggest that the junta's primary goal was not actually to win the islands, but was, in fact, to show the populace that it could stand up to Britain. If the military leaders truly wished to get the islands, it seems they would have avoided a battle that was sure to spell defeat and would have instead continued negotiating with Britain, which had already expressed openness to a lease-back agreement. Argentina's actions, however, were domestically focused.

Britain played a role in exacerbating the junta's weak position – and thus its inflexibility in negotiations – by severely weakening the already suffering Argentine economy. Britain boycotted all Argentine products and persuaded the European Economic Community to do the same. The result was that Argentina lost 20% of its export profits during the month of April, a loss which hurt all areas of the already-struggling economy. On April 26, *Business Week* reported that Argentine industry was operating at 55% capacity, its unemployment stood at 13%, underemployment was at 40%, and the peso had inflated nearly eight-fold in just the past year, from 2,000 pesos/dollar in 1981 to 15,000 pesos/dollar by the time of the article's publication. Export earnings had fallen to $9 billion/year, and annual interest on Argentina's foreign debt was

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[28] Jimmy Burns and Andrew Whitley, "Argentina Seeks to Consolidate its Popular Support," *Financial Times* 1:4 (7 Apr. 1982); Chris Hedges, "Latin Regimes Face Dread Possibility of Argentine Defeat," *Globe and Mail* (16 Apr. 1982); Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,*1982 Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Carrington, in the House of Lords on 30 March 1982, p. 18, 20.

[29] Chris Hedges, "Falklands Issue Exploited for Years by Argentines," *The Globe and Mail* (8 Apr. 1982); quote: Charles Kaiser, "Behind 'Enemy' Lines," *Newsweek* 57 (26 Apr. 1982)

[30] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 280, 286, 287, 288; Oakland Ross, "Haig Returns to U.S., U.K. Has Doubt on Peace Plans from Argentina," *The Globe and Mail* (20 Apr. 1982); Tim McGirk, "New British Ultimatum," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (29 Apr. 1982).

a staggering $7.2 billion. Although Argentina's economy had been declining for years, the sanctions imposed by the Europeans exacerbated the situation and put the country in a state of crisis. While one could not reasonably have expected the British government to act in a way that would have strengthened a government that had just invaded its territory, the negative effect of the economic sanctions actually made the Argentines less able to compromise. As economic woes worsened, the junta became even more unpopular and thus needed to be more inflexible in negotiations just to hang on to its last thread of credibility with the people.[31]

Even knowing that the economic sanctions were ruining the country, the junta was so weak politically that it had to reject the one proposal that would have lifted the crippling sanctions. While Haig was in Buenos Aires, he worked out an agreement with the junta that allowed for restoration of British administration of the islands, under the flags of six observer nations that were to monitor until sovereignty had been negotiated. This proposal would finally lift all economic sanctions. However, early the next morning he was told by Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez that the junta had changed its mind and rejected the proposal. As previously mentioned, the diffuse decision-making process of the junta was unreliable, but now one can perceive the reasons behind its inflexibility. While the leaders must have known that compromise was the only way to save their country from economic ruin, they also knew that withdrawing Argentine forces from the islands would have meant their immediate overthrow. Thatcher argues in her memoirs that any military junta, simply because of its nature, will never withdraw military forces, no matter the situation.[32] Whether she is correct or not, political pressure certainly prevented Argentina from withdrawing its forces in April 1982, even though keeping the troops stationed there was sure to bring defeat.

Political self-preservation, although not on such a large scale as in Argentina, had important effects in Britain as well. Whereas much of the pressure on the Argentine junta came from the nationalistic populace as a whole, Thatcher and important members of her government were pressured by specific groups. Still, whether it was the small but vocal Falkland Islands Lobby or the hawkish backbenchers of the Conservative Party, the effect of political pressure was the same in Britain as in Argentina. As British leaders came to worry about their own political survival, they became increasingly unwilling to compromise with the junta, which made it that much more difficult to avoid war.

Much of the pressure on British leaders came from the islanders and their supporters. The Falkland Islands Lobby grew increasingly powerful during the month of April. It came to include nine Members of Parliament from the Conservative, Liberal, and other parties. Largely due to their vocal expression of British nationalism, British public opinion changed from mainly pacifism to a willingness to make the military sacrifices necessary to win back the islands. On April 11, the exiled British governor of the islands, Rex Hunt, said the islanders wanted to remain British at all costs. However, a poll on April 12 showed that 60% of British people were not willing to sacrifice lives for the islands. The islanders very much wanted to remain British, but the government's initial response to this desire seemed to be the pacifist route, with the Home Office offering mainland residency to all islanders on April 15. However, as headlines like "Under the thumb of the Aliens" continued to sprout up in British newspapers, public

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[31] "Hard Lines Must Soften," *Globe and Mail*, (8 Apr. 1982); "A Shaky Economy Comes Under More Pressure," *Business Week* 48 (26 Apr. 1982); Chris Hedges, "Latin Regimes Face Dread Possibility of Defeat," *Globe and Mail* (16 Apr. 1982).

[32] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 282-283, 287, 288, 294; Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 208

opinion was turned more in favor of the islanders' call for a military response. Thatcher also helped bring about the change in opinion, continually stating in public speeches that the laws of the United Nations gave Britain the right to use whatever measures were necessary for self defense, including military action. By April 17, one in four Britons favored bombing the islands and 67% wanted to land troops.[33] As the British public rallied behind the cause for war, Thatcher was pushed in that direction as well.

Calls for war first appeared not among the populace, however, but within Thatcher's own party, the Conservatives. According to the *Financial Times*, a London-based paper, the government was in especially great danger politically because the Conservatives, more than any other party, had historically prided themselves on defending the country. Having failed to protect the country from Argentine invasion, the Conservative government was in danger of falling out of power. An editorial in the *Financial Times* argued that Conservatives were so afraid of being sacked that they were not thinking clearly, asserting that a fight for survival "does not make for rational action." Regardless of whether their actions were rational, members of the Conservative Party were worried about political self-preservation, which in turn compelled them to make stronger statements regarding defense than they otherwise might have made. For example, Thatcher's backbenchers, who could force her to resign if they believed she was not adequately representing the party, openly criticized her in the days following the invasion for not having sent a fleet to the islands a month earlier, when Argentina had begun to make aggressive statements about the Falklands. Although Thatcher defended herself by arguing that the fleet would not have made it in time and that airplanes would have had nowhere to refuel, the pressure to make a strong military response was obvious.[34] It would have been impossible for this pressure not to have affected her negotiations with the Argentine junta.

The pressure on Thatcher to maintain a strong diplomatic position, combined with her personal convictions and Argentina's inflexibility, ultimately resulted in a diplomatic standstill that was never overcome. As early as April 10, when British public opinion had not yet turned toward war, the Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail* reported that Thatcher's career depended on restoring the islands to British control. The Labour Party had called for her resignation following the invasion, and Conservatives were known to quickly remove leaders that did not perform well. On April 21, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that Thatcher's backbenchers would settle for nothing less than the British flag flying over the islands, and even Haig admits in his memoirs that her government could not have survived unless Argentine troops were removed. Unfortunately, the sticking point in negotiations came down to this requirement, for Britain refused to talk about sovereignty until Argentine troops left the islands, but Argentina refused to remove its troops until the British fleet left the area, and Thatcher said that removing

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[33] "Lobby power," *Financial Times* 1:14 (19 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "Falklands: British Resolve, US Diplomacy; Thatcher Sizes Up Her Options," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (8 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "Britain: Pressure for Diplomacy Builds," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (12 Apr. 1982); Jack Epstein and James Evans, "Falklanders Feel Betrayed by British Protectors," *The Globe and Mail* 12 (15 Apr. 1982); "1 Briton in 4 Favors Bombing Argentina," *The Globe and Mail* (17 Apr. 1982); "Haig Set for Talks, Argentine Junta Tightens its Grip on the Falklands," *The Globe and Mail* (16 Apr. 1982); "Firmer Trend Continues as Market Pins Hopes on a Peaceful Solution to Falkland Islands Crisis," *Financial Times* 2:34 (22 Apr. 1982); Charles Kaiser, "Behind 'Enemy' Lines," *Newsweek* 57 (26 Apr. 1982);

[34] Elinor Goodman, "Britain: 'Now it is the Time for Action,'" *Financial Times* 1:14 (5 Apr. 1982); "Jingoism is Not the Way," *Financial Times* 1:14 (5 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "Diplomats Race Clock in Falkland Showdown," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (5 Apr. 1982); Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,*1982, p. 26, 29.

the fleet would have immediately ended her career. In this way, the need to preserve her career prevented Thatcher from negotiating a diplomatic solution to the crisis.[35]

Still, political pressure on British leaders after the Argentine invasion did cause some British leaders to resign, the most prominent of whom was Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Carrington resigned on April 3, citing his failure to protect the islands while in office. Because he failed to prevent the invasion, he felt that British policy after the invasion could best be pursued without him. Other resignations included Richard Luce, one of Carrington's colleagues, and Humphrey Atkins, Chief Whip and an important player in foreign affairs. Defense Secretary John Nott offered his resignation, although Thatcher convinced him to remain, and Francis Pym resigned from the Defense Ministry, although Thatcher made him her Foreign Secretary to replace Carrington. Embarrassment for not having protected the islands affected leaders besides Thatcher, and this sentiment surely drove the administration toward a harder line against Argentina. Indeed, *The Globe and Mail* interpreted Carrington's resignation as a sure sign that the administration was going to take a tough stance against Argentina, a prediction that was correct in the end.[36]

Specifically, John Nott and Francis Pym were constantly affected by concerns about political self-preservation during April's negotiations. Being so pressured, they were pushed away from compromise and toward a tougher stance against Argentina. On April 5, the *Financial Times* reported that Conservative backbenchers had walked out on Nott while he was speaking to the House of Commons. Some even shouted, "Resign! Resign!" Concern about a reaction from the powerful backbenchers – some of whom went so far as to advocate bombing the Argentine mainland – even forced Nott to change a report that showed a drop in fleet numbers for fear of being shouted out of Parliament. Pym, too, struggled to satisfy the bloodthirsty backbenchers. The *Financial Times* argued on April 8 that Pym had only earned the political leeway to consider a peaceful resolution because he had emphasized the economic sanctions against Argentina, which, as previously discussed, actually hampered negotiations by further weakening the junta. Thatcher even had to save Pym from the backbenchers when he used the word "administration" to describe what Britain would win back from the invaders. She quickly stepped in and assured the backbenchers that "sovereignty" was what Mr. Pym had meant to say. [37] In such a tense environment, meaningful discussions about transferring sovereignty were nearly impossible.

Finally, concerns about self-preservation hampered even Alexander Haig, the supposedly neutral and freely-negotiating American Secretary of State. *The Globe and Mail* reported that Haig's aids worried that he would be removed as Secretary of State if he could not solve the crisis. Perhaps one reason for this concern was Reagan's friendship with Thatcher and his lack of patience with the Argentines. Once, Reagan specifically instructed Haig to tell the junta that

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[35] Barry May, "Iron Lady's Career Rides with the Royal Armada," *Globe and Mail* (10 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "Britain Maintains its Options – both Diplomacy and Force," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (21 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 272 ; "Bolivia would Fight for Argentina, Haig Returns to Washington as Peace Talks Break Down," *Globe and Mail* (14 Apr. 1982).

[36] "Thatcher Reaffirms Confidence in Nott," *Financial Times* 1:6 (6 Apr. 1982); Ivor Owen, "Backbenchers Tighten Noose round Nott in Commons Debate," *Globe and Mail* 1:2 (5 Apr. 1982); "Choice for Mr. Reagan," *Globe and Mail* (6 Apr. 1982); Elinor Goodman, "Tories Divided by Carrington's Resignation," *Financial Times,* 1:6 (6 Apr. 1982).

[37] Ivor Owen, "Backbenchers Tighten Noose Round Nott in Commons Debate," *Financial Times* 1:2 (5 Apr. 1982); Jeffery Simpson, "Britons Voice Support for Thatcher's Policy," *Globe and Mail* (23 Apr. 1982); Peter Riddell, "Pym Wins Backing on Falklands Diplomacy," *Financial Times* 1:18 (8 Apr. 1982).

continuing to be inflexible would cause the U.S. to blame the failed negotiations on Argentina and side with Britain. Indeed, *Newsweek* reported on April 26 that Haig was worried that Reagan had already arranged for Treasury Secretary George Schultz to replace him. In the end, Haig did lose his job as a result of the crisis, being forced to resign soon after the outbreak of war. Worry about such a result must have affected his ability to arbitrate, although his memoirs give the impression that he was more than willing to sacrifice his position in the government to try to prevent bloodshed up to the very last moment.[38]

Ideological Principle and the Cold War Context

One of Haig's most significant problems was the United States' need to appear strong before the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been flexing their muscles in areas like Afghanistan and had made significant inroads in Latin America, especially in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas. The West was worried that a poor performance in the Falklands would affect the international balance of power. To prevent this from happening, Western leaders felt the need to appear strong, which they did by upholding two principles in the Falklands: self-determination and the condemnation of aggression. Although it appears that the West neutralized the Soviet threat in the Falklands, the need to appear ideologically strong hampered negotiations.

Dissent within the West was perceived as a threat to the Cold War balance of power. From the beginning of the conflict, the Soviets had decried Britain's "colonialism," and some in the West latched on to this argument as well. On April 5, an editorial in the *Financial Times* called it an "anachronism" for Britain to try to regain a territory 8,000 miles away. Even Michael Foot, leader of Britain's Labour Party, argued at one point that Britain would violate UN Resolution 502 by counterattacking. He and Tory backbencher Sir Anthony Meyer said on April 15 that they would not support war, no matter the final outcome of negotiations. Although they would change their stance as negotiations continued, dissent such as theirs in the face of an ideologically aggressive Soviet Union was seen as dangerous, especially since the absence of the British fleet from the North Atlantic altered the military balance of power. In addition, one commentator remarked that the inability of the United States to prevent war in the Falkland Islands demonstrated its decline as a world superpower.[39] In this way, the Soviet threat was a significant concern.

Appearing weak in the balance of power was especially troubling for the West because the Soviet Union had begun to make ties with Argentina. Connections between the Soviets and the Argentines began in 1979, when the United States stopped selling grain to the Soviet Union in protest of its invasion of Afghanistan. Argentina, in dire need of export profits, quickly made up the difference. In 1982, many feared that this economic connection would become political, especially if leftist groups overthrew the junta. Argentina was surprised at the lack of international support for its invasion, especially after the United States voted for UN Resolution 502. Lacking support in the West, many worried that the Argentines would seek help from the

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[38]John King, "Falklands Fuzz Puts Washington on the Spot," *Globe and Mail* (23 Apr. 1982); Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 202; Elizabeth Peer, "Haig's Stake in the Falklands," *Newsweek* 19 (26 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 298

[39] "Jingoism is Not the Way," *Financial Times* 1:14 (5 Apr. 1982); Joseph C. Harsch, "Falklands: So Much for the Superpowers," *Christian Science Monitor* 23 (9 Apr. 1982); David K. Willis, "Tough Thatcher Line on Falklands Faces Severest Test," *Christian Science Monitor* 13 (15 Apr. 1982); Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 210

Soviets if war should result. As one author remarked, Argentina would be much more dangerous as a communist ally than Cuba or Nicaragua had been.[40]

Perhaps in an effort to make such an alliance with Argentina, the Soviet Union initially supported the Argentine position. As early as April 3, the Soviets abstained from voting on Resolution 502 and openly condemned the British Task Force as colonial aggression. *Pravda*, the leading Russian state-controlled newspaper, even argued that British attempts to retake the islands would go against United Nations rulings on decolonization. Argentina seems to have adopted this way of thinking, claiming at the Organization of American States that the British recapture of South Georgia Island was colonialism. To add to the West's worries, there was strong anti-American sentiment in Argentina, and the Soviet Union, while not sending arms directly to Argentina, did instruct Cuba to offer aircraft, pilots, and arms to the junta.[41] It seems that the Soviets saw the war as an opportunity to gain advantage in Latin America.

The Western Powers felt they could counter the Soviet threat only by firmly defending their ideological tenets, one of the most important of which was self-determination. In a speech to the House of Commons on April 3, Thatcher strongly condemned the Argentine invasion as an affront to the principle of self-determination. She mentioned that the British Governor of the Falklands, Rex Hunt, had observed the patriotic islanders literally "in tears" for having been taken over by a foreign power. Her stance was that the islanders must determine their own future, and she stood by that belief throughout the conflict. Although there were significant contradictions within her unequivocal defense of self-determination – a British government committee determined after the war that her stance had been in error – the right of the islanders to maintain their way of life became a rallying cry for the British people and an important ideological weapon with which to counter Soviet arguments.[42]

Even more important as an ideological tenet for the West was the condemnation of aggression. The Western Powers had been checking Soviet aggression for decades, and they would have appeared inconsistent if they did not condemn Argentina's aggressive takeover in the Falklands. Thatcher publicly declared that the "rule of law will triumph," and the United States supported her. Also playing into the British mindset was the national memory of the Munich Conference of 1938, where Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had appeased Hitler's aggression in Czechoslovakia and failed to prevent the Second World War. *The Globe and Mail* called Thatcher's way of thinking a "Munich psychology." In this way, concerns about appeasement encouraged Britain and the NATO allies never to tolerate aggression again. Indeed, as Haig recounts, Thatcher compared the situation in the Falklands to the Munich Conference, angrily shouting down Pym when he suggested that Britain should ask the islanders how they felt about a war before counterattacking.[43] For Thatcher, it was most important to make sure

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[40] Joseph C. Harsch, "Falklands Fallout," *Christian Science Monitor* 23 (13 Apr. 1982); Daniel Southerland, "Global Isolation Prods Argentina Closer to USSR," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (13 Apr. 1982).

[41] David K. Willis, "Britain: Pressure for Diplomacy Builds," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (12 Apr. 1982); Daniel Southerland, "Global Isolation Prods Argentina Closer to USSR," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (13 Apr. 1982); John King, "Argentina Denounces Invasion by British," *Globe and Mail* (27 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 278.

[42] Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,1982*, Speech by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Opening an Emergency Debate on the Falklands Crisis in the House of Commons on 3 April 1982, pp. 26, 39; Minutes of Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and Chairman's Draft Report on a Policy for the Falklands Islands. Read 27 April 1983, House of Commons, WFU ZSR Library British Government Documents, p. xxv

[43] David K. Willis, "British Resolve, US Diplomacy, Thatcher Sizes Up Her Options," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (8 Apr. 1982); quote: David K. Willis, "Tough Thatcher Line on Falklands Faces Severest Test," *Christian Science*

Argentina did not benefit from the invasion. Not surprisingly, this became a sticking point in peace talks.

The need to condemn aggression pushed Thatcher to maintain a hard line in negotiations. She recounts in her memoirs one instance when Haig had convinced Pym that Britain would lose international support if the two sides came to blows. For this reason, Pym believed that conflict had to be avoided. When Pym showed her these arguments, however, she called them "conditional surrender" and rejected them out of hand. In this instance, the "Munich psychology" seems to have played a role in her considerations. Thatcher's tough stance turned into an aggressive condemnation of Argentina. In speeches to the House of Commons, she used incendiary language like "rape of the islands" to characterize the invasion. Her tough stance also influenced others within her government like Nikko Henderson, the British ambassador to the United States, who told Haig that Britain not only wanted to remove the Argentines from the islands, but also "wouldn't mind sinking the Argentine fleet." Perhaps Thatcher's strong stance had gotten out of hand, making the British too eager to avenge the islands with blood. However, Haig offers a different interpretation, saying that Britain's unyielding insistence not to appease the aggressors marked a turning point in East-West relations. He believes the West had been declining into passivity, and that Britain's tough stance reversed the dangerous trend.[44] Either way, Britain's strong resolve against appeasement pushed its leaders into a hard stance in negotiations, making a peaceful solution even harder to come by.

The NATO countries joined Britain in its strong condemnation of aggression. Immediately following the invasion, the European Community condemned the invasion and called for Argentina to remove its forces from the islands. By April 12, these countries had imposed their toughest economic sanctions ever, denying Argentina of $2 billion in export profits. As both the *Financial Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* point out, these sanctions were a striking display of unity for the European Community. Never before had the group taken such drastic measures. The EC's partial sanctions on the Soviet Union, in response to its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, had cut Soviet exports by a mere 1.5%. The EC even failed to impose meaningful sanctions on Iran during the hostage crisis in 1980, only enacting a partial ban on Iranian exports. Given the unprecedented sanctions against Argentina, it seems that Western Europe was just as in favor of condemning aggression as Britain was, at least in an effort to support a fellow EC member. As Haig said, had the West abandoned the principle that the status quo must not be changed by force, it would have shown itself to be corrupt, which was just what the Soviet Union had been claiming since the outbreak of the Cold War.[45] By not

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Monitor 13 (15 Apr. 1982); Jeffery Simpson, "Falklands: Test for British Honor Despite the High Cost for a Small Prize, No Risk Seems too Great," *Globe and Mail* (8 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 272-273

[44] Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years.* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 206; Joseph C. Harsch, "Britain and Argentina Find Who Their (Very Different) Friends Are," *Christian Science Monitor* 3 (16 Apr. 1982); Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,*1982, Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Francis Pym, Opening the House of Commons' Second Debate on the Falklands Crisis on 7 Apr. 1982, p. 37 ; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 272

[45]Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falklands Crisis,*1982, Introduction, p. 6; Gary Yerkey, "EC Takes Toughest Economic Sanction Ever; W. Europe Stands with Britain," *Christian Science Monitor* 12 (12 Apr. 1982); John Wyles and Paul Cheesright, "Falklands: Britain Seeks Backing From Europe," *Financial Times* 1:1 (7 Apr. 1982); Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 265

allowing the precedent of aggression to stand, the West took the moral high ground, remaining consistent in the never-ending ideological battle with the Soviets.

Whether caused by Western ideological steadfastness or not, it seems that the Soviets were prevented from siding too strongly with the Argentines. On April 28, Lev Tolkunov, chairman of Moscow's Novosti press agency, declared that the Soviet Union would not necessarily fight for Argentina. Indeed, although the Soviet Union consistently condemned the British for failing to give up their colony, it never officially supported the Argentine invasion. Daniel Southerland of the *Christian Science Monitor* argues that the communists could not get too close to the Argentines for ideological reasons. After all, the junta's ideology was vehemently anti-communist.[46] However, the economic collaboration between the two countries demonstrates that the junta was happy to receive support from whomever it could. In light of this collaboration, Haig's interpretation seems to have merit. If not for the show of Western unity and strength, the Soviets might have been bolder in making ties with Argentina. The only problem was that, in order to show unity and strength, the West had to take a hard line in negotiations with the junta, and this prevented a peaceful solution from being reached in the Falklands.

Nations outside of NATO had reason to condemn the invasion as well. If Argentina could establish the precedent of solving territorial disputes with force, then any country with disputed territory would be in danger of an attack. In the end, this explained why Argentina did not receive the support it expected from its Latin American neighbors. As articulated by a high Brazilian official, if Latin American countries learned that Argentina could get away with simply occupying the territory it claimed, then nearly every country in Latin America would be at risk, for in 1982 there were over 20 active border disputes in Latin America alone. Establishing a precedent of aggression would have had worldwide implications as well, such as encouraging China to attack Taiwan or Turkey to occupy Rhodes. Even without the context of the Cold War, most nations condemned the Argentine invasion because allowing it to last would have set a dangerous precedent of aggression for the whole world.[47]

Conclusions

It was very unfortunate that war finally broke out in the Falkland Islands. Both sides genuinely wanted to avoid war, a fact they demonstrated by participating in a month of frustrating negotiations. Why, then, did fighting begin? Why did 1,054 soldiers have to die for these remote and sparsely populated islands? It would be irresponsible not to assign responsibility for an outcome as drastic as the outbreak of war. Who or what was responsible for the Falkland Islands War?

In considering such a question, it is important to distinguish between moral responsibility and historical responsibility. The question of moral responsibility assigns blame. Whoever is morally responsible for the war is guilty of starting the fight and causing the deaths. Not surprisingly, this question is very difficult to answer. As this paper has shown, numerous historical forces led to the outbreak of war, none of which is easily attributable to one person or group. Diplomatic principles relating to the Cold War, the precedent of aggression, difficulties

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[46] Ned Tomko, "Soviets Shy of Slipping onto Falklands Swamp," *Christian Science Monitor* 13 (28 Apr. 1982); David Buchan, "Moscow Backs Away from Openly Siding with Junta," *Financial Times* 1:4 (8 Apr. 1982); Daniel Southerland, "Global Isolation Prods Argentina Closer to USSR," *Christian Science Monitor* 1 (13 Apr. 1982).

[47] Lucia Mouat, "Former UN Ambassador McHenry: US Should Back British on Falklands," *Christian Science Monitor* 10 (22 Apr. 1982); Joseph C. Harsch, "The Argentina Case," *Christian Science Monitor* 23 (15 Apr 1982); James Nelson Goodsell, "Argentina: Neighbors Hold Back Latin America Unity Masks Deep Hostility," *Christian Science Monitor* (27 Apr. 1982); "Argentina Receives Guarded Support," *The Globe and Mail* (7 Apr. 1982).

in negotiation, and the need to remain in power are the main historical forces that hampered negotiations and led to war, but none of these issues implicates a particular person or group. Thus, the question of historical responsibility is more instructive than the question of moral responsibility, for historical responsibility is concerned not with who is to blame, but with what historical forces finally caused the outcome in question.

Some actors in the conflict probably deserve some measure of blame. Perhaps the junta made the wrong decision by invading the islands, and it could have stepped down instead of sending soldiers to die against a much stronger opponent. Perhaps the British should have been more patient, for the Argentine economy was plummeting with each day that passed, becoming increasingly less able to fight a war. However, these are merely speculations. To assign moral responsibility would require a definition of moral obligation that would be very difficult to establish in such a complicated situation. More importantly, whatever personal responsibility can be assigned seems less important than the larger historical forces at play. After all, given the many reasons for the failure of negotiations, would other actors really have been able to avoid war? Although one can never predict an unlikely feat of heroism, it is improbable that anyone would have been able to overcome the many impediments to negotiation that have been discussed in this paper. In the end, responsibility for the Falkland Islands War lays with the numerous historical forces that made diplomacy impossible. If there are lessons to be learned from this conflict, they would seem to relate to how similar impediments to negotiation might be overcome in the future. What more could be done and what might be done differently are questions that will always be worthy of further research.

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The Revolution That Began the Evolution

By Michael Belinsky
Dartmouth College

Democratization does not follow a single path, and is unlikely to have universally applicable necessary and sufficient conditions ... The next round of research and theory in democratization required identification, verification, and connection of the relevant causal mechanisms.

- Charles Tilly[1]

Introduction

The Parliamentary elites' successful rejection of democratic challenges during the English Revolution (1640-1660) contributed to the formation of a political consensus around petitioning Parliament as the means of democratic reform. In contrast, the success of the democrats outside of the parliamentary structure during the French Revolution ensured the weakness of future Parliaments in confronting democratic agendas. As the parliamentary consensus strengthened, parliamentary groups took over extra-parliamentary groups as the main advocate of democratic reform.

Methodology

Proving the causal link between elites' actions and the formation of a parliamentary consensus requires useful measures of elites' actions and parliamentary consensus. The story of elites—that is, powerful politicians like Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton—defending Parliament from most democratic demands outlines the independent variable. The dependent variable of parliamentary consensus—that is, democratization by petitioning Parliament rather than by advocating regime change—is quantified by examining the role of extra-parliamentary groups in democratization after the English Revolution.[2]

Extra-parliamentary groups, political organizations outside of Parliament, occupy the political space between parliamentary parties and civil society. Unlike parties, extra-parliamentary groups by definition have no direct representation in Parliament. Civil society encompasses citizens who actively participate in politics, whether through political clubs, voting, petitioning, or other means. Civil society holds opinions on a variety of issues. Extra-parliamentary groups, in contrast, are more structured and advocate a specific opinion on a specific issue or a small set of issues. Party strength also measures parliamentary consensus, but parties stand secondary to extra-parliamentary groups in indicating consensus. Parties are strong only to the extent that the people view Parliament as legitimate. Meanwhile, Parliament has

[1] Charles Tilly, "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization," *Sociological Theory* (Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2000), p. 1.

[2] "Democratization" in this essay means "a movement toward broad citizenship, equal citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, and protection of citizens from arbitrary state action." (Tilly, p. 1.)

legitimacy only to the extent that extra-parliamentary groups do not successfully oppose its actions or threaten its existence.[3]

The decreasing participation, or decreasing efficacy, of extra-parliamentary groups affirms the hypothesis of the formation of political consensus around Parliament. If most reforms occur through Parliament without the help of extra-parliamentary groups, then an obvious parliamentary consensus exists. The finding of strong participation and efficacy, however, does not negate the hypothesis. Instead, the means by which an extra-parliamentary group advocates its platform determines the progress of the parliamentary consensus. When a group threatens regime change or revolution, or petitions bodies other than Parliament, this speaks against parliamentary consensus. When a group lobbies Parliament (through petitions, dinners, debates, etc.) or otherwise seeks reform through Parliament, this evidence supports the hypothesis.

What amount of parliamentary petitioning would be necessary to prove the hypothesis, and what amount of non-parliamentary action would disprove it? If extra-parliamentary groups persistently rely on non-parliamentary means to shape democratic reform, then no existence of a parliamentary consensus can be proven. This paper can make a case for parliamentary consensus only if extra-parliamentary groups' reliance on non-parliamentary means decreases over time, or if extra-parliamentary groups stand secondary to civil society and Parliament in shaping democratic reform.

Is the measurement of parliamentary consensus robust to environmental changes? The hypothesis operates in a dynamic political environment; who elects, who gets elected, and how elections happen all change over time. The power of the state grows, as does civil society. For example, Parliament learns to meet peoples' demands and channel their discontent into petitions, commissions, and the vote. Comparing the English revolution to a similar event controls for many, but not all, environmental changes.

The comparison of the English and French revolutions illuminates other factors that may have contributed to the formation of a parliamentary consensus. Since no consensus was formed after the French Revolution, whatever characteristics the two revolutions share can be ruled out as sufficient causal agents (assuming similar causes cannot lead to different outcomes). Shared characteristics can, however, be necessary conditions. In order to disprove their role in shaping the parliamentary consensus, the English Revolution would have to be compared to other revolutions where a parliamentary consensus was formed in the absence of the given characteristics. The analysis here will extend only to the English and French revolutions, thus allowing that some factors that these revolutions share may be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the formation of a parliamentary consensus.

Any factor unique to the English Revolution (e.g., the presence and makeup of the New Model Army) may explain the formation of parliamentary consensus better than the elites' rejection of democratic demands. Unique aspects of the French revolutionary experience (e.g., the external threat of a Prussian invasion) similarly may have caused, and certainly may have contributed to, the revolution's different outcome.[4] A comparison to other revolutions where similar, and similarly unique, events did not lead to similar outcomes would help disprove such claims.

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[3] This discussion of extra-parliamentary theory draws from Philip Norton, "The United Kingdom," in R. A. Koole and Knut Heidar, eds., Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties Behind Closed Doors (London: Routledge, 2000); and Philip Resnick, "Political Theory of Extra-Parliamentarianism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1973).

[4] Christopher Hill points out that the ability of the French in 1789 to look back on the English Revolution of 1640 presents another problem when comparing the two revolutions. The presence of that event in French history may have altered the actions of the French during the French Revolution. (Christopher Hill, The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 2-3.)

The hypothesized effect of the elites' rejection of democratic demands on the democratization process suggests that strong elites helped institutionalize democratization by channeling it through Parliament. The grasp of this essay extends only to Britain's parliamentary consensus, and the above conclusion reaches far beyond that. Different histories of elites' success and failure in standing up to democratic demands have to be analyzed before the positive effect of channeling democratization can be proven.

The English Revolution

Parliamentary elites successfully rejected democratic challenges during the English Revolution. The Levellers were the most influential of the extra-parliamentary groups to enter the political chaos created by the first English Civil War in 1642.[5] After the Parliamentarians triumphed over King Charles I on the battlefield, the Levellers saw that settlement was failing to progress and proposed a set of democratic reforms. The Parliamentarians, in turn, responded to the Levellers with their own reforms.[6]

The Parliamentarians and the Levellers presented their claims during a set of debates in an attempt to settle the growing discontent within Cromwell's New Model Army over the Parliamentarians' inability to settle with the King. These debates, which came to be known as the Putney debates, started in October 1647 at the Church of St. Mary the Virgin in Putney, and lasted throughout November. The two parties compromised and elected a new, initially biennial, Parliament.[7] Emboldened by their progress, the Levellers pressed for more gains, but they would get no further.[8] Henry Ireton, a general in the army of Parliament and Cromwell's ally, spoke for the Parliamentarians and strongly disagreed with the Levellers' franchise requirement. (The Levellers argued that lack of property ownership should not restrict the right to vote.) Ireton stated that non-landowners have no vested interest in the state. Meanwhile, Cromwell began to fear growing radicalism within the Army. He ended the Putney debates and purged the Army ranks of all Agitators.[9] Unable to push for reform by compromising with the elites, the Levellers rallied public discontent against them. They called for the elimination of Army power and the abolition of Parliament, while also attempting to create rifts between Parliament and the New Model Army.[10] After Putney, the Levellers contended that political reform could not be realized through Parliament.[11] The possibility of influencing policy, however, died with the restoration of elite control over the Army.[12]

Levellers' suggestion to extend democracy, however radical, lay within the capitalist notions of property ownership. A branch of the Levellers known as the True Levellers went far beyond capitalism, calling for the abolition of private property and the creation of egalitarian communes.[13] The True Levellers were labeled "the Diggers" by their opponents for their extra-parliamentary solutions to the political crisis. By the 1640s, enclosure—a process by which arable farming in communal fields was ended by entitlements that made common land private—

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[5] Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), p. 11.

[6] The *Agreement of the People* states the Levellers' reforms. The *Head of the Proposals* states the Parliamentarians' reforms.

[7] Joseph Frank, The Levellers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 136.

[8] In *The Case of the Army Truly Stated*, the Levellers alienated the General Council presiding over the Putney debates, Parliament and elites like Cromwell, Ireton and Fairfax. The Levellers never called for the abolition of Parliament as an institution, but their reforms were anathema to the standing Parliament: 1) purge the present Parliament, 2) allow all free men over 21 to elect a new Parliament. These claims sound less radical now, but in the 1640s they were anti-parliamentarian. (Woolrych, pp. 384-385.)

[9] Frank, pp. 136-137.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Frank, pp. 135-137. *The Humble Petition* (Sept. 13, 1648), for example, had 400,000 signatories (pp. 167-168).

[12] Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 87.

[13] *The True Levellers Standard Advanced*, <http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/digger.html>, accessed Nov. 30, 2006.

left about one third of England as "barren waste, which the lords of manors would not permit the poor to cultivate."[14] The Diggers established collective communities on those wastelands and started cultivating the land for their benefit (hence their name).[15] Their intentions never escalated to the level of open resistance against Parliament, but their focus on the poor was antithetical to parliamentary solutions. The Diggers demanded that church, crown, and royalist land be handed over to the poor, which directly contradicted previous acts of Parliament.[16] Parliament responded unsympathetically to the Diggers: "The squatters' shacks were pulled down, their crops destroyed, and the men convicted of trespass and fined … the colony survived into the spring of 1650."[17] Thus, extra-parliamentary attempts of the Diggers failed against the legal and military pressures enacted by the Parliament.

Other groups also presented solutions to the political crisis of the mid-17th century. The pacifist Quakers railed against the established Church and called for annual Parliaments.[18] The millenarian Fifth Monarchists sought to reform Parliament for the second coming of Christ.[19] The Ranters, a radical branch of the Quakers (just as the Diggers were a radical branch of the Levellers), started a quest to deconstruct hierarchies by flaunting societal taboos, parading naked on the streets of London.[20]

None of the groups successfully implemented its demands outside of the parliamentary structure. The Diggers were first investigated and eventually abandoned as a non-threat that was easily put down. The Quakers were also subdued. Historian Christopher Hill writes that, however weak these groups may have been, Parliament felt threatened by them: "The hysteria of M.P.'s [Members of Parliament's] contributions to the debate [against the Quakers] shows how frightened they had been, and how delighted they were to seize the opportunity for counter-attack."[21]

Only the Levellers saw some of their demands met solely by the grace of Cromwell's Rump Parliament—a parliament purged of all MPs loyal to King Charles I. Such fundamental failure to influence the outcome of one of the most important revolutions in Britain—indeed, one that witnessed its most significant regicide[22]—made two lessons available to future democratic movements. First, Parliament can reform (lesson of the Levellers at Putney). Second, reform can only be done through Parliament, not against it (lesson of Levellers after Putney) or outside of it (lesson of Diggers and Ranters).

Neither the democratic nature of these groups' demands, nor their radicalism, was crucial for the creation of a consensus. It matters not what they said, just that they failed. Success, however, is a different story. Had their demands succeeded, the post-revolutionary picture in Britain would look different; perhaps, different enough for the parliamentary consensus in Britain to fail. Some of the Levellers' demands did succeed, and their partial success is just as important to the formation of a parliamentary consensus as the failure of others.

Did the lessons of democratic movements in the 1640s and 1650s survive to inform the actions of democratic movements in the 19th and 20th centuries? Some of the demands of future democratic movements (e.g., the Chartists, the Anti Corn Law League, the Reform League, etc.)

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[14] Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, pp. 101-104.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625-1600 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 429.
[18] Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, pp. 186-198.
[19] Ibid.
[20] "Ranters," *English Dissenters*, June 5, 2004, <http://www.exlibris.org/nonconform/engdis/ranters.html>, accessed Dec. 3, 2006.
[21] Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 201.
[22] The only other British regicide was of Mary Queen of Scots in 1587 by Queen Elizabeth I.

echo those of the Levellers, the Ranters, and the Quakers.[23] The future generations that drew on their predecessors' platforms may have also drawn on the successes and failures of those platforms. The successful institutionalization of Cromwell's reforms in the *Instrument of Government*[24] created the perception among potential political reformers that reform was possible, unless it threatened the existence of Parliament. Various groups still emerged over time to challenge Parliament, but most successful democratic reform would result from the work of parliamentary and civil society pressures, not extra-parliamentary ultimatums. This bottom-up explanation places the understanding of a consensus with the masses, from which extra-parliamentary groups emerged. Another explanation, from the top, would place the faith in parliamentary channels with the elite. The formation of a consensus at the top is compelling because, relative to other European states, "England represents an extreme instance of the continuity of aristocratic power."[25] Both explanations require a sense of historical determinism. People have to read history, learn from history, and act on their newfound knowledge for a consensus to emerge.

Path dependency often directs such action. Incremental democratization decreases the political cost of subsequent democratization, and reform through Parliament makes further parliamentary reform easier by increasing public knowledge about such actions and, in the process, strengthening the institution of parliament. Thus, if a cost-benefit of any given reform takes past events into account, then direct knowledge by a group of reformers of past events is not necessary for their performance to reflect those events.

Such explanations would not predict a uniform consensus: different groups (or MPs) may learn different historical lessons from the same event. If the bottom-up explanation holds, then the data would show extra-parliamentary groups that petition Parliament, as well as those that do nothing of the sort. A top-down explanation would be suggested by examples of elites challenging the legitimacy of Parliament. Since the data is likely to show both, neither explanation can be privileged over the other.[26] Perhaps the question of how a consensus forms can best be addressed by asking its opposite: How does a consensus fail to form? For that, this essay looks at the French Revolution.

The French Revolution

In contrast to the English Revolution, the democrats in France succeeded in destabilizing the French regime during the French Revolution. When King Louis XVI accepted the September 3 constitution in 1791, many thought "the revolution was now complete and ordinary constitutional life could begin."[27] The Legislative Assembly, however, was unable to maintain control of the regime. First, an earlier oath of allegiance forced on the clergy legitimized dissent against the revolution by creating a large number of refractors.[28] Second, the King's attempted escape, concealed by the Assembly, linked public discontent with the monarchy to the Assembly. The Legislative Assembly, just like the English Parliament, before the regicide, consisted mostly

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[23] The Quakers, the Levellers and the Chartists called for annual parliaments. The Reform League called for equality within Parliament; the Diggers called for equality outside of Parliament.

[24] The *Instrument* called for single-house triennial Parliaments to sit for at least five months; restricted the franchise to property owners or those with an income of at least 200 pounds a year; and granted liberty of worship to all but Catholics.

[25] Ellis Wasson, Born to Rule (Thrupp: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. 5.

[26] Other authors have suggested different causal links. John Garrard writes that "The survival and democratization of elite ensured that no displaced or disgruntled group had a stake in thwarting democratisation to return to power [unlike post-1918 Germany, East-Central European countries, and post-1989 Russia]." (Garrard, p. 4.)

[27] William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 157.

[28] Refractors are members of the clergy who refused to pledge an oath of allegiance to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and later faced repression and exportation. (Doyle, p. 147.)

of large landowners.[29] Its composition alienated it from the Parisian masses, as it attempted to resolve these issues. As the legitimacy of the Assembly waned, so grew the majority's dissatisfaction with the post-revolutionary settlement; they demanded more. The moderate Assembly was able to neither contain nor channel the resulting discontent. From the massacre at Champs de Mars, to the massacre of over half of the prison population, the Legislative Assembly watched helplessly as the Parisian mob, rejecting the Assembly's solutions, imposed their own solutions on the streets of Paris.[30] The "leveling" of hierarchies by the Parisian mob in the French Revolution was very real.[31] Feudalism was abolished. Against the will of the Assembly, all fiscal privileges for the nobility were eliminated. The organizational structure of the Catholic Church was similarly removed; anti-religion became the new religion. The leveling was much more fundamental, however: 1,200 nobles and 232 priests were executed.[32] By 1801, 12,500 noble families fled France, and 25,000 priests immigrated or were deported.[33] As the elites realized that the Assembly could no longer protect them and their interests from the raging mobs, they too withdrew their support.

The inability of the French Assembly to restrain radical democratic solutions through parliamentary channels[34] contributed to a major de-stabilization of the parliamentary system and to a distrust of the Assembly's ability to represent the popular will. From 1789 to the present, France has experienced twelve regimes (not counting provisional governments), each swept away by coup d'États from above, revolution from below, or war from without.[35] The lack of a parliamentary consensus contributed to the endemic political violence in France during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The restored Bourbon Dynasty (following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo) gave way to the July Monarchy after Parisian mobs began to riot in the streets. After a right-wing revolution of 1848, the July Monarchy gave way to the Second Republic. The Second Republic fell in a coup, and gave way to the Second Empire, which ended when a Parisian mob invaded the National Assembly and called for the establishment of the Third Republic.

Post-revolution parliamentary reform was rejected by the masses, even when it was democratic, because they wanted reform on their own terms—that is, outside of parliamentary bodies. When, in 1848, Parisians demanded that the landowner-dominated Constituent Assembly issue support for the Prussian Revolution, the Assembly rejected their demands and closed down all national workshops.[36] Thwarted in their search for a legislative solution, workers took to the streets in a social revolution. As historians Parry and Girard write, "Despite universal male suffrage, they believed that the only solution was a revolution that would remake society as a whole, not just its political regime."[37] Although their attempts were crushed by the National Guard, their action and intent display a violent rejection of the possibility of a parliamentary consensus.

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[29] The Legislative Assembly was elected on Oct. 1, 1791. (Doyle, p. 174.)
[30] Doyle, p. 220.
[31] James I, who proclaimed "No Bishop, No King," would have recoiled when a British painter caricatured the French republicans' declaration "No God! No Religion! No King! No Constitution!" (George Cruikshank, painting, "The Radical's Arms.")
[32] Doyle, pp. 410-420.
[33] Ibid.
[34] For consistency with the previous section, I use the term "parliament" instead of "legislature." Different French regimes gave different names (and different powers) to their parliaments. Whether the National Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, or the Legislative Body, I use "parliament" to refer to the lawmaking body of the regime.
[35] D. L. L. Parry and Pierre Girard, France since 1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1.
[36] Parry, pp. 62-63.
[37] Ibid.

The French ruling elite had their own reasons for rejecting the parliamentary consensus. When, in 1851, the Constituent Assembly refused to adopt Louis-Napoleon's constitutional reforms, he instigated a successful coup d'État. Louis-Napoleon dissolved the Assembly, suppressed the resulting rural insurrection, and created the Second Empire. Since Louis-Napoleon successfully overruled parliament in the name of executive authority, the legislative body of the Second Empire had no authority to initiate laws, could not elect its own president, and could not publish its debates.[38] Ironically, the dissolution of the Second Empire came when Napoleon attempted to strengthen the regime by taking steps to legitimize the legislative body in response to economic discontent. The regime became strongly dependent on popular support at a time when its legitimacy depended on the outcome of the battle between France and Prussia.[39] When news of Prussian victory reached Paris, "crowds invaded the Legislative Body and then marched off to Hotel de Ville in ritual manner to proclaim the Third Republic."[40]

The Third Republic presents a similar picture of parliamentary illegitimacy contributing to political instability. Over 108 governments came and went in the 70 years of republican rule.[41] Most government collapsed in the face of pressure from extra-parliamentary interest groups.[42] Parry and Girard describe how "past failures of political movement made unions suspicious of socialist parties."[43] When the main trade union, CGT, was formed in 1895, it declared itself outside all political parties. All French unions, in fact, developed in "isolation from the state and political parties."[44] They were extra-parliamentary groups with no interest in parliamentary action.[45]

These few examples focus on post-revolutionary politics of the nineteenth century. They indicate, however, a major factor of the political instability in France after the revolution. The failure of parliament to meet the demands of radical democrats during the French Revolution forced the democrats to take their demands to the streets. Their success outside of the parliamentary structure destroyed the legitimacy of legislative reform. The masses disliked parliament because it did not represent their demands. The monarchy disliked parliament because it refused to bend to its will. Besieged by the monarchy from above and the public from below, the "parliamentarians" were unable to create a consensus around using parliament as the means of reform. The lack of a parliamentary consensus played a crucial role in the political instability of nineteenth century France. The continued success of revolutions and coups created a self-reinforcing cycle that France did not exit until the 21st century; a cycle that arguably still plagues the political legitimacy of the Fifth Republic.

What other factors unique to French politics detracted from the formation of a parliamentary consensus? France faced external threats, which often destabilized the regime. Also, the French economy was often more protectionist than the English *laissez faire* model.[46] Could those factors better explain the difference in outcomes between post-revolutionary France and post-revolutionary England?

Although external threats contributed to both the outcome of the French Revolution and the instability of political regimes afterwards, enemies abroad do not account for all the unrest at

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[38] Parry, p. 63.
[39] Parry, pp. 68-69.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Parry, p. 79.
[42] Parry, p. 50.
[43] Parry, p. 68.
[44] Parry, p. 83.
[45] "Unions had a culture of confrontation: to make demands not to provide assistance, to stand apart from politics, to destroy the state and capitalism society, not to reform it." (Parry, p. 83.)
[46] Whereas major extra-parliamentary pressure opposed the Corn Law in England, France successfully guided a similar tariff through parliament in 1892, despite workers' objections that it will raise the cost of food in urban sectors. (Parry, pp. 90-91.)

home. The direct cause of the fall of the Second Empire lies in France's military loss to Prussia. The military loss would not have resulted in a political catastrophe, however, had Louis-Napoleon not legitimized the legislative body in the face of an economic malaise. The public's distrust of a Napoleon-run legislature, not military defeat, underlies the collapse of the Second Republic. Similarly, the Third Republic remained relatively unworried about external threats, yet political instability persisted. Protectionism stalls economic growth, but it also stalls the process of what Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction." The economic adjustment that follows *laissez faire* politics is equally as likely to cause political instability as protectionist policies. It is by no means obvious that these factors hurt the chances for consensus any more than parliamentary failure during the French Revolution. This list of possible alternate causalities is far from complete. Post-revolutionary France also was less industrialized than post-revolutionary Britain in the 1650s and 1660s; urbanization developed in Britain earlier and its religious differences were settled more quickly. Further research can evaluate the relative power of these factors to detract from the formation of a parliamentary consensus.

The forces behind political problems and solutions are mutually determined: The strength of the institutions is measured relative to the tasks they face. The English institutions of the seventeenth century draw their strength from a parliamentary tradition that stretches back to the signing of the *Magna Carta* in 1215, and from the New Model Army that defeated the King in war and quelled the masses in London. Yet the democratic opposition was weak in 1640 England. The Levellers were never able to rouse the "middling masses," and the Ranters and Diggers barely tried. In contrast, before 1793 the French military forces lacked loyalty and discipline. They were stretched between internal rebellion and external threats. The divided Legislative Assembly, which lacked England's parliamentary tradition, had to mend political rifts in the face of growing economic problems. Had the New Model Army been weaker, the democrats stronger, and the economic problems more pervasive in England, then the English democrats, like the French, may have successfully imposed their solutions outside of Parliament, to the detriment of a parliamentary consensus.

Other Roads to Consensus

The English and French revolutions share broad characteristics. In both crises, depressed wages, increased grain prices, government debt, and religious discontent contributed to revolutionary movements that destroyed the regime.[47] Both countries experienced regicide, followed by military rule, and finally a restoration of the monarchy. Thus, their revolutions share many, but not all, causes; follow similar, but not mirror, paths; and exhibit few analogous outcomes.

Because factors similar to those in England correlated with different outcomes in France, those factors can be ruled out as sufficient for the formation of a parliamentary consensus. Thus, regicide, military rule, and a return to monarchy are all insufficient for the formation of a parliamentary consensus.

The English Revolution was by no means the only event to contribute to the formation of a parliamentary consensus. Other events present good candidates for the solidification of reform through Parliament, most notably the Glorious Revolution. The outcome of the struggle between James II and Parliament in 1688 permanently decreased the power of the monarchy to govern. The Jacobites rose to resist Parliament and failed. Parliament gained power and legitimacy at the expense of the power of the monarch. These events undoubtedly contributed to the formation of a parliamentary consensus.

Historians Douglass North and Barry Weingast, however, argue that the Glorious Revolution was the *first* contributor to such a consensus. They claim that "several failed experiments with alternative political institutions … ushered in the monarchy in 1660. This too

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[47] Lawrence Stone, Causes of the English Revolution (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 27.

failed, resulting in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and its fundamental redesign of the fiscal and government institutions."[48] From this claim, North and Weingast argue that the Glorious Revolution set England on a dependent historical path towards the formation of Parliament as the sole institutional defender of private property—a cornerstone of modern democracy. There are reasons to prefer 1640 to 1688 as the origin of this path dependent argument. Parliament remarkably persisted throughout the "several failed experiments with alternative political institutions" in 1640-1660. That persistence suggests not only previous path dependency but also elite success in suppressing anti-parliamentary movements. The fundamental restriction on the monarchy came in 1649, when the Rump Parliament executed Charles I, not in 1688, when James fled from England. In fact, 1649 helps explain the quick success of the Glorious Revolution—further proof to start there. A causal link from an event to an outcome can be well understood through comparison. North and Weingast do not compare the "fundamental redesign of the fiscal and government institutions" to similar redesigns elsewhere.

Perhaps a more parsimonious explanation than the one provided above would point to the success of the landowners and merchants in the English Revolution. The Revolution permanently removed feudal tenures, restrictions on enclosure, most monopolies and economic controls, and non-commercial foreign policy.[49] The interests of the merchants and landowners that arose out of these changes, however, could have been furthered by a more capital friendly monarch. But, as North and Weingast write, property and Parliament were fatefully united in the 1688 Revolution. The capitalists' preference for parliamentary solutions, however, emerges from 1640; that preference solidifies by 1688.

Christopher Hill believes that the New Model Army "seemed to have saved the social order."[50] It undoubtedly contributed to the pacification of revolutionary England, as it, for example, entered London and, instead of pillaging the city, diffused tension. However, the Army did not begin the formation of a parliamentary consensus. Had Cromwell continued the Putney debates, Parliament could have been dismissed, and the tension created by Agitators within Army ranks could have erupted into open revolt. Elite rejection of further deconstruction of parliamentary structures, followed by those demands' failures outside of Parliament, underlies the formation of the parliamentary consensus.

France also lacks the constitutional tradition that in England extends back to the *Magna Carta*. Did the recognition of parliamentary authority in 1215 put England (and later Britain) on a path to a parliamentary consensus? Perhaps path dependency can be traced back to 1215 (or even earlier, to the Roman invasion in 55 B.C.), but an earlier starting point does not disprove the hypothesis. For the hypothesis to hold, it is enough to prove that the events of 1640-1660 contributed to, but did not wholly determine, the formation of a parliamentary consensus.

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[48] Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, Dec. 1989.
[49] Stone, p. 72.
[50] Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 20.

Finding Parliamentary Consensus

Table 1: Analysis of Extra-parliamentary Impact on Democratic Reform.[51]

Act of Parliament	Democratic impact	Role of extra-parliamentary groups
1829 Catholic Emancipation	Allows Catholics to hold civil office	Major
1832 Reform Act	Increases the franchise by 64 percent	Major
1833 Abolition of Slave Trade Act	Abolishes slave trade within the British Empire	Major
1846 Repeal of the Corn Law	Abolishes protectionist measures against urban civil society	Major
1867 Reform Act	Increases the electorate by 82 percent	Minimal
1870 Education Act	Establishes public school infrastructure	Minimal
1872 Ballot act	Creates the secret ballot	None
1874 Trade Union Act	Eases trade union negotiations	Minimal
1883 Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act	Distinguishes between corrupt and illegal electoral behavior	Minimal
1884 Third Reform Act	Universalizes the household franchise	None
1918 Fourth Reform Act[52]	Extends the vote to men over 21	None

Table 1 shows eleven democratic reforms in England along with the impact of extra-parliamentary groups. The table reveals that extra-parliamentary groups played a decreasing role over time. Four acts of Parliament required major extra-parliamentary support before 1850. After 1850, four acts of Parliament required minimal extra-parliamentary support; three acts required none. The presence of extra-parliamentary support does not necessarily disprove the formation of a parliamentary consensus. Their decreasing role suggests that Parliament and parliamentary groups played an increasingly important role relative to extra-parliamentary groups after the 1850s.

Extra-parliamentary participation often relies on a parliamentary consensus. The Committee for Abolition played a crucial role in pushing through Parliament the 1807 Abolition of Slave Trade Act and the 1833 Abolition of Slavery Act. The Committee used parliamentary petitioning as the main method of democratic reform.[53] The Catholic Association, the main driving force behind the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act, similarly resorted to parliamentary petitioning. The superiority of parliamentary petitioning over other methods (e.g., rioting, striking, etc.) becomes apparent when looking at an extra-parliamentary group that tried both. Chartists began promoting their democratic platform by petitioning the government in 1839.[54] Parliament immediately rejected their radical demands. In response, Chartists organized simultaneous uprisings around the country. Violence erupted between the protestors and the

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[51] The data on extra-parliamentary groups is gathered primarily from Hugh Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy (London: Longman, 2001), pp. 28-78; John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), pp. ix-xv. A "major" role describes an essential effect—that is, without the group's support, the bill would have failed. A "minimal" role describes a contributing effect—that is, the group's support helped, but the argument that it was essential is much harder to make. Groups play "no" role if they did not contribute to the bill's passage at all, or their contributions were highly insignificant at best.

[52] Also known as the Representation of the People Act.

[53] Adam Hochschild, "High Noon in Parliament," Ch. 16, in Bury the Chains (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), pp. 226-238; Cunningham, p. 48.

[54] The Chartists' *People's Charter* had six demands: manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, secret ballot, equal electoral districts, no property qualifications for MPs, and MP salaries. (Cunningham, p. 47.)

police—twenty Chartists were killed, 500 were detained.[55] The movement did not end there, however. Faced with prison and obscurity, the group de-radicalized and returned to parliamentary petitioning. The evolution of this major extra-parliamentary movement shows that, while parliamentary consensus was not always effective, deviations from this method of reform were punished and some extra-parliamentary groups were even coerced to work through Parliament.

The Anti-Corn Law League relied on Parliament to repeal the Corn Law.[56] On the one hand, Richard Cobden, one of the leaders of the League, complained that "the Government was based on corruption and the offspring of vice, corruption, violence, intimidation and bribery." On the other hand, the League resorted to corruption and vice to win seats in the Commons during the 1841 general election.[57] Of the League's leaders, George Wilson became an MP in 1830s, Cobden in 1841, and John Bright in 1843. The League formally became a parliamentary party group.[58] The Anti-Corn Law League clearly understood the power of Parliament. Cobden later remarked, "You speak with a loud voice when you are talking from the floor of the House, and if you have anything to say which hits hard, it is a very long whip and reaches all over the kingdom."[59] It was because the League worked within Parliament, not in spite of it, that they were finally able to repeal the Corn Law in 1846.

The 1870 Education Act further illuminates the evolution of groups from extra-parliamentary to parliamentary status. The National Education League, an extension of the Liberal party, was established in 1869 to campaign for free, compulsory, and non-sectarian schools.[60] After the League successfully lobbied for the passage of the Education Act, the party replaced the League with the National Liberal Federation to "incorporate other Liberal pressure groups,"[61] and to elect MPs. Using the examples of the National Education League and the Anti-Corn Law League, it can be argued that from the late nineteenth century, politics in Britain were properly party politics (with the end of independent MPs). Compared to the Anti-Corn Law League, the Reform League had a much smaller impact on the 1867 Reform Act.[62] The Act became a pillar of British democratization by increasing the size of the electorate by 82 percent.[63] Most accounts privilege elite politics over extra-parliamentary agitation in the story of the Act's passage.[64]

Extra-parliamentary groups had a minimal impact on the passage of the 1872 Ballot Act, which allowed for secret ballots; groups also played a minimal role in passing the 1883 Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, which distinguished between corrupt and illegal electoral behavior.[65] Finally, extra-parliamentary groups played no distinguishable role in the passage of the 1884 Third Reform Act, which universalized household franchise, or the 1918 Representation of the People Act, which extended the vote to all men over 21.[66]

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[55] Hugh Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy (London: Longman, 2001), p. 41.
[56] Introduced in 1815, this protectionist measure imposed duties on imported corn to ease competition for British corn growers. (Cunningham, p. 45.)
[57] Bloy, Marjorie, "The Campaign for the Repeal of the Corn Laws," *A Web of English History*, Aug. 19, 2007, <http://www.historyhome.co.uk/peel/cornlaws/c-laws2.htm >, accessed May. 1, 2008.
[58] Upon their election to Parliament, Bright, Cobden and Wilson formed a group of like-minded MPs with extra-parliamentary support. Thus, the evolution from extra-parliamentary to parliamentary groups was formed. (Heidar, p. 6.)
[59] "The Anti-Corn-Law League," *A Web of English History*.
[60] Cunningham, p. 124.
[61] Ibid.
[62] The Act increased the franchise by 82 percent by giving the vote to every male adult householder living in a borough constituency and male lodgers paying 10 pounds. (John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain.)
[63] Garrard, p. 39.
[64] Cunningham, p. 69.
[65] Cunningham, pp. 104-105.
[66] Ibid, pp. 62, 69.

Extra-parliamentary anti-parliament pressure played a significant role in the passage of the 1832 Reform Act, which increased the franchise by 64 percent. Revolutionary sentiment "hung in the air" as the working class threatened violence.[67] Extra-parliamentary pressure was such that the Duke of Wellington remarked, "It may be relied upon that we shall have a Revolution."[68] Expectations of a divergence of consensus arose, and some MPs mused that public opinion had outgrown "the channels … it has been accustomed to run through."[69] But this pressure did not give rise to any significant extra-parliamentary group. Elite intervention prevented these expectations from materializing. Working class violence did not erupt. Reform was used to suppress radical dissent, while reinforcing the constitution's property-based qualification for political participation.[70]

Elite intervention illuminates the dual nature of the parliamentary consensus. The lack of consensus in France was apparent as groups from above and below attacked the parliamentary structure. The consensus in England at times suffered attacks from the bottom, but elites rescued the consensus from the anger of the masses. The English Revolution suggests the necessity of elite intervention and elite stake in Parliament. The history of French regimes after 1789 suggests that both elite and popular acceptances of a consensus are necessary for parliamentary solutions to persist. When elites pushed reform through parliament, the public grew distrustful of parliament. When parliament successfully addressed public concerns, elites sought to reform the institution of parliament.

The declining impact of extra-parliamentary groups on the passage of democratic reforms suggests the formation of a parliamentary consensus. The evolution of groups' means from non-parliamentary to parliamentary presents further proof of that consensus. Most importantly, by the beginning of the twentieth century, extra-parliamentary groups either played no role in democratic reform or participated in the reform mostly through parliamentary channels. In 1890, the following passage appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*:

> Parliament is King; it is the modern embodiment of the power of the nation; internal attempts to deprive it of its strength are aimed at that very sovereignty of the people which it is the boast of our reformers to have established on a truly democratic basis.[71]

In 1892, *The Times* of London declared democracy to be King in England. Almost 250 years after the elites rejected assaults on the parliamentary structure, the formation of the parliamentary consensus was complete.

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[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid, p. 32.
[69] Ibid, p. 39.
[70] John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), p. 39.
[71] "House of Commons Foiled," *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1890, p. 287., quoted in Jesse Macy, "The English Crown as an Aid to Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol. 7, No. 3, Sept., 1892), p. 483.

Table 2: Omitted Democratic Reforms.[72]

Act of Parliament	Democratic impact
1689 Bill of Rights	Limits royal power
1689 Toleration Acts	Limits power of Anglican courts
1824 Repeal of Anti-Combination Laws	Legalizes trade unions
1828 Repeal of Test and Corporation Acts	Allows Dissenters to hold public office
1850 Irish Franchise Act	Increases franchise from 45,000 to 163,000
1850 Small Tenements Act	Extends the franchise to tenants (renters)
1854 Corrupt Practices Act	Attempts to define corrupt electoral practices
1858 Jews Relief Act	Admits Jews to Parliament
1859 act	Abolishes property qualification for MPs
1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act	Legalizes peaceful picketing; decriminalizes trade union activity
1894 Local Government Act	Establishes elected district councils
1907 Qualification of Women Act	Allows women to stand as municipal councils

The extra-parliamentary groups analyzed here suffer from selection bias—those that did not further democratization, in terms of the franchise and egalitarian reform, were omitted. Because many omitted groups could have used non-parliamentary means (drawing inspiration from Guy Fawkes instead of Richard Cobden) the evidence is lopsided. Even if all the omitted groups advocated non-parliamentary solutions, however, their failure would still contribute to a case for parliamentary consensus. Also omitted is a study of extra-parliamentary influence on non-democratic acts.

Table 1 does not provide the full dataset of democratic reforms, and does not analyze the role extra-parliamentary groups to the fullest extent. Table 2 provides a list of twelve democratic reforms for further analysis. The dataset of unexamined reforms in which extra-parliamentary movements participated is large enough to disprove the hypothesis. However, the analysis in this paper captures the largest extra-parliamentary movements. Even if most democratic reforms listed in Table 2 required extra-parliamentary support through non-parliamentary channels, the relative smallness of these groups would mitigate the result. Further, seventeenth century English history suggests that small extra-parliamentary groups are unlikely candidates for successful solutions.

Concluding Discussion

Did the Parliamentary elites' successful rejection of democratic challenges during the English Revolution contribute to the formation of a political consensus around petitioning Parliament as the means of democratic reform? A better proof of this hypothesis would compare the English Revolution to other revolutions to eliminate insufficient factors. All factors of those revolutions would be analyzed to eliminate those factors, the existence of which is not necessary for the formation of a parliamentary consensus. The consensus would be ascertained by measuring the power of parliamentary parties, all extra-parliamentary groups, elite rhetoric, and revolutionary sentiment. These factors would be compared across different countries to control for political idiosyncrasies. Even then, the hypothesis would hold true only to the extent that institutional path dependency holds true. The causal link between the English Revolution and later gradualism requires path dependency.

[72] John Garrard, Democratisation in Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), pp. ix-xv.

The proof presented in this paper is far from perfect. Only two revolutions are compared, so the factors these revolutions share cannot be ruled out as necessary. Only some factors in the revolutions are compared, so factors unique to these revolutions may have contributed to the formation of the consensus. Further, this proof does not include the measure of parliamentary groups, elite rhetoric, or control for factors unique to England's political environment.

However, these shortcomings do not warrant the argument's dismissal. Even if other factors in the English Revolution contributed to the formation of a consensus, this paper makes an important statement about the affect of elite action on parliamentary consensus. Even if much unexamined evidence speaks against such consensus, the examined evidence suggests elite impact on the attempts to form a consensus. In the question of elite influence on the institutionalization of Parliament, this paper both suggests a direction and takes the first step in that direction.

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***John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights.* By David S. Reynolds.**
(New York: Vintage Books, pp. 592. Cloth, $35.00)

Accompanying America's troubled attempt to cope with the existence of slavery in its past is the examination and interpretation of those figures who broke widely-accepted moral and legal codes in order to hasten the end of the "peculiar institution." Perhaps no other American figure presents as complex and difficult a persona for historians to interpret as the famous abolitionist John Brown, known for his part in leading the murder of proslavery settlers in Kansas as well as his leadership of the insurrection at Harpers Ferry, Virginia.

In time for the sesquicentennial of the Harpers Ferry incident, David Reynolds has written an excellent interpretative cultural biography of Brown which attempts to reevaluate the abolitionist. Moving away from former studies on Brown, Reynolds attempts to take into context the events of the time and perhaps more importantly, what he considers Brown's "Puritan" heritage. As Reynolds notes, previous biographies either label Brown as a faultless hero deserving of sainthood or a fanatic whose sanity must be questioned, lending much importance to this new, more balanced work.

This "Puritan" heritage, which at first might seem to be merely a simplistic indication of Brown's Calvinism and piety, is explained through the first chapters of Reynolds' work. Reynolds successfully builds the case for historians to consider Brown and his father Owen as "Puritan," tying back not only to the Massachusetts Bay Colony (to which the family claimed ancestry), but to the English Civil War and the figure of Oliver Cromwell. (164-165) The reader, through Reynolds' narrative, may find Brown to be a sort of anomaly upon the period's religious landscape. Unlike his contemporaries, he did not seem to be swayed by the theological trends moving away from Calvinism, which affected how he later considered his role in history. Reynolds' work skillfully sketches the life of Brown as an individual who fell outside of popular religious persuasions. Perhaps this lack of categorization explains the "uncomfortable" nature by which historians have considered Brown.

Reynolds' major argument - and a core point of controversy - lies in the assertion that Brown's violence stimulated the outbreak of the Civil War. While this fact cannot be denied, it is Reynolds' suggestion that Brown sparked the war at the "right time" which has stirred the scholarly realm in recent years. Reynolds claims Brown as "a positive agent for change," (443) noting that the Civil War was inevitable in the nation's history. Brown, Reynolds suggests, sparked the Civil War as a conflict over slavery before the nation's population or access to technology doubled or perhaps even tripled the amount killed at the battlefields of Antietam, Shiloh, or Gettysburg. (442)

Reynolds' work is an important contribution, especially considering the author's ability to consider cultural influences in the life of a controversial figure. While the author is certainly partial toward his subject, his bias comes from careful historical analysis of a difficult figure to examine. Reynolds successfully interprets Brown through a thorough examination of major cultural, political, and personal issues present in the abolitionist's life.

Joshua D. Fahler
Kent State University

***MoonPie: Biography of an Out-of-This-World Snack*. By David Magee.**
(University Press of Florida, 2006 Pp. 182. Hardcover, $19.95.)

Throughout the history of modern food production, few commercialized treats have stood the test of time. Setting a unique standard for delectable snacks, MoonPies have proven worthy of such high esteemed notoriety in their short time of existence. Amazingly enough, Chattanooga Bakery enjoyed all this achievement while yet only utilizing a regional grassroots advertising campaign. In this biography of "The MoonPie" author David Magee explores the history, impact and personal testaments that this lunar-shaped snack has created not only within Southern culture, but around the world.

During the early years of the twentieth century a small bakery in Chattanooga, Tennessee produced regionalized cakes, candies and pastry items. In 1917 coal miners in Kentucky sought a snack that was filling, would not stale and was affordable, thus the MoonPie was born.(31) Soon thereafter the Chattanooga Bakery started producing the legendary chocolate cakes with marshmallow filling for a cost of five cents. This price remained the same until the introduction of the Double Decker MoonPies following World War II.(53) Over the course of nearly one hundred years, MoonPies have been in domestic and international markets and enriched the lives of anyone to whom these yummy cakes fall prey.

The development of the MoonPie tradition is due to its unique sweet taste, affordable cost, and word of mouth. No formal advertising campaign was used until just recently, and quality has never been a question in nearly a century of production. New products were unveiled as society evolved with the times, but the same goodness and guiding principles characterized the success of the family business. Nearly one million MoonPies are made everyday, and each is handcrafted with the same touch that produced the first ones in 1917. They are sold in mom and pop stores, as well as commercial giants. Millions of treat seekers have taken this original taste and its associated memories to the ends of the globe and exposed the beacon of satisfaction as found only inside a bite of this snack cake.

David Magee uses personal testimony to convey the real impact that this treat has had in the development of modern day American culture. Stories of daily trips to grocers, innovative ideas of consumption, and the memories generated with family and friends, all center around a craving for MoonPies. Throughout the story Magee paints the picture that this snack has the power to paint the most poignant memories. These scrumptious slices of heaven are solely responsible for first kisses, mending relational wounds, congratulatory reinforcement, childhood family bonding and turning points in stressful days.

MoonPie: Biography of an Out-of-This-World Snack, is well written and certainly creates the craving for these tasty treats while reading. The effective use of personal testimony and the historical sequence allows the book to relate to any audience. Magee draws the reader in by telling a compelling story of hardship, successes, and legacy. A very informative and delightful read, *MoonPie: Biography of an Out-of-This-World Snack,* will satisfy anyone looking for a good book to learn more about the inner workings of the Southern frame of mind.

Robert Mason
Appalachian State University

Moral Geography: Maps, Missionaries, and the American Frontier.
By Amy DeRogatis.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 256 pp. Paper, $30.50)

When John Shipherd set out to the town of Elyria, Ohio, in 1831, he carried with him not only vestiges of his New York home, but also his interpretation of a heavenly city, manifested when he converted this growing town in the still-virgin frontier. Two years later, with a failed attempt to convert the town looming in his memory, he successfully founded Oberlin Colony and Collegiate Institute in the interest of creating a representation of God's Kingdom in the region of Northeast Ohio known as the Connecticut Western Reserve.

The town became an example, according to Amy DeRogatis, of a Puritan-inspired attempt to create a New Jerusalem. It flourished in spite of the criticism which the community and college attracted as a result of the radical theological and antislavery leanings of its founders, which fell outside of the realm of "ordinary" Presbyterian and Congregational religious life. Oberlin attracted students from across the country to its seminary, welcomed women and African-Americans, and became a voice on the frontier for the abolition of slavery.

In *Moral Geography*, DeRogatis seeks to understand how implicit religious meaning was communicated through the geographic organization of the frontier. Using Oberlin's founding as a planned community as an example, DeRogatis recounts the history of other cities and towns in the Western Reserve which were purposefully modeled after settlers' constructions of an ideal society. These constructions were an earthly representation of what the settlers believed to be God's Kingdom. This guides DeRogatis' study, which is interested in "the relationship between religion and space," as she successfully conveys the significance of a moral ideal to geographic modeling.[1] According to DeRogatis, this relationship is at the roots of attempts by 19th century settlers from New England to map new areas. Their constructions of these areas, DeRogatis claims, became reality the moment the decision to settle a given region was made. Upon settlement, missionary labors would be met with physical toil in their attempt to create cities and towns in the West which were as well-founded morally as they were physically attractive.
Generalists or other scholars whose interests fall outside the realm of American religious history will appreciate DeRogatis' successful attempt to show how less tangible ideas were sometimes subconsciously manifest through the concept of place. It is through this cross-disciplinary approach that DeRogatis successfully makes her case, blending religious history into the study of cultural geography against a backdrop of early American history. Those interested in religious history will appreciate DeRogatis' new approach to studying an often researched topic. By successfully integrating the concept of place into her thesis, the author examines a different perspective on how these settlers understood not only their earthly existence, but, to use a phrase heavily utilized by Robert Abzug, their "cosmic timelines." (4)

Some minor criticisms must be voiced, especially DeRogatis' mention of Charles G. Finney being "Arminian," reflective of the author's tendency not to delve into the theological and philosophical beliefs of her subjects. While this tendency is understandable and the complaint is minor as it does not form the basis of her thesis, Finney's labeling is questionable, especially considering the large amount of dialogue - and general confusion - in trying to describe exactly who he was as a theologian.

Minor complaints aside, Amy DeRogatis has managed to deliver a startlingly original argument in a well researched field. Perhaps what we can learn most from the author's new

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perspective are ways by which we can uncover how "ordinary" people during this period constructed meaning in their lives. An understanding of this will prove beneficial, as it will allow us to further understand the incentives behind the great experimentation which changed not only the religious but the social and political landscapes of early America.

Joshua D. Fahler
Kent State University

Remembering the Great Depression in the Rural South. By Kenneth J. Bindas. (University Press of Florida. Gainesville, FL. pp. 184. Cloth $59.95)

The Great Depression is usually described as a time when people were waiting in soup lines, jumping off buildings, and struggling to work and eat. In *Remembering the Great Depression in the Rural South*, Kenneth Bindas moves beyond the repetitive and predictive accounts in most history books, and instead weaves together over 600 oral histories and interviews to construct a cohesive, personal, and thoughtful study of the Great Depression.

The rural South was most affected by the Great Depression, having suffered from low wages and low crop prices long before the 1930s. If Southerners were lucky enough to have a job, they worked as sharecroppers, tenant farmers, or factory workers, never making enough money to save, but enough to pay for their home and food for their families. Others, who were less fortunate, were forced to beg, train hop, or look for monthly or daily work, making very little money and rarely having enough to feed their families or pay their debt. However, even those with very little knew they were lucky and tried to scrape together a small meal for anyone who asked. As many interviewed by Bindas and his students' recall, "those were the good old days, but those good old days were pretty rough times."(3)

With little money and a dying hope, people of the rural South had little to look forward to, until 1932. As interviewed one man remarked, if Hoover had been reelected "everybody in the south would have starved to death."(37) Instead, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president and many interviewed remembered their excitement because "he had ideas and things" that were going to help the people.(37) FDR's New Deal programs and fireside chats gave the people of the South "a ray of hope."(42) His fireside chats utilized oral tradition, popular in the South, allowing the people to trust the president and feel as if they could make a difference. Along with hope and motivation, the president provided jobs and money for workers to take back to their families. Even those interviewed without a direct connection to the Civilian Conservation Corps or the Works Progress Administration had a story of the benefits the programs brought to the people and the country.

The interviews and analysis in Bindas's section on consumption make the Depression and its consequences more human, because most know what it is to want something and not be able to buy it. With these memories, Bindas paints a picture of the Depression in a way no textbook can.

The latter half of the book is what makes it so impressive. Bindas takes the interviews and molds them into a story about daily life, hopes and dreams, and privation. The Depression becomes real, not just some section in a history book that everyone knows about, but a story of regular people going through hard times and surviving. By grouping oral histories and memories into categories of privation, consumption, politics, and daily life, Bindas is able to analyze the interviews, without talking over those who lived through the Great Depression and have something genuine to say.

Alison Shea
Appalachian State University